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Abstract  
A growing number of epidemiology studies have determined significant rates of 
psychotic experiences throughout general/non-clinical populations.  Typically, the 
term used to classify these phenomena is ‘Psychotic Like Experiences’ described in 
terms of aberrations, attenuated psychosis or magical ideation.  In accordance with 
Social Constructionist theory, it is expected that there are various interpretations and 
applications of this knowledge.  These range from identification of a psychosis 
phenotype in order to ascertain those at risk of transition into psychotic illness; to an 
anti-separation, a normalisation approach whereby the existence of psychotic 
experiences is portrayed as integral to the human condition, ‘as part of ordinary 
mental life’.   The former is promoted as a route to develop early intervention and 
prevention health programmes; the latter as part of an anti-stigma and social inclusion 
agenda.  However, there are few qualitative studies into the lives of those living with 
PLEs beyond the ‘professional, statutory health domain’ and certainly none that 
attempts to explore the conceptualisations, the social impact and subsequent 
discourses created by those living with PLEs specifically in Ireland.  As part of Social 
Constructionist theory language and discourse are the primary source that shape the 
human world where social objects such as psychotic experiences are deliberated.  
Through the deployment of discourse analysis this thesis sets out to explore discursive 
devices that arise from texts created by a number of participants living with PLEs in 
Ireland.  Discourse Analysis can help participant groups develop their discourse 
through consciousness raising including the identification of compromises and 
contradictions that destabilise social agendas - that of normalisation.  The 
identification of discursive repertoires revealed participant positioning and a number 
of compromises and dilemmas.  Summarily, these were found to be:  The continuation 
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of social exclusion through Othering; internalization of a social phenomenon; the 
individualization of a universal experience; accountability and responsibility and 
absorption of neo-liberal ideals.  I conclude with suggestions to enhance a truth claim, 
or ‘candidate for knowledge’ through the symbiosis of knowledge, experience and 
expertise from within the very thing they resist – the meta/grand narratives of 
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Chapter One - Introduction  
There is a wide divergence on estimated prevalence of psychosis in Ireland.  Bowe  
(2012) estimates that 75,000 people are affected by psychosis, whereas DETECT 
(2012), an early intervention service in Ireland for people who are at risk of 
developing psychotic disorder estimate that “Schizophrenia and other psychoses, 
affect over 120,000 people in Ireland” (p9).  However, both DETECT and Bowe do 
not describe how they came about these figures.  Noteworthy is that both sources fail 
to qualify their estimates in terms of whether or not all individuals captured have ever 
been formally diagnosed with psychotic disorder and whether or not this accounts for 
life-time prevalence or the incidence of psychosis at a given time¹.  This lack of 
clarity is indicative of the ambiguity, divisive nature and complexity involved in 
establishing an objective measure that captures psychotic experiences.   
International research on PLEs in general populations have reported incident and 
prevalence rates ranging from 1- 17.5%, with a systematic review reporting a median 
prevalence rate of 5% (van Os et al., 2009).  
 
Given the lack of consensus and clarity on estimates of the presence of PLEs in 
Ireland, yet taking into consideration international studies on the subject, a reasonable 
determination can be made that Ireland, has significant incident rates of PLEs in the 
general population (more on this in chapter 2).   
 
Following the assumptive remark above and to put psychosis in a social context, 
Johns et al (2014) and Boumans et al (2017) note that it is not necessary nor an   
inevitability for people living with PLEs to require ‘professional’ support.  This 
indicates that a significant number of people living with psychotic experiences do not 
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come to the attention of statutory mental health services.  There is also evidence that 
rates of psychiatric disorders in populations (including psychosis) is more common 
than originally believed, prone to significant underreporting (Moffitt et al., 2010).  
Shortcomings in data analysis, data collection and stigma attached to the disorders are 
given as reasons for underreporting.  The observations hither referred signifies a lack 
of engagement and meagre knowledge base with/about non-clinical populations living 
with psychotic experiences.  Psychosis as a conceptual ‘template’ representative of 
patterns of human behaviours and experiences has historically been propelled into a 
controversial social space where it is coupled with ‘madness’; characterised in terms 
of significations of the fragility of the human mind, an escape from the constraints of 
rationality, of ‘psychic’ objection to societal oppression emanating from modern 
rationality, or a sign of incoherence regards inferences and incompatibility with 
normal experiences (Stompe and Ritter, 2009).  Psychosis as a single entity, 
categorised and rationalised has become increasingly questionable, deliberated, 
challenged and opposed (Boyle., 2000; Fee., 2000); (see more in the succeeding 
chapter 2).  By way of example, there is a wide range of social variance as to whether 
or not the primary basis from which we should approach psychosis should be that of 
health (illness or disease), society, culture or spiritualism (Read, Mosher, and Bentall, 
2004; British Psychological Society, 2014).   
________________________________________________________________ 
¹ Population studies have found life-time prevalence rates for psychotic disorders, specifically Schizophrenia and Bipolar Type  
1, to exceed 3% (Perälä  et al., 2007).  (Prevalence rates typically refer to the number of individuals identified at some stage in life 
with psychotic disorder).  The population of Ireland stood at 4.58m in 2011 (Central Statistics Office Ireland, 2012).  3% of this 
population equates to 137, 400 individuals.  Based on figures provided by Bowe and DETECT a reasonable conclusion could be 
that these are at best crude estimations, representative of prevalence rates in Ireland for people who have, through time, been 
identified with psychotic disorders, and/or that they are potentially significant underestimations.  Either way, they do not seem to 
represent incident rates of psychosis in Ireland which include people who do not receive a diagnoses of psychotic disorder.  
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The contested space where disputes arise, depend very much on diversity of 
interpretations and representations which are in turn governed by the availability and 
usage of language.  It is this contested space, from the perspective of those living with 
psychotic experiences who live outside/beyond statutory mental health services that 
this thesis sets out to explore.  Participants sought for this study comprise of 
individuals within Ireland who live independently in the community with PLEs, yet, 
have not necessarily received a diagnosis of psychotic disorder.  The limited 
engagement with this cohort and lack of knowledge about their interpretations, 
representations and personal accounts leaves an incomplete picture in understanding 
challenges faced in finding social acceptance as a consequence of social biases and 
acts of social exclusion directed at the psychotic experience (Boumans et al., 2017; 
Lawrence, Jones and Cooper, 2010)  To date, such challenges have not been studied at 
the levels of language and discourse.     
 
 
The term Psychotic Like Experience (PLE) has been used to capture a range of 
experiences, similar to clinically defined symptoms, found throughout/within general 
populations.  Psychotic Like Experiences include perceptual aberrations and magical 
ideation (van Os et al, 2009).  The former can be compared to hallucinatory events, 
the latter similar to a delusionary experience.  Experiences at this level tend not to 
cause any significant impairment or distress (Linscott and van Os, 2010) and can even 
be life enhancing (Jackson and Fulford, 2002).    Those who are not unduly distressed 
by PLEs tend not to come to psychiatric attention (Fonseca-Pedrero et al., 2011).     In 
other words, their experiences do not typically become clinically defined.  For 
instance, one study carried out on the Irish population with 11 to 13-year old children 
found that 20% report verbal hallucinations (Kelleher et al., 2010).  For the majority 
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of children, the experience disappears as they grow older (Escher et al., 2002) 
supporting a continuum of psychosis hypothesis, below.    
  
Descriptions of psychosis include hallucinations, delusions and a variety of cognitive 
deficits (Andreasen and Black, 2006).  Over recent years studies have shown 
psychotic experiences to be commonly distributed across a variety of populations 
indicating a continuum of psychosis (Hanssen et al., 2005; Rössler et al., 2007, 2015; 
Unterrassner et al., 2017; Verdoux and van Os, 2002; van Os, 2003).  These range 
from the benign, and often short lived - described by Chapman and Chapman (1980) 
as “Attenuated versions of psychosis”, (or more specifically put ‘Exceptional 
Experiences’ that include: “Odd beliefs, dissociative anomalous perceptions, and 
hallucinatory anomalous perceptions.”; Unterrassner et al., 2017, p1) - to a 
graduation of experiences that potentially become overwhelming, disruptive and 
enduring – a process defined by van Os et al (2009) as psychopathological alteration.  
Ascertaining which individuals will progress from the benign lower end of the 
psychotic spectrum to that which becomes fractious and personally disruptive 
(potentially involving clinical intervention) has been argued to be problematic and 
challenging (Jackson, 2001; Lawrie et al., 2010).  
Psychosis (and by association PLEs) continues to be a disputed concept, filled with 
inconsistencies and conflictual subject positions (Burgy, 2008; Smith, 1998).  It is 
therefore open to a variety of interpretations and ongoing constructions which are 
played out in every-day discourses:  
   
“Different models derive from different constructions of the world and events with it, 
but none is ‘true’ in an absolute sense.  There is nothing ‘truer’ about assorted 
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neurotransmitters that there is about intrapsychic processes, inner child or various 
deities”  
(Perkins 1999; cited in Repper and Perkins, 2003, p.23)  
  
It is the cogent use of language in the context of PLEs, in the face of the above 
acceptance of plural and complex understanding, that I now turn to.      
      
1.1 The persuasive power of language  
Language, as Anderson and Goolishian (1988) would have it, is something human 
beings “live in … in the same way fish live in water” (p56).  Language is therefore an 
important medium to study, as a ‘social substance’ from which meaning and various 
strategies for living (eg; coping with illness) can be postulated (de Guzman et al, 
2009).  Foucault describes how language can become an impetus to influence 
behaviour, used to “shape, guide or affect the conduct of a person or persons”. 
(Gordon, 1991, p5).  Certain discourses raise awareness of risks to health encouraging 
behaviours that are preventative in nature, in some cases driven by political 
determinates (Finer, Thurén and Tomson, 1998; Porter, 2007; Walsh et al., 2008).  
The person becomes a source of knowledge and ‘subjectified’, in that s/he may find 
themselves portrayed as deficient, in need of remedial intervention (Walsh et al., 
2008).  For example, self-help literature engages language that can induce a sense of 
self-mastery and self-improvement in one’s life (Effing, 2009).  Rhetorical devices are 
activated drawing the reader into a world of metaphors full of mechanistic 
connotations eg; stress as life’s enemy to be defused; a flow of information to be dealt 
with through the ‘mental computer’ (Brown, 1999).  Texts can provide powerful 
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discourses able to influence individual comprehension and associated coping with a 
particular human state.  Brown (1999) found self-help literature on stress to include 
constructions of stress and related “regimens” conjuring up the “art of making 
oneself” or “realizing one’s full potential” (p35) in order to achieve a ‘product’ (the 
self) engaging in a wholly technical activity.  Levels of influence are exposed, 
designed to encourage people to relate to their experiences in a certain manner, giving 
direction as to how they might learn to live with them.  Even though such discourses 
have been found to be potentially counter therapeutic they continue to be accepted 
wielding power and influence over the individual (Haeffel, G. 2010; Cook et al., 
2012).  Participants for this study will have an awareness of at least some discourses 
that will impact on how they interpret, intercept and how they live with PLEs.  Levels 
of participant awareness, influence and impact of various discourse on PLEs is 
significant to this study helping to understand discursive constructions at interview.        
 
1.2 Discourse, objectivity and psychosis  
Discourse is a loosely bound concept involving production and comprehension of 
language.  This compromises language in use at a micro level, for example what 
individuals are doing with their speech (Cameron, 2013); to a macro level where 
dominance over ways of describing aspects of the world exists (Ogden, 2002).  The 
former involves performances that allows individuals to position themselves in relation 
to social objects; the latter involves practices “that systematically form the objects of 
which we speak” (Foucault, 1972, p49).  To simplify further, discourses are units of 
text (written, spoken) socially constructed and socially informed, that aim to explain 
and persuade.  Macro discourses permeate discourse generated at the individual, micro 
level (Ogden, 2002) and therefore influence how we tend to talk about aspects of the 
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world.  The effects and consequences of discourse is studied through discourse analysis 
which considers the context that allows or inhibits certain discourses to gain social 
purchase.  As part of understanding the context that allows a dominant discourse to exist 
around psychotic experiences, I begin describing some of the social and historical 
factors that govern the way we measure and therefore apprehend this human experience.        
   
Traditionally, the dominant research paradigm from which major mental health 
problems (including psychosis) has operated under is within the tradition of positivism, 
a philosophical system that regards methodologies of a reductionist kind, such as 
epidemiological studies and the causative effects of genetics, above and beyond those 
that are of a sociological, qualitative nature (Kutney, 2006; Thomas, Bracken and  
Yasmeen, 2007).  This includes statistical and quantitative methods that rely heavily on 
‘facts’ that are observable and quantifiable (Weaver and Olson, 2006) playing down the 
significance of meaning, morals, values and belief systems that are engaged when 
people with major mental health problems come to interpret and understand associated 
experiences (Bracken and Thomas, 2001; Bracken and Thomas 2005).  Simply put, 
positivism tends to look objectively at lives lived - a paradigm that Bracken et al (2012) 
term ‘Technological’.  These methodologies can for instance, be deployed to try and 
determine the frequency and intensity of psychotic experiences in the general 
population using the continuum model of psychosis as a theoretical framework to 
hypothesise transitions to psychotic illness (Yung et al., 2009; Kelleher and Cannon,  
2011; Binbay et al., 2012; Nelson, Fusar-Poli and Yung, 2012).  A growing number of 
qualitative studies have been carried out to facilitate understanding of psychotic 
experiences from the first-person perspective (Boydell et al., 2010; McCarthy-Jones et 
al., 2012).  Few, however, have captured these experiences by studying the 
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construction and functionality of language in providing accounts of psychotic 
experiences, particularly in relation to social resources at the person’s disposal and 
how these are utilised to provide credible accounts (Crowe and Alavi, 1999; Hamilton 
and Manias, 2006).  One study based on the above approach is Harper (1996) who 
examined discourses on paranoia from the first person and dominant (mainly 
psychiatric) institutional perspectives.  The author found that constructions served 
particular political interests.  For instance, one consequence was that scientific 
explanations offered by clinicians (pertaining to pathology) obscured the variable 
nature of discourse closing off or discrediting alternative accounts.  ‘Objective 
scientific facts’ that positivism relies upon are power laden and persuasive.  They can 
and do trump first person evaluations and descriptions, influencing social and political 
landscapes (for instance linking health and risk, justifying state sanctioned 
institutionalisation and coercive practices toward the psychotic person; Sashidharan 
and Saraceno, 2017).  This has alienating consequences levelled at self-experience:  
 
“ the first-person perspective, the views, positions and experiences of persons in 
distress, who in the dominant paradigm are treated as objects of expert discourses 
and actions, which define, classify and intervene in the experience of distress, 
imposing predetermined scientific and professional concepts, which are foreign to 
experience itself.”   
(Georgaca, 2013, p407).  
 
Georgaca may have a point, but discourses are never static and those directly under 
their influence have been shown to counter, resist or/and construct their own ‘version 
of events’ (see for example reference to Intervoice and Recovery chapter 2).   
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Resistance to the orthodoxy of the day, can uncover acts of protectionism against a 
particular concept and/or practice.  Resistance is not straight forward though.  It is 
capillary like, involving a network of social relations.  One can never have full control 
over a discourse, its effects, the direction it takes, the transformations that may result; 
nor does a discourse sit neatly in opposition to another.  The “Discourse we are in is 
often a matter of negotiation, contestation, and “hybridity”, involving a complexity of 
players, ‘thoughts, words, deeds, bodies, tools, and objects” (Gee, 2008, p182).  
Resistance, at the individual level is revealed through discursive use of social 
resources, positioning and identity formation that takes place during social exchanges, 
in particular among persons who seek legitimacy and social recognition (Andreouli, 
2010).   With this in mind, first person reporting of psychosis has become increasingly 
significant for a number of researchers, activists and practitioners seeking to 
acknowledge, appreciate and promote the lived experience as a stimulus for social 
change (Parker et al., 1997; Georgaca, 2013).  
In the context of this thesis, the importance of language as a transformative medium is 
of great significance.  Studying language in use can reveal issues of power and 
influence at work, such as consequences of historical and dominant discourses bearing 
down on persons directly affected (van Dijk, 2008).   It also provides us with 
momentary glimpses into the linguistic performances involved (such as adaptive 
processes) in order to maintain a credible identity in the midst of social indifference.  
Therefore, studying language in use can reveal how: “people may resist the way they 
are positioned by others, as subordinates or as members of a group they do not wish 
to be identified with” (Cameron, 2013, p178).  This of course relies on qualitative 
methodology beyond positivist assumptions, capable of capturing and interpreting 
language as a purposeful tool.  
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This study is of an exploratory and descriptive nature.  It applies qualitative 
methodology to apprehend and make sense of discourse in relation to psychotic 
experiences with a number of individuals residing in Ireland who live with PLES 
outside/beyond statutory mental health services.  This includes those who at some 
stage have been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder and likely ‘used’ statutory 
mental health services; and others who have never received a psychiatric diagnosis 
who likely never engaged statutory mental health services.  The fundamental inclusion 
criteria for this study, regardless of receiving a psychiatric diagnoses or experience of 
statutory mental health services is that participants self-declare as having experienced 
psychotic experiences and are ‘successfully’ living with PLEs in their respective 
community (see Chapter 3, 3.20 for more on participant criteria).  Successful living 
with psychotic experiences combined with participants assertion that they live with 
PLEs without professional support indicates that they are not part of a distinct 
psychiatric population but belong to general society (Lawrence, Jones and Cooper, 
2010; Boumans et al, 2017). Further, studies as already alluded to above and further 
described in Chapter 2 demonstrates that psychotic experiences are distributed 
throughout general populations.  This gives additional credence to the claim that the 
participant group for this study are not to be marked socially or communally 
distinctive.  Related to the latter is that there is ample evidence that persons who live 
with psychotic experiences, in particular those who live outside/beyond mental health 
services, believe them to be within the range of normal human experiences (often seen 
as adaptive strategies), seek social acceptance preferring not to be seen as 
significantly different from others in general society (see for example 2.2 Chapter 2).  
For reasons given, I therefore contend that the participant group sought for this study 
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belong to general society and believe that participants would concur with this 
categorisation.     
        
Qualitative data was collected, firstly from a self-assessment questionnaire, followed 
by a one-to-one audio taped interview.  Interview data was transcribed and analysed 
using discourse analysis as described by Potter and Whetherwell, (2007).  Discourse 
analysis enables the examination of linguistic (discursive) practices that appear during 
conversation involving: “the construction and reflection of social realities through 
actions that invoke identity, ideology, belief, and power.” (Young, 2008, p1).  
Discourse analysis is not concerned with language structures such as rules and 
formation of grammar, but the larger unit of text where meaning is created, the 
context with which it is constructed considered; where language is understood in 
terms of social action and performance.  It considers the interrelationship between 
language and society (Slembrouck, 2003).  As with Brown (1999) and self-help 
literature, discourse analysis considers the impact of social influences on the 
generation of text eg; the use of available discourses on psychotic experiences.    
  
Discourse analysis is ideal in revealing participant’s use of and reliance on social 
(collaborative) resources; the discursive practices that influence positioning, coping 
and relating with regards PLEs.  Attention will be given to construction of accounts 
by studying language in use and discursive resources the individual engages to 
position and socially situate themselves.  Discourse analysis will be utilised to achieve 
an understanding of the nature of discourse under construction, the challenges therein 
including the identification of nuances, inconsistencies, contradictions, compromises.  
Particular attention will be given to repertoires as part of discursive practices, as:   
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“available symbolic resources which particular individuals or groups can draw on in 
their attempt to make sense of their own specific situation and construct a viable 
identity”, (Burman and Parker, 1993, p95).    
   
It is hoped that by studying the construction of accounts through the functionality and 
application of language, including resources referred to, that there would be potential 
to open up dialogical spaces to help create new discourses around psychotic 
experiences.    
  
Willig (1999) suggests that the process of conducting a discourse analytic study can 
be used either “therapeutically”, as a way of shifting participants’ subjectivities 
through reflexively examining their positioning, or as a form of consciousness raising, 
where participants can discern the ways in which they have been constrained by 
certain discourses. In this way, socially oppressed and/or marginalized groups can 
benefit from discourse studies, by exploring and revealing the subtle ways in which 
they have been subjugated by dominant symbolic systems and practices (Willig, 
1999).  That said, this study is starting from a point that the participant group is 
relatively empowered (see methodology chapter), living ‘successfully’ with their 
psychotic experiences, able to provide self-assured accounts of their experiences. 
However, they may unknowingly produce text that are equivalent to or correspond 
with the very systems and practices they oppose.   This thesis sets out to explore the 
extent with which this occurs and the effects of discourse created by participants at 
interview and its consequences.       
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 1.3 A Reflexive note  
Before proceeding it is worth noting that the author (referred to in first person terns 
from here on in) has personal experience in the subject matter.  I have self-experience 
of PLEs and for approximately 20 years been involved in what is described by some 
as the ‘Survivor Movement’ or the ‘Consumer Movement’ - a social movement 
primarily consisting of psychiatric patients and ex-patients seeking to improve the 
social status of people with mental health problems and influence statutory services 
encouraging liberal practices through advocacy, petitioning and lobbying (Oaks, 
2006; Rissmillar and Rismillar, 2006).  A major driving force behind the ‘movement’ 
was to achieve social acceptance of psychiatric symptoms as part of normal human 
experience.       
  
Following the above, I will spend the remainder of this chapter summarising what has 
informed and motivated my own positioning on PLEs; what has led me to conduct this 
study with reference to positioning and reflexivity.     
  
1.4 Motivating factors and the journey to positioning  
Discourse analysis is not so much attentive toward content and information found 
within text, but the context and interactions between various bodies that inform and 
influence the discursive nature of the text. It is therefore important for me to discuss 
my own positioning as anyone involved in conversation becomes part of the discourse 
created.  It follows that my input becomes part of the analysis.    
  
Specifically, positioning:   
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‘considers that all interaction is discursive or narrative; and, secondly, because it 
understands that this is a changing, fragmented and absolutely contextual 
phenomenon.’   
(Tirado and Gálvez, 2007).    
  
My influence on text generated may be blurred; interactions can be woven or blend 
into the text which are in danger of being overlooked, taken as sole productions of the 
research participant.  The construction of face to face discourse should be taken as 
‘Situated activity’, something created between persons, at a given moment in time, its 
course and production unforeseen: ‘never something based and maintained a priori’ 
(Tirado and Gálvez, 2007).  The presence of the author, my level of interaction 
impacting the discursive construction of text created during interview requires 
attention.          
My journey involved institutional settings where I was treated for a psychiatric 
disorder, use of day care facilities and community support provided by mental health 
professionals over a period of approximately 14 years (1990-2004).  During this 
period, and beyond, I conversed with people with mental health problems who were 
disgruntled with mental health services - in particular, where they felt their human 
rights were breached; their autonomy threatened; being subject to coercive and 
condescending practices.  The power of psychiatric diagnoses appeared to be a 
constant component that allowed these breaches to transpire ie; being diagnosed 
mentally ill assumed the individual (patient) a site of risk, having difficulty/incapacity 
to make decisions.   Despite the level of discontent and protestation, there was an 
inability and/or reluctance for these individuals to move beyond psychiatric services.  
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There appeared to be objections and resistance to the authority of psychiatry on the 
one hand, and on the other, what appeared to be a dependency, a reliance for support 
and recognition of mental anguish.  This is reflective of Speed (2006) who notes the 
presence of different levels of agency and acceptance in discourse constructed by 
mental health service users.  Agency and acceptance lay on a continuum utilised 
according to the perspective the service user wanted to convey at any given time - the 
use of ‘Patient’ indicating passivity; ‘Consumer’ active involvement in care and 
treatment and ‘Survivor’, actively resisting services.  
 
During the latter stages of using statutory mental health services I began to hear of, 
then ‘mix with’, an increasing number of people who ‘lived with’ what appeared to be 
considerable psychiatric symptoms (hearing voices, unusual believes) who lived 
beyond psychiatric services.  Some had been through the system, ‘survived’ and 
moved on; others had never engaged with them.  Their discourse was one of 
resistance to and denunciation of psychiatry; of ‘alternative’ meaning making systems 
and supports, liberalisation, normalisation and social acceptance of ‘psychiatric 
symptoms’, (with particular emphasis on psychosis).  These narratives, as they were 
shared and presented, inspired me to move beyond psychiatric services. 
 
My own journey from crisis point, ultimately leading me into psychiatric services, 
involved a period of reflection on the power of language and how public discourse 
continued to be dominated by a persistent message of deficiency in character and 
hopelessness attached to persons diagnosed with a psychotic disorder.  At first, I was 
‘intrigued’ as to how a diagnosis might be able to represent a person who is in need of 
support, acceptance and understanding.  However, I became indifferent over time to 
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psychiatric labels, rendering them meaningless in my life, non-representative of who I 
am, or my ability to create a rewarding future.  This tendency to be indifferent carries 
over into various life circumstances including my current employment involving peer 
advocacy where a non-judgemental approach toward others, ‘peers’ with mental 
health issues is ritually practiced.  Consequently, I detach myself as far as possible 
from judging others who might have a different view of receiving a psychiatric 
diagnosis eg; those that appear to believe that a psychiatric diagnosis is representative 
of their mental health problems.  I respect their right to define their needs, describe 
their personal circumstances and origin of their psychotic experiences.  In other 
words, my approach when interacting with peers, is to isolate my own experience, 
suspend opinions and beliefs about psychotic experiences, allowing people to come to 
their own ‘meaning making decisions’.  
 
It is this ‘standoffish’, slightly detached or reserved position that informs regular 
interactions I have with people who, whether inside or outside of services, have 
personal experience of mental health challenges and one I maintained during 
interviews with study participants.   That said, even though this is my general 
approach when interacting with peers, I reserve my right to hold a cynical and 
sceptical opinion on diagnoses and would generally subscribe to the view that 
‘accepting’ or ‘yielding’ to a diagnoses ‘for life’ (Tucker, 2009) signifies the power 
and authority of psychiatry in ‘making subjects’ (Roberts, 2005).  In making subjects 
the psychiatric enterprise satisfies a modern world that measures human performance 
in accordance with standards of rationalisation, rejecting behaviours and experience it 
judges unreasonable or irrational (psychotic experiences).          
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I must add here that personally, unlike many others I have spent time with, I have not 
experienced coercion or adverse practices whilst under the care of psychiatric 
services.  I often question though if what was provided to me could not have been 
provided in a different environment; where the approach to care was not dependent on 
nor overly influenced by diagnoses, categorisation and corrective interventions.  A 
secondary part of my journey involved working for the very mental health services I 
initially engaged.  My first paid role was as a day care worker in a community drop-in 
centre, then as a ‘Coordinator’ being responsible for bringing together service users, 
carers/family members and service providers in developing local mental health 
services.  I worked constructively with this service trying to bridge experience with 
(professional) expertise but found this task impossible.  The traditional structures of 
power and authority stubbornly persisted; the bottom up approach desired by service 
users was never realized.  Moving from service user to provider of sorts has 
undoubtedly influenced my view of all things related to mental health services.  My 
experience leaves me feeling sceptical about the readiness, or indeed willingness of 
some working within the mental health system in shifting the locus of control, of 
reordering the hierarchy of power and authority assumed by psychiatry, bestowed by 
the state (Barker and Stevenson, 2000).  Given the number of years I have been 
involved in the survivor movement and efforts made to change mental health services 
I am left concerned about the capacity of ‘resisters’ of traditional mental health 
systems to shift this locus of control.  The hierarchy of power and authority not only 
turns service users into subjects but allows public discourse on psychotic experiences 
to remain pessimistic and guarded, enabling the persistence of marginalisation and 
social exclusion against persons living with psychotic experiences (Bonnington and 
Rose, 2014; Timimi, 2014).   
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It will come as no surprise then that I remain sympathetic to narratives of resistance, 
believing psychotic experiences to be “part of ordinary mental life” (Garret et al., 
2006, p605).  However, what has become apparent over time, up to the point of 
deciding on the given study, was the inconsistencies, nuances and numerous versions 
of accounts of psychotic experiences that the ‘survivors of the system’ presented.  
There was no overarching theory pertaining to the existence of psychotic experiences, 
their causality or how they should be personally or socially integrated.  That said, 
there was a consensual belief, borne out by people’s experiences, that due to the 
psychiatric system a common public response to psychotic experiences involves 
suspicion, social distance and the need for intrusive practices as sanctioned by the 
state.   If this common response was to change, there would be a requirement to 
challenge the meaning making systems responsible for this public perception (in short 
psychiatric interpretations; diagnoses, labels).  Meaning making systems involve 
language at the macro level.  Therefore, the primary ‘challenge’ for the cohort 
described was at a linguistic level ie; to find ways to change public discourse on 
psychotic experiences.  To put it another way, words matter, they influence our 
understanding of and in turn shape common responses to human experiences 
(Cameron, 2007).  If psychotic experiences are to be normalised; to find social 
acceptance and prompt an empathetic public response, then the language thereof 
would need to change.  To help unravel why this dominant meaning making system 
had not changed in accordance with assertions made by this cohort, studying language 
as a performative act would be required.  This would include effects and 
consequences of the incohesive nature of narratives as naturally occurs; the 
inconsistencies, compromises, nuances and numerous versions of accounts presented 
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during conversation.  Discourse analysis, as the chosen methodology for this study 
can help reveal limitations and constraints to discourse created by groups that seek to 
challenge meaning making systems that negatively impact them, and in doing so assist 
them in developing a new strategy or a more effective or efficient way to counter 
discourses that they seek to amend.  I refer back to Willig (1999) who suggests that 
the application of discourse analyses can benefit disenfranchised social groups 
through consciousness raising, where they can become more aware of the way they 
have been constrained by certain discourses and be in a position to counter unforeseen 
effects or consequences of their own subjectivities and positioning.    
    
Finally, Willig (2013) describes Personal reflexivity as: “the ways in which our own 
values, experiences, interests and beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in life 
and social identities that shape the research” (p55). This list comprises motivating 
factors involved in developing and conducting research.  Given the above, personal 
motivation for this study is to try and understand what these linguistic challenges 
consist of and if there might be a way of breaking the linguistic impasse in order to try 
and pave a pathway of social acceptance toward the psychotic experience.        
  
1.5 Study Aims and Objectives  
The significance of this study is underscored by the numbers of persons living with  
Psychotic experiences, ‘hidden’ in general populations.  Their lived experience, their 
accounts outside/beyond the mental health system is rarely considered or expressed 
even though they potentially outnumber those caught up in the system.  In essence, it 
appears that this cohort have become marginalised and silenced.  The social 
environment (stigma, discrimination and institutional ideology) has been found to be 
particularly problematic for those caught up in the psychiatric system, those who have 
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moved through it and those described as ‘non-clinical’; who live with PLEs.    
Psychosis is associated with experiences that are socially suspect, linked with human 
deficits that are wholly undesirable, marking the ‘host’ as undesirably different, 
creating an exclusive environment with alienating consequences.  There has to date 
been few qualitative studies designed and carried out to explore challenges faced by  
‘non-clinical’ populations living with PLEs, and as far as the author is aware, none 
with a particular focus at the linguistic level.   It is at the linguistic level, in particular 
the discursive formations, where issues of social power surface, vis-a-vis; control over 
meaning of experience takes place.  It is the struggle to control meaning and create a 
positive identity for those living with PLEs in Ireland that is significant to this study 
that the author wishes to explore.  This will be achieved through the application of 
Discourse Analysis where discursive formations are identified in text generated during 
one-one; face to face interviews.  The identification of repertoires, participant 
positioning, contradictions and compromises (eg; dilemmas) present in discourse 
created by participants at interview that will help unravel issues of social power at 
play.  To conclude, the overarching aim is to give a voice to those living with PLEs 
outside the psychiatric system; raise awareness of their own discourse that runs 
contrary to their intended consequences.  I begin with a literature review, Chapter 2 
below, presenting evidence and various theories associated with PLEs.  This will help 
contextualise PLEs unravelling the potential impact of various discourses (in 
particular those that are socially dominant), on the study participant group, the 
positions they take up and the formation of discourse during interview.  
 
To conclude this section and to help bring clarity, combined summary aims and 
objectives for this study are to:  
 
  23  
• Interview persons self-declared living with PLEs in Ireland in order to 
understand the construction, personal positioning and orientation of their 
discourse,   
• Reveal the effects and consequences of participant discourse on perceptions 
and interpretations of PLEs,   
• Identify communicative social systems that support and enhance the discourses 
on psychotic experiences constructed by the cohort of research participants  
  
1.6 Summary of the remainder of the thesis 
Below I present a summary of the remainder of the thesis.  This will help bring clarity and act 
as a rough guide as to what follows.   
 
Firstly, Chapter 2, Literature Review, provides context to the subject of study (psychotic 
experiences) where a number of representations on psychosis and by extension PLEs are 
presented.   In part A, Chapter 2 I present historical background to psychosis as a concept 
including the rise of epistemological parameters as defined by a paradigm that dominates 
social discourse on psychotic experiences – the meta/grand narratives of psychosis.  The 
meta/grand narrative identified is determinist and essentialist in nature restricting 
circumstances for positive meaning making to take hold for the individual living with 
psychotic experiences.  The meta/grand narrative is primarily expressed through the scientific 
enterprises of psychiatric and psychological knowledge. In part A, Chapter 2 I also present 
interventions, commonly practiced and socially sanctioned operating within and through this 
dominant paradigm.  In section B, Chapter 2, I present the case that PLEs are commonly 
experienced across general populations introducing ideas, beliefs and evidence that psychotic 
experiences are a natural part of mental life, non-determinist, subject to social and cultural 
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milieus.  A number of models, theories and culturally inspired meaning making arrangements 
are offered up as more attractive to people living with PLEs in the general population.  These 
arrangements are presented as more humane than the dominant paradigm, facilitating better 
understanding and improved ways to apprehend and engage the psychotic experience.   I 
conclude Chapter 2 with examples how those with lived experience of psychotic experiences 
maintain or reclaim identity and shake off the negative labels and stereotypes that, at least for 
a significant number of people, are associated with the meta/grand narratives of psychosis.  
In presenting the various circumstances, approaches and theories on psychotic experiences I 
identify available discourses to study participants when speaking about their PLEs that will 
potentially appear in the text they generate at interview.         
 
In the Methodology Chapter, Chapter 3 I return to the theoretical concepts fundamental to 
this study, Social Constructionism and Discourse Analysis, how they consolidate a theoretical 
arrangement to meet the aims and objectives of this study.  Repertoires are put forward as the 
primary unit of text that make up a discourse, with discursive performances appearing within 
each repertoire revealing how the repertoire was achieved.  The identification of these units 
and revelation of linguistic performances enabled analysis where I could uncover orientation, 
positioning, effect and consequences of participant discourse.   As part of establishing 
credibility to the technical end of the chosen methodology a system of transcription was 
identified, methods of coding and analysis presented, and a standard to ensure validation 
presented.   The significance of the researcher as interviewer and potential to influence 
participant discourse at interview is explored in a section on reflexivity.   Following the 
section on reflexivity, ethical concerns are addressed, sample size and criteria to participate 
rationalised.  Methods of recruitment, selection process and interview schedule where 
described with Chapter 3 ending in a number of tables providing demographic and 
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experiential information on participants.        
 
In Chapter 4 I present findings, post analysis.  Here I identify a number of repertoires and 
discursive acts that reveal participant positioning, orientations, effects and consequences of 
text generated at interview.  Positioning revealed that participants believe themselves to have 
a unique, unquestionable expertise securely attached to the lived experience of PLEs.  The 
orientation of participant discourse highlighted a desire to normalise the psychotic experience 
by shifting public opinion and attitudes toward the psychotic experience and discourse 
thereof; effects and consequences of the repertoires and discursive performances at interview 
resulted in a number of dilemmas and compromises to their claims to expertise and ultimately 
the silencing of the psychotic experience.           
 
Chapter 5, Discussion, considers the implications for the discourse constructed and 
discursive performances enacted by participants at interview.  I begin by considering 
personal gains for participants emanating from these constructions and performances.  
I then focus on the participant’s primary orientation (desire) to change public 
responses, attitudes and ultimately discourse on psychotic experiences from a deficit, 
disability, risk-oriented discourse to one that normalises and accepts the psychotic 
experience as part of a common human state, in reach of and shared by all.  I go on to 
consider the current context where this discourse of normalisation and public 
acceptance is proposed to take place.  I highlight constraints to participant’s primary 
orientation, imposed via the social dominance of neoliberalism including 
complimentary and corroborative institutional arrangements and practices.  The 
constraints highlighted are essential to achieve the study aims ie; to reveal the 
compromises, unforeseen effects and consequences of participant discourses.  I 
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deliberate the current social system, dominated by neoliberalism, and potential to 
move public discourse on psychotic experiences in the direction as desired by 
participants.  This involves the identification of an interpretative community, 
deliberating the level of reliance on the individual experience as the only authentic 
representation of the psychotic experience, to one that leads to dialogue and potential 
social change.  
 
In Chapter 6 I conclude the thesis reflecting on the potential for individual 
representations and collective action required to achieve the necessary shift in public 
discourse on psychotic experiences in the direction desired by participants.  Here, I 
suggest converging knowledge and expertise found within the very system and 
establishments they resist ie; those working within the meta/grand narratives.  This, I 
suggest would add weight to participant claims to truth, achieved in dialogical spaces 
where a credible blending of expertise can counter misrepresentations and public 
concerns surrounding psychotic experiences.  I end with an epilogue, where I express 
personal struggles of consciousness encountered whilst carrying out the study and 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review  
To begin, the literature review below is taken from a position of scepticism.  A 
sceptical approach has been noted as “a method, not a position”, involving “a tacit 
and desirable state of critical engagement” (Gurney, 2017, p3); for its ability to 
facilitate constructive doubt and raise awareness over variances that exist between 
ideals and practices (Midgley, 1998).  Ideals come into play with regards to the 
various theoretical positions to psychotic experiences; practices as to how beneficial, 
facilitative and attractive are the consequences of these ideals impacting those with 
lived experience.    This approach is informed by the author’s personal experience, 
both living with PLEs and being part of a social movement that is highly critical of 
established ‘truths’ about psychotic experiences (Zucker, 2014).  This involves 
‘problematizing’ a number of defining sources (ie; critiquing their claims to truth) 
considering why someone with psychotic experiences might or might not be attracted 
to a given knowledge resource, identifying dominant world views that might impede 
an optimistic outlook for participants living with psychotic experiences, safeguarding 
identity. Problematizing knowledge is an ‘inquisitory’ activity bringing it in line with 
epistemological notions affiliated with Social Constructionism (Burr, 2001).  Social 
Constructionism considers all truths to be questionable and negotiable.  Truths are not 
dependent on ‘facts’ that rise above human experience and social activities thereof.  
They are subject to, and change, according to the ever-present forces of history, 
culture and social context that lead to shifting discourses.  This highlights:   
 
“the idea of language as much more than a mere mirror of the world and phenomena 
‘out-there’, and the conviction that discourse is of central importance in constructing 
the ideas, social processes, and phenomena that make up our social world.”   
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(Nikander, 2008, p413) 
  
Finally, in keeping with a position of scepticism, problematising theories, models and core 
constructs that make up various discourses on psychotic experiences I have chosen a 
literature review that is ‘Integrative’ (Khoo, Na and Jaida, 2011).  An integrative literature 
review summarises results derived from topics and subtopics that sketch prevailing ideas 
around a subject matter.  At this level, evaluation of research evidence in accordance with 
critical analyses of research methods and interpretation is not required.  The prevailing ideas 
can be uncovered in the rhetorical functions of discourse arising from research studies and 
other relevant literature.   In other words, topics and subtopics tend to create a distinct 
representation of a subject matter, taken up as a position creating a specific discourse.   
According to Khoo, Na and Jaida, (2011) an integrative literature review also allows the 
‘reviewer’s voice’ to become dominant.  In accordance with the integrative literature review 
I will identify topics, subtopics and ideas around psychosis and psychotic experiences, 
present the rhetorical functions they serve that enable me to locate discourses that offer a 
particular representation of the psychotic experience (eg; are psychotic experiences 
presented as faulty biology or a shared human experience?).   Further, in accordance to 
Khoo, Na and Jaida’s, (2011) examination of literature reviews, the reviewers voice will be 
allowed to dominate in assessing each idea and its claim to truth, enabling a position of 
scepticism to prevail during the literature review.  This will allow me to present established 
discourses that serve various functions potentially influencing participants’ own discourses 
presented at interview.   
 
Further to this, a linear writing structure is usually expected whilst presenting research at 
this level eg; introduction, literature review, methodology, research design, findings, 
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conclusion (Uncles, 1998).   Davis (2007) observes that this is not always applicable - in his 
case ‘unsatisfactory’.   Traditional research structures can get in the way of innovation 
inhibiting levels of creativity necessary in generating meaningful observations and 
interpretation at particular junctures of the research process.  Using Davis’s experience of 
conducting a doctoral research I will weave “back and forth” between relevant literature, 
data analysis and interpretation during Chapter 4 Findings.  This will allow the research 
cycle to reflect the study as it evolved allowing relevant observations to present when 
necessary.  Therefore, literature presented in Chapter 3 will sometimes augment with the 
Findings Chapter 4 or vis versa.        
 
2.1 Literature review – scoping search parameters    
In this chapter I will review a range of literature on psychosis and psychotic like 
experiences (PLEs).  Psychosis, is commonly associated with clusters of intense 
human experience and behaviours whose primary descriptions include hallucinations, 
delusions and disordered thought (Costello, 1993, Bentall, 2003, Burgy, 2008).  As a 
disputed concept, psychosis is opened up to competing positions operating within 
scientific, political and social spheres (Berrios and Beer, 1994; Janzarik, 2003; Burgy 
2008).  Given the range of positions and theories on psychosis - for instance emphasis 
on social (Sharpley et al, 2001) vs biological (Arsenhault et al, 2004) causation - each 
in turn motivating an abundance of research activity, a substantial weight of materials 
is available on the subject.  Leff (2008), points out that most theories on psychosis 
include social, psychological and/or biological features indicating the wide variety of 
ontological factors involved. Boundaries have therefore to be set in order that a 
manageable and appropriate volume of information is thoroughly reviewed.   In order 
to manage the information available on psychosis I suitably apply three items on 
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Gough’s (2007) Weight of Evidence criteria choosing literature for its 
appropriateness, relevance and finally assessment of knowledge contribution presided 
by the study aims.  Literature reviews are often used to summarise the most up-to-date 
research evidence to inform policies and practices.  However, in this case the 
literature review needs to reflect discourses on psychosis that are culturally available; 
that filter their way into social discourses, also impacting and potentially 
influencing/orientating discursive accounts at interview. Consequently, given the 
various domains and broad range of perspectives on psychosis the scope of search 
terms is necessarily broad and generic to include literature on: theoretical constructs; 
empirical evidence; biographical and autobiographical materials; media and health 
professional opinions and practices.  Core constructs, primary/dominant paradigms 
and ‘less known’/’fringe’ ideas of psychosis have to be factored.   
 
In sticking to the aims and objectives of the study and having outlined the broad remit 
for the literature review I chose to apply a non-systematic approach where concepts 
and core constructs determine the framework (Webster and Watson, 2002) or to put it 
another way “key concepts are transformed into keywords” (Ferrari, 2015, p232).  
Core constructs on psychosis are found within and throughout established 
authoritative expertise (eg; psychiatry, psychology, psychotherapy); fringe/less known 
notions (eg; spiritual explanations), often being found in ‘marginal’ discourses.    
Discourses are seldom (if ever) singularly fixed, made up of a synthesis of knowledge 
including the subjective (lived experience) institutional, allied bodies and practices 
(professional groups), public discourses and perceptions (Sharp et al., 2013).  The 
intention here is to draw upon associated concepts, theories, perceptions and practices 
that influence discourses on psychotic experiences.  This review will focus on subject 
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areas relevant to the research question, critically examining their claims as 
representative of the psychotic experience.  Areas to be covered in the literature 
review, set within the confines of this study, are taken from various perspectives 
including first person accounts, scholarly, academic and/or practitioners.  These are 
presented below:    
 
1. What constitutes psychosis and psychotic like experiences (PLEs)  
2. Models of psychosis  
3. Major theories on psychosis  
4. Social and political impacts of psychosis as a concept  
5. Living with psychotic experiences, responses and coping  
Search terms within the conceptual and theoretical bounds above include: psychotic 
like experiences, theoretical models of psychosis, interpretations and representations 
of psychosis (psychiatric, psychological, psychoanalytic, spiritual, sociological); 
stigma, discrimination and exclusion; identity and discourse; narratives and the lived 
experience; psychosis and recovery.   Data bases; SocIndex (a Sociology research 
database); Psychology & Behavioural Sciences Collection covering areas such as 
psychiatry and psychology, mental processes, anthropology, observational and 
experimental studies and Google Scholar were primarily exploited to achieve the 
broad search required for this literature review.   Google search engine was used to 
explore the potential to include what might be ‘less known’/’fringe’ ideas of 
psychosis.      
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Given issues of social power (control over meaning) as discussed in the previous 
chapter, it is important that levels of influence on social discourse, from each source, 
be reported.  This specifically exposes the impact of dominant/grand narratives (see 
2.5 below) on those living with psychotic experiences.  Although PLEs in terms of 
diversity of human encounters are the primary interest of this study, psychosis as a 
single entity (pathology) will also be explored as this may overlap or at the least 
impact on participant discourses where awareness of links between the psychotic 
experience and pathology is revealed.      
  
I will review and present critiques to a number of models/representations, empirical 
and positivistic sources on psychosis and PLEs.  These are available as social 
resources, each one in turn offering a particular comprehension of psychotic 
experiences.  Exposure to knowledge influences people’s positioning on particular 
issues in their lives (Harre and van Langenhove, 1991) and has direct consequences 
on the discourses they cultivate.    
  
It is the aim of this study to explore psychotic experiences with a number of 
participants within Ireland who have lived with PLEs for a significant amount of time.   
In order to get to grips with sources that may have shaped their individual discourse 
on PLEs a number of well-known theories will be presented.  It is not however the 
intention here to construct a knowledge base that would risk invalidating or pre-empt 
participant responses to the research questions nor generate preconceived analysis of 
data.  The intention is to exhibit prevailing views on the nature of psychosis which 
may appear and impact on the construction of participant discourses and 
comprehension of the self (Moulding, 2003; Tucker, 2009).     
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A note on terminology.  Given the continuity between psychotic experiences and 
PLEs identified in this chapter I have purposely chosen to use both terms 
interdependently.  As a continuum of psychotic experiences has been identified across 
general populations (Johns and van Os, 2001) difficulties with differentiating between  
‘genuine’ symptoms of psychotic illness and those that are identified as PLEs exists 
(Thapar et al., 2012).  Adams (2007) found psychosis proneness (ie; evidence of 
psychotic symptoms suggesting pathology) among African-Americans and  
Caucasians being assessed for PLEs indicating elevated probability to developing 
psychotic illness.  Though an increase of risk of developing psychopathology has been 
associated with high levels of distress directly caused by psychotic experiences, 
difficulty remains with separating PLEs from clinically significant psychotic 
experiences (Hanssen et al, 2005; Kelleher and Cannon, 2010; Lawrie et al, 2010).  
Given the blurred boundaries between PLEs and psychotic symptoms I will be 
referring to health care terminology when using the term psychosis - ie; pathology, 
mental illness and cognitive deficits - psychotic experiences that appear in non-
clinical populations when referring to PLEs (Kelleher and Cannon, 2010).  Reasons 
for the distinction will hopefully become increasingly clear during the remainder of 
this chapter as will the history of the psychosis as a modern behavioural and 
experiential concept. 
   
Prompted by noticeable criterions that set out standards in interpreting psychotic 
experiences, in turn influencing how the psychotic experience should be apprehended I 
have decided to divide part of this chapter into two distinct sections, A and B.  These 
criterions provide starting points from which meaning making systems and approaches 
influence the ability for individuals to interpret and integrate their psychotic 
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experiences. For the purposes of this study a meaning making system can move in one 
of two directions.  A top down system that tends to impose meaning upon cohorts of 
people whom it identifies as being deficit laden, where faults in communication, sense 
of self and reality are assumed.  A bottom up, meaning making system is one that 
tends to be fluid, facilitative toward the individual’s communicative efforts, and sense 
making processes.  I take my lead from Alpern (2013) when referring to a meaning-
making approach, described as: ‘methods of support and treatment that engage with 
the content of the individual’s de-centering or psychotic experiences’ (p10).   
    
Introducing parts A and B 
In part A of this chapter I identify a paradigm that, through historical events and 
consequential systems or approaches to meaning making, has created a meta/grand 
narrative dominating public discourse on psychotic experiences.  The meta/grand 
narrative, I argue, is driven by a top down meaning making system that judges 
psychotic experiences in terms of personal failings generating meaning-making 
approaches where correction or cure is required.  I refrain from being overly critical at 
the early stage of Part A, being descriptive, summarising historical context that has 
provided conditions where the interpretative authority of the meta/grand narrative has 
emerged and taken hold.  Understanding conditions that have ‘facilitated’ the 
emergence and continuance of the meta/grand narrative will enable measured critique 
involving the constructive scepticism described above.  This helps introduce variances 
that exist in understanding and engaging psychotic experiences.  I end part A with a 
critique of the meta/grand narrative and a corroborative meaning making approach.  
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In part B I describe meaning making systems and approaches that tend to sit outside 
the paradigm as constructed by the meta/grand narrative.  These I present as being less 
restrictive and less likely to be attached to personal failings or individual deficits as 
represented by the meta/grand narrative.  I contend that these ‘ulterior’, ‘alternative’ 
or counter meaning making systems and approaches are more liberal and potentially 
more attractive to individuals living with psychotic experiences beyond/outside 
statutory mental health services.       
  
A 2.1 The emergence of psychosis  
The meanings we attach to words are important in defining our social environment 
with the application of language contingent upon historical and social contexts (Burr, 
2001).  To put it another way, words may serve particular purposes at particular 
historical and social junctures.  From this perspective, inconsistency in definitions and 
application of psychosis as a categorisation of human experience should come as no 
surprise.  Smith (1998) notes:  
 
“The term psychotic has historically received a number of different definitions, none 
of which has achieved universal acceptance”.   (p895)  
And:  
In tracing some of the developments involved in the evolution of the concept Burgy 
(2008) concludes that: “The consideration of the concept of psychosis is a conflict 
charged domain of dichotomies” (p1208).  
  
What follows is an exploration of the emergence of psychosis as a concept with 
various ontological consequences.  Each source of knowledge explored here makes 
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use of corresponding reference points in framing psychotic experiences.  For example, 
to varying degrees, much of psychology and psychiatry frame psychosis within 
biological, neurological and sociological parameters (Morgan, McKenzie and Fearon, 
2008).  However, it is the dominant discourse within each parameter that I will focus 
on and try and define.  Discourse in these terms is taken from the use of language 
inherent within each source; that is:   
  
“language identified by the social conditions of its use, by who is using it and under 
what conditions.” (Henry and Tator, 2002, p2).     
  
Key influences that have shaped our understanding of psychotic experiences will be 
identified including some defining periods and key philosophical concepts that have 
led up to a particular framing of psychosis. It is psychosis as a concept that the author 
is primarily interested in, including the social structures that have shaped our response 
to psychotic experiences and/or PLEs.  The analysis will focus on periods leading up 
to modernity through to current times.   
 
At this juncture, it must be noted that it is beyond this study to carry out a detailed 
account of changes that have taken place in conceptualising psychosis over time.  
Presented is a summary of selective readings in order to illustrate variations in relation 
to current understandings of psychosis evident within discourse as appears in the 
written word from a number of sources described above.  Efforts will concentrate on 
sketching out the history of ideas, a method of enquiry corroborating the “motivation 
and the meanings of words … social context” and; “the complex ways that the 
persons and ideas of the past have influenced the present” (Hamillton, 1993, p47).  
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Historical and social forces that have shaped current framing of psychotic 
experiences, with particular emphasis on ideologies that have had significant impact 
within ‘modernised’ societies² such as Ireland, the site of this study will be 
considered.  Given the diverse positioning and constant flux inherent within discourse 
it may be possible that a number of available resources with regard to the framing of 
psychosis and PLEs will escape the attention of the author.    
  
Some sources may be taken as dominant narratives (also known as grand or meta 
narratives) ie; those that have greatest influence on how we speak about a given 
subject (Gutting, 2005).  Some will be presented as counter narratives, potentially 
more meaningful and more attractive to people experiencing psychotic experiences 
who, for reasons explored, do not engage traditional health systems supposedly 
designed to provide support and care for this ‘sub-population’ in Western societies.      
 
A 2.2 What do we mean by psychosis?  
Some scholars have traced descriptions of experiences and behaviours that they 
believe provide evidence of mental illness (from which psychosis is inferred) beyond 
the time of the Greeks (see for example, Porter 2002).  However, we can-not say for 
sure if these descriptions are comparable to psychosis as it was first introduced or 
indeed, how these early descriptions might have influenced our current understanding.  
That said; we can be relatively confident in tracing the introduction of psychosis in 
modern times which marks distinctions between particular abnormal from normal 
behaviours and experiences.  
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Experiences and behaviours associated with psychosis may be interpreted in different 
ways in accordance with social and cultural environments (Jenkins and Barrett, 2004).  
However, when considering the development of psychosis as a concept, its usage 
stems from Westernised systems of rationalisation (see 2.3 below).   It is therefore 
difficult to describe psychosis without acknowledging this historical context and 
therefore warranted that I begin with this framework in mind.  Saravanan et al (2004) 
are mindful of the level of influence Westernised systems of rationalisation has had on 
conceptualizations of psychosis: “Globalisation and colonisation in various guises 
introduce new social effects and spread biomedical systems of thought, including 
causal explanations” (p109).  It is the search for casual explanations within certain 
social demarcations that has had major influence on our usage of the term psychosis.     
  
The word psychosis derives from the Greek roughly translating into: abnormal 
condition of the mind.  Karl Friedrich Canstatt has been credited with introducing the 
word into psychiatric literature in 1841 (Burgy, 2008.)  It was first used in 1845 by 
Ernst von Feuchtersleben to differentiate disorders of the mind from what was 
understood to be disorders of the nervous system – neurosis (Berrios, 1991; Beer, 
1995).  Since the introduction of psychosis in depicting a dysfunctional mind, debates 
have taken place whether it indicates a unitary disease or a variety of diseases or 
syndromes (Berrios and Beer, 1994; Goel, 2007).   
_____________________________________________________________________  
² Here I refer to Giddens (1991) while making use of the term Modernised cultures.  Fundamental to his description of 
modernisation is of societies that have gone through industrialisation/urbanisation including a process of rationalisation involving 
an expansion of scientific and technological influences often leading to an individualised society that values choice over and above 
unconditional conviction to ‘traditional’ structures such as religion, family and gender.   
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Classic descriptions of psychosis include: hallucinations, delusions, disordered 
thinking and impaired insight (Jaspers, 1997).      
  
Psychosis is often distinguished in terms of positive and negative symptoms 
(Andreasen and Black, 2006).  Negative symptoms include emotional and cognitive 
deficits eg; blunted emotion and affect, low motivation, poverty of speech and 
inability or lack of willingness to form relationships.  Negative symptoms are likely to 
be detrimental to quality of life and social functioning (Dikeos et al, 2006), shown to 
have significant impact on social relations including those engaged in care giving for 
individuals with clinically defined psychotic illness (Velligan and Alphs, 2008).  
Positive symptoms involve false perceptions including hallucinations, delusions and 
thought disorder (inability to think rationally and clearly).  In summary, negative 
symptoms involve experiences that are lacking in individuals yet expected to be 
present in ‘normal’ populations (motivation, expressed emotion, willingness to 
socially engage etc).  Positive symptoms include the presence of experiences that tend 
not to be present in ‘normal’ populations.  Both can impact negatively on the 
individual’s ability to communicate and negotiate the social world (Fusar-Poli et al, 
2009).          
 
Hallucinations are typically described as sensory perceptions that occur in the absence 
of external stimuli and can impact all five senses (Laroi et al, 2014; National Institute 
of Mental Health, 2014).  The most common hallucinations experienced are: auditory, 
visual, olfactory and tactile.  Delusions are strongly held beliefs, even though there is 
evidence to the contrary.  This does not include beliefs that are constructed due to 
false or incomplete evidence.  The two main categorisations of delusions are 
grandiose and persecutory.  Although hallucinations and delusions are described 
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above in terms of psychopathology they are known to exist in non-clinical populations 
(see for example Nuevo, 2012) and subject to social variables such as culture as to 
their acceptability and variance of prevalence (Laroi, 2014).  Within the realm of 
psychopathology, hallucinations and delusions are associated with non-consensual 
realities at odds with socio-cultural norms where the individual resides (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013).  They can also co-occur (Zanghellini Rückl et al, 
2011).  For example, some people experience verbal hallucinations and believe that it 
is evidence of demonic possession or the voice of God (false claims.)   Thought 
disorder includes disconnected and incomprehensible speech, flight of ideas and 
thought stopping (Barrera and Berrios, 2009).  According to psychopathology the 
psychotic individual is believed to lack self-awareness (also called insight) of how 
their experiences and behaviours might impact on functioning and is at odds with the 
social environment (McCormack et al, 2013). 
   
Distinctions are also made between functional psychosis and organic psychosis.  The 
former relating to categorisations of mental illnesses (of which a definitive physical 
cause is yet to be established - Bentall, 2003; Joseph, 2010,;Whitaker, 2010), the latter 
structural defects caused by physiological dysfunction of the brain (for example 
psychotic experiences that occur among dementia populations).  To summarise, 
psychosis as traditionally defined has been subject to Westernised systems of 
conceptualisation tending to frame it within pathology marking psychotic experiences 
against ‘normal’ experiences (and behaviours).  This was made possible due to certain 
philosophical and historical transformations.       
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A 2.3 The rise of positivism and the segregation of psychotic 
experiences      
Positivism was borne out of the Enlightenment, a period in Western history when it 
was asserted that the legitimate use of reason would free the individual and secure 
their autonomy (Bracken and Thomas, 2001).  The Enlightenment provided 
opportunities for reason and logic to flourish, a time when positivism, as a particular 
belief system developed.  Positivism rests on the assumption that objectivity and 
scientific inquiry are the most reliable methods at our disposal in accessing and 
establishing facts about the world.  Foucault (1965) associates the Enlightenment with 
the rise of the clinician.  He points out that even though psychiatry lacked any 
theoretical framework from which to work from, it was accepted as a medical 
profession developing its own classification systems.       
 
One of the defining moments in the history of psychiatry, in its endeavours to 
categorise human experiences and behaviours, was the introduction of Dementia 
Praecox as a mental illness.  In 1902 Kraepelin arrived at this diagnostic construct by 
dividing what he observed to be severe mental illnesses with good prognosis (manic 
depression) and those with poor prognosis (dementia praecox; (Angst, 2002; 
Jablensky, 2007).  Kraepelin believed psychiatric illnesses to be caused by biological 
and genetic defects, a conviction that would later underpin the psychiatric position 
(Noll, 2013).   
 
Psychotic behaviours and experiences were most evident in manic depression and 
dementia praecox, with the latter believed to be more severe and degenerative.  
Bleuler later renamed dementia praecox, Schizophrenia (literally meaning splitting of 
the mind) leading to the development of sub-categories such as hebephrenic, 
 
  42  
catatonic, paranoid schizophrenia (Boyle, 2002.)  Bracken and Thomas (2005) note 
that, since Kraepelin, psychiatry attached itself to a classification system with 
phenomenology at its core.  This set a trajectory for psychiatry to privilege symptoms 
and pathology over and above the effects of interpersonal experiences of the ‘patient’ 
(Evans, 1996).  There is no singular approach or definition of phenomenology and it is 
beyond the scope of this study to explore the various positions.  However, it warrants 
a brief description in the context of leading models of psychosis.   
  
Broadly speaking phenomenology is the study of the quality or nature of subjective 
experience, the study of consciousness as experienced through the first person 
(Moran, 2000).  From a psychiatric position phenomenology is employed to describe 
mental life.  Bracken and Thomas (2005) note that Jaspers, a significant figure in the 
history of psychiatry, advocated a form of phenomenology that isolated the internal 
mental experience from context and body.  In order to examine mental events in their 
purist form, it was necessary to separate them from social influences.  The 
objectification of the subjective experience, the segregation of mental events where 
the subjective becomes the object – the ‘other’ - was established (eg; constructions of 
mental illness; Berrios, 1999).  This translated into representational models of the 
mind that traverse across much of psychology and psychiatry today and includes 
major theories associated with linguistics and cognitivism where language has tended 
to become an internalised individual phenomenon (Bracken and Thomas, 2005).  The 
history of psychiatric and psychology disciplines is tainted with erstwhile challenges 
to the separation of mental events from context - for example the histories of social 
psychiatry (Uchtenhagen, 2008) and the behaviourist movement within psychology 
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(Bargh and Ferguson, 2000) - as a principle framework from which human 
experiences and behaviours could be understood.   
That said, there are some significant figures within the field of psychiatry who have 
influenced, via phenomenology, the focus of concern for the psychotic person.  For 
instance, Parnas and Henriksen (2014) advocate the subjective, first person 
perspective using psychometrics and self-reporting as ways to apprehend and 
understand the psychotic experience.  This shifts the focus of interest from one that 
imposes an exclusive ‘outside-in’, objectively charged interpretation, to an ‘inside-
out’ perspective (centred on personal experience, self-perception and personal 
reporting).  Laing (1967, discussed at the end of this section) expanded the 
phenomenological domain to include the impact of the social environment as a pretext 
to developing psychosis and, for some individuals, its persistence.  Here, Laing 
presents that psychosis is a strategy in response to interpersonal challenges, and a 
reasonable attempt at repair.  In turn, a phenomenological approach should help 
apprehend the psychotic experience from the first-person perspective building 
empathy, understanding psychosis as part of the human condition (Englander, 2018).  
However, even though these approaches to understanding psychosis have been put 
forward by significant figures in the history of psychiatry, its methodologies and 
systems of meaning making has continued to be governed by a phenomenology that 
imposes an outside-in, objectification of the psychotic experience (Read, Bentall and 
Fosse, 2015).  This in turn dominates social discourse that leads to public distance and 
suspicion of the psychiatrically identified person (Farrelya, 2015; Casstevens, 2010; 
Ohlsson, 2018).    
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Consequences of an internalised view of mental life is that emotional and 
psychological problems can only be addressed at the individual level by one of two 
means – through the encouragement of self-control or by being controlled (Rose, 
1999). This is significant for individuals who are labelled psychotic.  Various brain 
imaging techniques associate psychosis with a biological vulnerability to cognitive 
deficits impacting on social functioning (Bellani and Brambilla, 2008).  The 
individual is a victim of internally generated events, unable to resist the provocation 
of spontaneous psychotic experiences such as command hallucinations (Leudar and 
Thomas, 2002).   This marks the psychotic individual as someone not to be trusted, to 
be monitored and governed by a supervisory social system (Moncrieff, 2010). 
Personal accounts are scrutinised and subject to social discourses informed by 
objectively charged notions that can devalue and invalidate individual accounts 
leading to social inequality (Cromby and Harper, 2009).      
Other disciplines such as anthropology and sociology have raised concerns and 
presented challenges to this model of personhood.  However, such challenges tend to 
sit at the periphery of social and politic discourses.  Haslam (2000) argues that 
essentialist ideology is involved in the notion of mental illness as a biological and 
genetic entity engaging abstract and conceptual thinking.  He illustrates how this has 
had a significant impact on lay people’s perceptions of psychotic experiences:  
  
“in principle these essences are scientifically describable, presumably genetic or 
atomic microstructures of some sort, so that a division of labor exists in which 
laypeople, who do not know the relevant essences, should grant scientists the last 
word in determining what qualifies as an instance of a kind. … because natural kinds 
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share deep similarities, "carving nature at the joints," they are particularly rich 
sources of inferences, having considerable "inductive potential."  
(Haslam, 2000; p1038)  
In accordance with Haslam’s remark, public perception of psychotic experiences are 
heavily influenced by the power and authority of scientific discourse, socially 
accepted, directly impacting how ‘we’ tend to talk about psychosis or psychotic 
experiences.  This allows those who claim specialist (scientific) knowledge of 
psychosis privilege and dominance over the experience eclipsing self-knowledge 
or/and self-experience.   This is of interest to this study as the power and authority 
bequeathed to science and its proponents may present at interview as repertoires of 
resistance to, of compliance with or appear as ambiguous, inconsistent or/and 
contradictory accounts toward scientific loaded discourse on psychotic experiences.  
Gelman (2003) explains how cognitive psychology is also essentialist in nature.  For 
instance, psychotic symptoms are believed to be the result of a breakdown of typical 
mental processing (the essential essence signified here would be the mind/brain, an 
entity closed off from social life).  Focusing on the functions of the individual mind 
and internalised dysfunctions diverts cognitivism away from the importance of 
socially constructed realities:    
 
“Cognition is as much to do with relational things as with what is whizzing around in 
private… You can only think because of your place in networks of relationships with 
other people and because of patterns of discourse that give shape to your image of the 
world and of yourself”   
(Parker and Burman, 2008, p109)   
  
 
  46  
Psychosis and psychotic experiences have been subjected to the phenomenological 
and positivistic approaches as described above.  These are the dominant forces that 
have shaped the current discourses on psychosis and psychotic experiences in Western 
society.  Referring to Sakalys (2000), in the context of a literature review of ‘The 
Meaning of Madness’, Casey and Long (2003) note that within healthcare 
“metanarratives or grand narratives” act as “socially sanctioned ways of interpreting 
experiences in order to achieve uniformity and social order” (p92). This is in turn 
linked with an explanation of psychosis pertaining to illness which “constructs what 
society can expect to be normal behaviour” (Crowe 2000, p.584).     As this study is 
conducted in a Westernised society, Ireland, it is these dominant forces surrounding 
psychosis that I begin to describe.      
 
A 2.4 Dominant contemporary discourse  
As psychosis (and by association PLEs) has become a health concern, they cannot be 
detached from the political and social phenomena that have been created by 
psychiatric (Szasz, 2008) and psychological (Smail, 2005) discourses.  Within 
literature and Western Culture, psychotic experiences are principally defined as a sign 
of illness or cognitive malfunction; the health expert has therefore set the ‘bench 
mark’ from which associated experiences are compared and described at the 
individual and societal level (Szasz, 1970; Rose 1998).  Rose (1998) refers to the 
‘psy’ models that influence modern cultures, shaped by science or/and 
psychotherapeutic theories of human thought and/or behaviours.  Disciplines wedded 
to the psy models (‘Psy disciplines’); in particular psychology, psychiatry and to an 
extent psychotherapy become primary sources that have shaped various institutions, 
how we understand and intercept ourselves in modern times.  This inevitably 
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influences our identity, response to and interaction with psychotic experiences.  
Below are descriptions of psychosis from a medical and cognitive perspective, 
generally taken as ‘meta’ or ‘grand narratives’ (referred as meta/grand-narratives 
hereafter).   
A 2.5 Psychosis as sign of illness  
Psychiatric assessments are designed to identify signs and symptoms of mental  
disorders.  They are based on an overarching theory that certain behaviours and 
experiences are indicative of underlying pathology.  There are two main 
classifications systems that are applied in psychiatric settings, that can also be used for 
research purposes such as comparative epidemiological studies between Western  
‘developed’ countries and ‘non-Western’ developing countries.    
  
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) was first published 
in 1952 by the American Psychiatric Association.  It evolved from an accumulation of 
psychiatric hospital statistics combined with a manual developed by the United States  
Army.  The International Statistic Classification of Diseases and Related Health  
Problems (ICD) is produced by the World Health Organisation (see WHO, 1992).   
There have been stringent attempts to correspond the coding systems of the DSM and 
ICD.  However, because both systems have been revised at different times this has not 
been possible (Dalal and Sivakumar, 2009).  Dalal and Sivakumar (2009) observe 
conflicts between DSM and ICD with regards to the practical interpretation of mental 
illnesses and failures inherent within both in making distinctions between related 
syndromes, symptoms and normality:  
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‘But, the existence of two parallel nomenclatures and sets of definitions does help to 
emphasize that most of psychiatry's illness concepts are still provisional and that their 
definitions are arbitrary.’ (p316)  
  
The shift in conceptualisation of mental disorders between DSM-I, DSM-II and 
subsequent versions of DSM provide further evidence of significant changes in 
interpreting their casual nature and presentation.   DSM-I and DSM-II maintained a 
psychodynamic framework.  Mental disorders were a consequence of relational 
problems such as past family conflicts and traumatic life events.  The DSM III and 
DSM IV indicated a shift in emphasis from a psychodynamic interpretation to mental 
disorders (in particular psychotic experiences) to one that was decidedly biological 
and genetically centric (Read et al, 2004).   Brief flirtations with an environmental 
understanding of mental disorders (for instance the bio-psycho-social model) tended 
to be short lived signifying an enduring desire for systems of classification and 
categorisation that would justify psychiatry as a medical profession (Pilgrim, 2002; 
Blazer, 2005).    
 
A shift of emphasis from nurture to nature indicated a desire to develop a stringent 
scientific framework from which to understand biological and genetic factors involved 
in mental illnesses³.    
  
Among the mental disorders listed in DSM-5, where psychotic experiences appear 
(eg; personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, bi-polar disorder, depressive 
disorders) Schizophrenia receives the most attention.  Influential online sources and 
media representations of Schizophrenia are available describing it as a “chronic, 
severe, and disabling brain disorder” (National Institute of Mental Health, 2014) and 
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by some from within psychiatry as the “most disabling mental illness” (The Hindu, 
2013).   
 
According to the DSM-5 Schizophrenia belongs to a functional class of psychosis 
whereby illness and brain disease is inferred (Ahveninen et al, 2006; Gottesman and 
Gould, 2003)  
(Note: I use the word inferred here as according to a number of commentators eg; 
Belzeaux, (2011) and Kendler, (2005) there remains deficient knowledge of specific 
aetiology, cause(s) to psychotic experiences and behaviours.)  The criteria to receive a 
diagnoses of schizophrenia has been altered since the introduction of DSM-5.  Its 
predecessor, DSMIV stated that a diagnoses of schizophrenia could be given if one 
psychotic symptom was present for six months, during which at least one positive 
symptom is persistent over a given month.   
 
  These include the following:   
1. delusions 2.hallucinations 3. disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or 
incoherence) 4. disorganized or catatonic behaviour (occurrence of significant 
immobility and stupor) 5. negative symptoms, i.e., flattened affect, avolition (severe 
lack of motivation) and alogia (inability or poverty of speech).   
 
____________________________________________________________________  
³ Note: the construction of the newly published DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, published May 2013) has been 
subject to various criticisms, in particular the potential for over drugging and over diagnosing mental illnesses prescribed by a 
system that emphasises ‘user acceptability over validity’ (Balt, 2011).     
 
 
  50  
DSM-5 insists that an individual exhibit at least two of three positive symptoms ie; 
hallucinations, delusions, disorganised speech.  Subtypes of schizophrenia (eg; 
catatonia, paranoia), whereby psychotic symptoms irregularly appear making a full 
diagnoses difficult, has been removed from DSM-5.  Clinical experience highlighted a 
tendency of symptoms to shift over time resulting in a change in diagnoses and the 
occurrence of overlapping of subtypes.  According to DSM-5 subtypes are indicative 
of ‘specifiers’ to schizophrenia.  ‘Attenuated psychosis syndrome’ or ‘psychosis risk 
syndrome’ appear in Section III of the DSM-5.  These are described in terms of 
moderate or mild versions of symptoms of psychosis yet underline a group at risk of 
developing psychotic disorder. As a result anyone with psychotic experiences 
(including those with PLEs) can be subject to the ‘clinical gaze’ whereby medical 
experts are presumed to be able to detect an ‘underlying reality’ and/or ‘hidden truth’ 
associating certain experiences (in this case psychotic) with illness (Shawver, 1998).  
Surveillance techniques to identify at risk groups can be developed (Walsh et al., 2008) 
and necessity for early intervention justified (Tsuang et al., 2013).  People living with 
psychotic experiences (PLEs), remote from the clinical gaze, may become conscious of 
the prospective ‘intrusion’ to personal autonomy, identity and way of life and resist or 
avoid its clutches by making behavioural and/or linguistic adjustments eg; create 
alternative stories involving their psychotic experiences or/and ‘learn’ to be discreet 
with whom such experiences are shared.      
 
Furthermore, the process of validating mental illnesses, assuming biological and genetic 
links to psychosis, underplays social consequences of such a system.  The tendency to 
medicalise mood and behaviour has been observed to lead to stigmatisation, create 
negative outcomes and lead to the creation of social distance from the general public 
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(Martin, Pescosolido, and Tuch, 2000).  In particular toward those diagnosed with a 
psychotic disorder:   
“The sense of separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ could be increased by pointing out 
a genetic, unchangeable aetiology and the hope for recovery could be reduced”  
(Rusch, Angermeyer and Corrigan, 2005, p233).    
  
Kvaale, Gottdiener, and Haslam (2013) and Lee et al (2014) note that social distance 
from the general public can be exacerbated in accordance with assumed levels of 
genetic influence on psychiatric diagnoses.  Those with a diagnoses of psychotic 
illness, in particular schizophrenia, are more likely to be judged dangerous than those 
diagnosed with an affective (mood) disorder, resulting in significantly greater levels 
of social isolation for the former.   
     
A 2.6 Beyond psychotic disorders  
Medical conditions such as Alzheimer’s Disease (DeMichele-Sweet and Sweet, 2010) 
and Parkinson’s Disease (Rabey, 2009) can include psychotic symptoms.  The 
influence of disease and psychoactive drugs are excluded before a psychiatric disorder 
can be diagnosed (Oliver, 2012).  Alcohol abuse can also cause psychotic symptoms 
(Pera¨ la¨ et al., 2010).  Oliver (2012) places the above into a secondary category of 
psychosis with primary categories including schizophrenia and bipolar disorders 
belonging to a ‘psycho-pathological’ pathway.  Although hallucinations and delusions 
regularly appear in other psychiatric disorders eg; bipolar disorder (Potash, 2001; 
Pavuluri et al., 2004); major depression and anxiety disorders (Varghese et al., 2011); 
they are most commonly attached to a primary diagnosis of psychosis as described 
above.  It is difficult to attain accurate records of the level of psychosis identified 
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within psychiatric populations, partly because of the crossover between and within 
diagnoses, partly because of changes in diagnoses that individuals with psychiatric 
histories undergo and partly because of their instability in presentation (Gelder et al, 
2005).  However, in the general population McGrath et al (2008) in an analysis of 
systematic reviews on incidence rates, mortality and prevalence of schizophrenia 
conclude the median incidence of schizophrenia to be 15.2/100,000 population.  
Perala et al (2007) found the life-time prevalence of psychotic and bipolar disorders to 
exceed 3% in the general population.   Delusions and hallucinations ascribed to 
psychosis and mental illness within DSMV and ICD10 try to take into account 
cultural influences on both.    
Even though there are obvious schisms within the meaning making system that 
governs the meta/grand narratives, it continues to be systemically warranted and 
publicly accepted.  The public associate the psychotic experience with risk to health 
and safety, where social conditions allow coercive practices that threaten liberty and 
autonomy of the psychotic person to persist.  To put it another way, imposing 
meaning on to the psychotic experience that illness, biological impulses, brain lesion 
or faulty brain functioning is at work allows practices of control to persist: ‘Doing 
unto’ as opposed to ‘Doing with’ (Walsh et al, 2008).  Before shifting the focus of the 
psychotic experience beyond psychiatric populations I introduce meaning making 
systems and approaches steeped in positivism, fixed to the meta/grand narrative of 
psychosis.  I argue that these are allied to the illness (deficit) model, corroborate with 
the meaning making system and subsequent approaches that is psychiatry, with 
specific consequences for anyone living with psychotic experiences potentially 
leading to acts of resistance and avoidance.   
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A 2.7 Psychological and Cognitive model of Psychosis  
 
As with the identification of mental illness within the psychiatric paradigm, 
psychological assessments are designed to objectively evaluate an individual’s sense 
of reality (Leudar and Thomas, 2000) - whereby an individual’s internal world 
(primarily made up of feelings, thoughts and perceptions) is matched against the 
external world: “a set of perceptual, cognitive and sensorimotor acts that enables one 
to determine one’s relationship with the  external physical and social environments” 
(Reber, 1995, p640).  Reality testing is therefore employed to ascertain primary 
psychological and emotional faults which are indicative of underlying cognitive 
dysfunction (Bentall, 2003).  A break in normal cognitive schema is used to situate a 
person experiencing psychotic experiences within a cognitive framework (Birchwood 
et al., 2004) utilising for example psychometric measures (Fowler et al., 2006).  As an 
example, Bentall et al (1991) assert that ‘hallucinators’ have difficulty in applying 
cognitive effort in determining internally generated from environmentally generated 
stimuli.  The authors conclude that among a group of psychiatric patients diagnosed 
with psychotic illness hallucinations are self-generated and misattributed.  Faulty 
appraisal has also been underscored by So et al (2012) who found that among seventy-
three individuals experiencing clinically defined psychosis two models of reasoning 
biases are involved in the creation and persistence of delusions (Jumping to 
Conclusions and Belief Inflexibility).  The ability for these individuals to question 
their belief processes or reconsider their explanations of events was minimal.    
  
Frith (1995) proposed a psychological framework based on social cognition to explain 
symptoms of schizophrenia.   Parrot and Madoc-Jones (2009) describe social 
cognition in terms of systems of encoding, storage, retrieval, and processing of data 
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that take place in the brain.  From Frith’s perspective, psychotic experiences inhibit 
the individual’s ability to deploy empathy toward the mental state of another or 
speculate reflexively what the individual might be communicating – a process he 
called (defective) meta-representations.   As McCabe et al (2005) would have it:  
 
 ‘the primary representation becomes detached from the patient’s knowledge about it 
so that, for example, other’s intentions are no longer interpreted in the context of 
one’s knowledge about them but in isolation from it’ (p1443).   
   
In other words, the delusional and hallucinatory system is somewhat closed, cutting 
the individual off from ‘normal’ social exchange.  Customary human response to 
interactions with others is lacking as the ability to apprehend the intentions of others 
through the complex contrasting between one’s own mind and another’s is beyond the 
individual experiencing psychosis.  The inability to accomplish reasonable 
conclusions and appreciate another’s view of the world in relation to personal beliefs  
(primarily due to delusional and hallucinatory dispositions) leads to social 
dysfunction, a classic consequence of psychosis.    
Bentall (2003) and Boyle (2002) promote cognitive models of psychosis and strongly 
oppose the diagnostic criteria asserted within the biomedical model of psychotic 
illness.  They are quick to point out that there is no conclusive evidence of a direct 
causative link between biological/genetic faults and psychosis.  Conversely, Garety et 
al (2007) in a review of cognitive models of psychosis propose that a biological 
element be incorporated.  This includes the influence of genes and the role of 
neurobiology eg; brain dysfunction influencing ‘dopamine dysregulation’ resulting in 
improper deployment of attention leading to cognitive biases.  The authors propose an  
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“interactive causal model” factoring genes/biology; environment and 
cognition/emotion.  Garety et al (2007) acknowledge that a negative view of self, 
based on personal belief of being weak, vulnerable and inadequate is at play in the 
development and persistence of psychotic experiences (see also Taylor et al., 2014).   
However, there appears little consideration of the creation and maintenance of this 
negative view of ‘self’ beyond the emotional and psychological impact of historical 
social adversity (including care giver’s negative response) experienced by a 
significant number of those with psychotic experiences.  While attempts appear to be 
directed at reversing the processes that lead to problematic psychotic experiences, the 
cognitive model of psychosis, by emphasising faulty mental processes and 
highlighting environmental and biological/genetic linkages, makes distinctions 
between normal (healthy) and abnormal (unhealthy - psychotic) populations.  The 
civic power of discourse that underlines social and behavioural deficits among a 
distinct group of people cannot be underestimated.  As with the illness (biological) 
model, social meaning in relation to discourse that promotes acceptance, equality, 
normalisation and social justice is wanting (Friedli and Stearn, 2015).      
 
In a review of Richard Bentall’s cognitive model on psychosis and hallucinations 
Marius Romme, a social psychiatrist involved in a social movement seeking to 
normalise psychotic experiences responded: “I really like your research on 
hallucinations, Richard. But the trouble is, you want to cure hallucinators, whereas I 
want to liberate them. I think they are like homosexuals in the 1950s -- in need of 
liberation, not cure.” (Bentall, 2003, p.511).   The ‘correctional’ usage of cognitive 
theory referred to by Romme is illustrated in its therapeutic application.  In some 
cases the cognitive approach to therapy has been developed to 
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supplement/compliment biological interventions in those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia.  Cognitive behaviour therapy in combination with low dose cognitively 
enhancing psychiatric medications has been shown to improve symptom management 
and achieve symptom reduction (Rathod and Turkington, 2004; Turkington et al., 
2006).  Emphasise is placed on reducing relapse and achieving adherence to treatment 
with reality testing engaged.  Others included in the individual’s social circle (eg; 
family members) are encouraged to support this model of care.  Not to dispute the 
success of the combined intervention, but in focusing on symptom reduction and 
management; reducing incidences of relapse while engaging reality testing and 
striving for treatment adherence the combined approach described could be construed 
as socially inhibitive.  Any meaning attached remains within the realms of a 
misattribution of experiences, cognitive biases, genetic and biological dispositions.  
The interventions and theoretical frameworks described in this section deduce that 
psychotic experiences are characteristic of faulty schemas requiring modification 
through chemical or/and cognitive interventions with limited reference to context.     
 
Bracken and Thomas (2005) believe the level of reductionism involved in traditional 
illness and cognitive models to be unethical: “It is just as wrong to say that someone 
is mistaken to believe in what they think is true about themselves, as it is to say there 
is no meaning in what they say” (p, 162).  Kramer, Rajah, and Sung (2013) go further 
and illustrate how cognitive treatment can be employed to incapacitate social groups 
who are “perceived to embody risks to society” (p537).  They demonstrate how a 
cognitive treatment model developed to rehabilitate young offenders can be 
implemented to preserve economic inequalities through the promotion of Neoliberal 
ideologies.  ‘Correctional officers’ were trained to convince young offenders of the 
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merit of remaining compliant to prison service policies as a means to achieving 
stability through employment, when in reality employment opportunities for young 
offenders are rarely offered or achieved.  The individual with a ‘faulty’ world view is 
encouraged to accept and adapt to a particular notion of the social environment.  In the 
case of Cognitive models of psychosis, a correctional basis for treatment has been 
evidenced.  This has shifted emphasis from diagnoses to symptoms (specific 
experiences).  Parker et al (1997) in considering this new emphasis warn of its 
consequences noting that an “alternative schizophrenia research programme” by 
focusing on “symptoms (such as hearing voices), rather than gross diagnose … are 
now the subject and symptom of a new pathology” (Parker et al., 1997, p123)   
 
The authors assert that shifting from diagnoses to symptoms impacts on stigma and 
social exclusion as the individual ‘experiencer’ remains subject to discourses that 
underline individual deficits emphasising the social undesirability of psychotic 
experiences. Those with PLEs who prefer to look beyond statutory mental health 
systems for social support may not agree with a cognitive view of psychosis due to its  
‘invalidatory’ leanings designed to expose personal deficiencies.  Resistance to this 
model is perhaps understandable; however exposure to unconventional or marginal 
discourses would be required to avoid a ‘knowledge vacuum’.  There is certainly 
evidence that exposure to an ‘alternative’ world view of psychosis enables people 
living with psychotic experiences to successfully side-step popularized institutional 
and conventional wisdom (Heriot-Maitland et al., 2011).  In comparing two groups of 
people with psychotic experiences (clinical (C) and non-clinical (NC)) these authors 
found that “prior conceptual knowledge” (usually supernatural) and “open attitudes” 
helped NC participants integrate their experiences enabling an optimistic outlook and 
avoidance of psychiatric services.   These unconventional discourses may be more 
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positive, accepting and even celebratory of psychotic experiences and therefore 
potentially more attractive.  For instance, some people find relief and contentment in 
framing their psychotic experiences within a non-material spiritualistic realm (Jackson 
and Fulford, 1997), some believing their psychotic experiences lead to ‘gifts’ 
providing insight into a world beyond normal human consciousness (McCarthy-Jones 
et al., 2013).  
 
Further to this, a number of cognitive models have been hypothesised lending support 
to the continuum hypothesis above (chapter 1) and below (part B); associating 
psychosis with adversity and trauma, linking persistent negative emotional processes 
with the development and continuation of psychotic experiences (Garety et al., 2007).  
The cognitive model of psychosis has therefore been expanded to include the 
possibility of linking environmental and social causations to psychotic experiences 
taking into consideration the emotional impact on the likelihood of psychotic 
experiences to appear and endure.  Garety et al (2007) believe that this will lead to: “A 
better understanding of the relationship of social adversity and trauma with 
psychosis, and the mediating role of emotional processes, schemas and information 
processing abnormalities” (p1388) in order to improve therapeutic attempts to 
ameliorate said processes.  However, mention of ‘information processing 
abnormalities’ may indicate a persistent focusing on symptom reduction and 
encourage a continuing dichotomy between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ human 
experiences that some people with PLEs oppose, resist and try to avoid.         
  
Laing (1964) believed that a transcendental process whereby existential meaning 
could be derived from psychotic experiences, leading to renewal and liberation for the 
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psychotic person – a ‘break down to break through’.  The psychotic experience is 
essentially meaningful and needs to be engaged, not challenged and labelled as reality 
alien from naturally adaptive human occurrences as prescribed by the biological and 
cognitive models described above.  Liberation for the individual is achieved primarily 
through therapeutic means whereby psychotic experiences are understood as: “a 
special strategy that a person invents in order to live in an unliveable situation” 
(Laing, 1967, p95).   For Laing and others like him, psychosis is a product of 
unbearable social life that finds expression through symbolic speech and behaviours.  
Psychotherapy, and in particular psychodynamic therapy has evolved to engage this 
symbolism creating its own approaches and language that is impacted on and by 
social discourses (Carruthers, 2009)   
     
 
2.8 Psychosis, Psychotherapeutics and Psychodynamics   
Here I refer to Psychotherapeutics as ‘talking therapies’ practiced within the fields of 
psychotherapy, psychology and counselling (Parker, 1998; Rose, 1999).  This includes 
Cognitive Models of therapy as referred to above.    
  
Psychotherapeutics have been developed to alleviate mental and emotional distress 
through the raising of self-awareness, self-reflection and appropriate change in 
behaviour by the ‘client’ facilitated by the therapist (Palmer, 2015). The application of 
psychotherapeutics involves reconstruction and ‘meaning making’ which has an 
obvious dependency on language, observed to be temporal (Avdi and Georgaca, 
2007).  It has been pointed out that psychotherapeutics, as with all human 
interventions, do not operate in a closed space but responds to and is impacted on by 
socio-cultural environments (Avdi and Georgaca, 2007; Carruthers, 2007).  In other 
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words, psychotherapeutics does not operate in a vacuum; is influenced by the world 
beyond the constructed therapeutic space and language therein.      
 
There is an ever-expanding range of approaches and techniques involved in the 
application of psychotherapeutics influenced by a number of overarching theoretical 
frameworks (Garfield, 2006; Engel, 2008) 4.  However, it is not the therapeutic 
orientation that is of real issue here, but the impact psychotherapeutics may have on 
discourse around psychosis.   
   
Below, particular attention is paid to psychoanalyses and psychodynamics.  Their 
impact on prevailing notions surrounding human nature has been substantial and 
enduring (Cluely and Desmond, 2015).  The assumption that conflicts of 
consciousness are at the heart of psychological and emotional distress is consistent 
within both camps.   Their compatibility is such that the two terms are interchangeable 
in the context of this section of the thesis.  Their influence on psychotherapeutics (in 
particular alluded to in the introductory lines of this section) is that psychoanalysis is 
the originator of “insight oriented therapy” (Silver, 2001) - the rationale for most 
psychotherapeutic work.   
Contrary to social constructionism, psychoanalytic and psychodynamic theorists tend 
to believe that there are core elements to being a person eg; the psyche, personality.  
Personality and Psyche are believed to be made up of core non-material structures and 
energies that motivate toward particular decisions and actions.   The Psyche involves 
_____________________________________________________________________  
4 (Richie, 1980 records over 250 approaches to psychotherapy; Garfield, 2006 notes over 800 
approximately 25 years later)  
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 ‘psychic processes’ where conscious and unconscious conflicts arise; personality is 
described in terms of a relatively permanent yet fluid fixture belonging to the 
individual eg; a “functional complex” (Jung, 1971).    
 
The goal of psychodynamic therapy is to help the client become aware of 
unconscious, psychic driven conflicts that lead to personal distress.  It is unconscious 
conflicts that have the greatest impact on human behaviours, where traumatic, or other 
life experiences such as those involving problematic transitions during key stages of 
emotional and psychological development, are ‘enclosed’.  Correspondingly, socially 
objectionable beliefs and desires can be hidden from view and can be addressed 
through a number of therapeutic techniques.  The therapeutic objective is an increase 
in awareness and appropriate behavioural change for the client.  The capacity for 
psychological and behavioural insight is a prerequisite for successful psychodynamic 
work.   
 
Sigmund Freud, founder of psychoanalysis divided neurosis and psychosis, making 
distinctions as to the route to these potentially problematic conditions: “in neurosis the 
ego suppresses part of the id out of allegiance to reality, whereas in psychosis it lets 
itself be carried away by the id and detached from a part of reality” (as cited by 
Altamura et al., 2009, p490) 5  
    
Therefore, individuals experiencing psychosis have difficulty with emotional and 
behavioural regulation becoming somewhat uninhibited by social convention.  
 Freud consequently believed that an element of control and self-awareness is 
available to people with neurotic problems (for example phobias and psychosomatic 
complaints) through an attachment with reality; with limited control and self-
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awareness (due to a disconnect with reality), available to individuals experiencing 
psychosis. 
 
He also believed that psychotic symptoms such as delusions were akin to dream states 
when a “time sense” was lacking (Kumar, Soren and Chaudhury, 2009).  Freud held 
that interpretation of dreams could reveal unconscious conflicts that lead to emotional 
and psychological problems.  During sleep, conscious efforts to suppress (or repress) 
noteworthy memories or hidden desires are diminished.  The content of the dream is 
symbolic of a desire for something that is often socially inhibited.  This leads to 
unconscious and preconscious tensions.  Clients who are encouraged to remember 
dreams could begin to make associations between their content, underlying 
problematic psychological and emotional states.  As the psychotic individual is 
regularly involved in a mental state akin to ‘sleep’ their ability to engage in this 
component of psychoanalytic work is greatly restricted. 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 Freud, described three main components of human personality – the id, ego and super-ego.  The id 
represents inherent natural instincts and drives of our being such as desires and impulses that motivate 
us toward personal gratification and pleasure.  Unlike the id which operates at an unconscious level, the 
ego adheres to the ‘reality principle’ acting as a social barometer as to how and under what conditions 
the id may be discharged.  Finally, the Super-Ego is involved in maintaining a relation with the ‘outer 
world’ through the repression of the id in order to enable social acceptance.  The super-ego develops 
during a stage in development where an awareness and requirement to social convention is compelled 
such as morals and values that are expected of the individual.  The ego attempts to moderate the 
passions of the id and defines what is realistic in relation to moral expectations that inform the superego.  
The ego therefore separates what are socially acceptable and personally achievable (realistic) behaviours 
from natural drives.  
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Although Freud questioned the capacity for individuals suffering from psychosis to 
engage reality, he believed symptoms of psychosis had a potential healing function:  
 
 “The delusional formation, which we take to be the pathological product, is in reality 
an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction.”  (Freud 1910, cited by 
McGlashan, 2009, p478). The process of reconstruction described here has undergone 
further development within the field of psychodynamic theory.  Lacan proposed that 
psychotic delusions and hallucinations are part of the development of a stabilization 
strategy.  He puts forward the case that a break between the signifier and signified 
occurs during psychotic states ie; objects are misinterpreted, misrepresented, 
responded to inappropriately or never affirmed with the experience and knowledge of 
the ‘real’ becoming disjointed and distorted.  From initial confusion and a struggle for 
meaningful language the psychotic person reattaches themselves to a form of social 
reality; eg; paranoid and/or delusional beliefs (Redmond, 2013).    
Jung, like Freud also compared psychotic experiences to a dream state. Similar to 
Lacan and Freud he believed the psychotic experience had a compensatory effect, that 
of rebalancing that which has become intolerably unbalanced and that the psychotic 
experience is understandable, almost universal and not beyond the reach of 
rationalisation:    
 
“These forces did not originate in our patient out of nowhere. They are most 
emphatically not the result of poisoned brain cells, but are normal constituents of our 
unconscious psyche. They appeared in numberless dreams, in the same or a similar 
form, at a time of life when seemingly nothing was wrong. And they appear in dreams 
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of normal people who never get anywhere near a psychosis” (Jung, 1939, citied by 
Unger, 2012).   
 
 “More than once I have seen that even with such patients there remains in the 
background a personality which must be called normal. It stands looking on, so to 
speak…Through my work with patients I realized that paranoid ideas and 
hallucinations contain a gem of meaning” (Jung, 1995, citied by Unger, 2012).  
  
The therapist role within psychodynamics, is to observe then assist the interpretation 
of conscious/unconscious/preconscious declarations in order to resolve past/present 
experiences that have led to personal distress.  This can place the therapist in a 
privileged position; that of an enabler to help the unravelling of problematic psychic 
experiences.   
2.9 Psychotherapeutics on the couch  
An ambivalent relationship between society and psychotherapeutics exists.  On the one 
hand society desires the therapeutic space extending beyond the usual social 
interactions where the client’s private and ‘true self’ is explored; protected by 
confidentiality involving trust and meaningful engagement with another human being.  
This is ‘marketed’ as a process that facilitates necessary and healthy 
readjustments for the individual client (Rose, 1999).  The therapeutic encounter pledges 
‘life-changing’ and life affirming outcomes (Carruthers, 2007; Harari, 2014).  In 
contrast, public confidence and significant criticism of psychotherapeutics exists 
including public doubt on the benefits and limitations of psychotherapy (Furnham and 
Wardly, 1991; Furnham et al., 1992; Carruthers, 2007).  Noted also is an often-
unacknowledged esoteric characteristic to psychotherapeutic theories that maintains the 
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status quo of expert (professional) and non-expert (patient).  The status quo is often 
preserved by language that is abstruse and cryptic, beyond the reaches of everyday 
descriptions of life events and experiences (Hallenstein, 1978).  This can be illustrated 
by presenting commonly used vocabularies within the world of psychotherapeutics eg; 
Ego, Mirroring, Transference, Schemas.  Each in turn have special meaning with 
regards to observations, responses and the nature of engagement taken up by the 
therapist.  Their usage in psychotherapeutic terms can only be understood, become 
meaningful and influential during human encounters if one is in possession of specialist 
knowledge.  Guilfoyle (2002) and Roy-Chowdhury (2003) through the study of 
discourse during psychotherapy sessions observe how therapists can influence client’s 
framing of problems by encouraging an adaption of discourses within a particular 
psychotherapeutic framework.   Gerhardt and Stinson (1995) describe this process in 
terms of: “demand characteristics”; in that they structure the therapist's mode of 
intervention and thus, ultimately, how the therapeutic work is carried out.” (p619) 
Some practitioners have gone as far as rejecting the fundamental basis of their 
psychotherapeutic training.  Dylan Evans, an adherent of Lacanian Psychoanalytic 
descent for over a decade found his teachings to be full of “internal contradictions”,,  
“bizarre rhetoric” and “obfuscatory language”, concluding: “This obscurity [of most 
Lacanian writing] has been seen as deliberate attempt to ensure the Lacanian 
discourse remains the exclusive property of a small intellectual elite” (2005, p142)   
  
Society’s ambivalent relationship with psychotherapeutics along with evidence of 
theoretical ‘impermeability’ points to 1. public misgivings and 2. a general 
inaccessibility of the discourses therein.    
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In response to concerns of elitism and intrusive practices, attempts have been made to 
remove the therapist as observer/commentator/interpreter in the guise of Narrative  
Therapy whereby the therapist becomes ‘witness’, facilitating alternative, positive, 
constructive and empowering stories, ultimately led by the client (Combs and  
Freedman, 2012).  However, a problem persists for the therapist:  
  
“How does the counsellor tell the difference between her or his efforts to encourage 
empowering alternative stories and unexamined participation in oppressive 
discourse?  How does re-storying work if it is not just taking up a different subject 
position in a different social discourse?” (Blevins, 2009; p45)   
 
Even within a psychotherapeutic interventionist model developed to liberate and 
deliberately avoid discourse contamination from the therapist the ‘entanglements of 
social discourses’ remains (Blevins, 2009).  The therapist can only hold a certain level 
of consciousness on the influence of their socially informed discourse over another.       
Critical misgivings aside as to the privileged position of the therapist during therapy, 
doubts have been expressed on the presence of psychotherapeutics within a meaning 
making structures dominated by the meta/grand narrative governed by a medical 
system of categorisation warranting coercive and socially alienating practices.  The 
system is prohibitive, restricts access to psychotherapeutics to anyone in the throes of 
a psychotic episode, convenient to its hierarchical structures.    
 
2.10 Psychotherapeutics and prohibitive factors  
Within institutional settings, psychotherapeutics have been noted for their 
exclusionary leanings away from psychosis; in particular psychotherapeutic 
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interventions are typically suspended whilst someone is in an acute psychotic state 
and only become available when the psychosis dissipates and the patient judged ready 
to engage (Lakeman, 2006).  This typically follows a period of intense 
pharmacological treatment leading to compliance and recommendations whereby 
psychological and pharmacological interventions can be combined (Gabbard, 2007; 
Donker et al., 2013; Malmberg, Fenton and Rathbone, 2001).   According to Silver, 
(2001) the lasting impact of this standard response is that: “the patient is not worth 
talking to, is somehow preverbal or perhaps subhuman” (p25).   The Schizophrenia 
Commission (2012) go further noting that it is quite rare for someone diagnosed with 
psychotic illness to be offered ‘talking therapy’ at any stage of their psychosis.  The 
exclusivity implied here is not necessarily the choice of the therapist.  It is integral to 
a system that is governed by a hierarchical programme of care where causative 
models of psychosis are inextricably linked to biological faults, in turn dominating the 
nature of the response to someone in a psychotic state.  It is no surprise then that there 
is a pervading doubt from within psychiatry of the merits and efficacy of 
psychotherapeutic practices, in particular those that propose to exclude 
pharmacological interventions in helping someone with psychosis.   In this vein, as 
with cognitive therapy models discussed above, Gabbard, (2007) argues for 
psychotherapy to be brought in line with an interventionist model of mental illness 
that is attentive to the effects of psychotherapeutic practices on changes within the 
brain.  Perhaps, as Parker et al (1997) note there are strategic and political drivers to 
any acceptance of psychotherapeutics into institutional settings:    
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“The spread of para-medical institutions offering psychoanalyses or psychotherapy as 
a treatment alongside or as an alternative to drugs gives psychiatry a human face, 
and then directs attention to the importance of talking things through”.  (p 12)   
  
To conclude, the above discussion on psychotherapeutics does not amount to an 
outright dismissal or rejection of its merits; nor is it motivated by a devaluing of its 
underlying principles and theoretical underpinnings. Indeed, it is acknowledged that 
there is a growing demand from people with psychosis to access psychotherapy 
(Garety, 2003; Schizophrenia Commission, 2012) and testaments that insight 
orientated therapy has been of great benefit to some people struggling with psychotic 
experiences.  Pertaining to this Cantin (2009) below presents a patient’s discourse:    
  
“In psychoanalysis, one of the things that you do is to try to investigate all your 
memories and dreams – what is the color, what is the scenario, what repeats itself; 
and when one discovers what repeats itself; one realizes that it is certainly not reality 
that makes something repeat, it is our perception, it is or experience, it is not reality” 
(p292)   
  
 What is highlighted is the number of impediments, within and without the 
psychotherapeutic domain, that thwart access to the language and concepts thereof.  It 
is not that someone with psychosis might or might not find a branch of 
psychotherapeutics helpful or unhelpful, liberating or inhibitive in the course of 
making sense of and anchoring their experiences.  The issue raised is their tendency to 
be, for the greater part, inaccessible and of course overshadowed by the meta/grand 
narrative associated with the medicalisation of psychosis.    
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As noted previously, psychotherapeutics is more likely to be embraced within 
traditional institutional care settings if they complement, confirm or become 
consumed within a biological framework eg; a cognitive-therapeutic model.  The 
biological model of psychosis relies on its promotion of a one dimensional relatively 
simplistic model that tends to promote pessimism (Walsh et al., 2008), the necessity 
for pharmacological intervention, in turn justifying social control (Lüllmann, et al.,  
2011).  This relegates social and psychotherapeutic perspectives of psychosis.   The 
absorption of an elementary message that psychosis is underpinned by biological 
faults located within the individual is one that is accessible and readily digested by the 
public (Read et al., 2006).  The challenge for psychotherapeutics in its attempt to 
influence discourse around psychosis is that of credibility and acceptance in a world 
that seeks stability and consistency.   The biological model of mental health (of which 
psychosis belongs) satisfies the governance of public health which endorses 
standardisation of performance, measurements and outcomes (Wainwright, 2015).   
These target driven arrangements are themselves driven by fear of risk to the very 
fabric of society:     
  
“Therapy has been institutionalised as a legitimate and enduring cultural practice, 
integrated into networks of other institutionalised practices (eg. medical, mental 
health, child protection and legal systems).  As therapy is supported and maintained 
by its participation in these and other networks, it may be considered an effect of 
power.  But it is also itself productive of effects: of discourses, practices, subjects and 
further power relations that become part of the broader cultural network”.   
(Guilfoyle, 2005, p103)   
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The epistemological grounds of psychotherapeutics is therefore challenged by social 
demand for robust public health and safety systems.  For reasons outlined their 
potential to liberate or empower the individual experiencing psychosis is limited due 
to institutional arrangements. Finally, there is a danger of psychotherapy, in declining 
the person in the throes of psychosis to be judged as another technology that is part of 
the ‘broken dialogue’ between the mad and the sane, the mentally ill and the 
psychologically well (Foucault, 2006).  The acceptance or rejection of the suitability 
of psychotherapeutics for people experiencing a ‘psychotic break’ is as much a 
political battle as it is a conceptual one.  At risk of contradiction, systemic therapy 
manifested within a system of ‘Open Dialogue’ has been developed to engage 
individuals in acute psychotic state.  This approach appears to have promising 
consequences (Duff, 213) and has to an extent been accepted within some 
concentrated areas of public health services.  This has been referred to already and 
will reappear at the end of this chapter.  In the meantime, interest in Social Causation 
of psychosis in the form of life adversity has been growing, specifically among those 
who claim that psychosis is a product of significant negative life events and social 
injustices and should be addressed appropriately at cultural and political levels.    
 
A 2.11 Beyond the meta/grand narrative   
 
The illness and/or medical and biological model as many refer to, has met with 
significant challenges.  Szasz (1961; 1970) denies mental illness (and by association 
psychotic illnesses) exist.  He argues that the term mental illness is a metaphor for  
‘problems of living’.  Individuals experiencing extreme human states such as 
psychosis are grappling with moral dilemmas in relation to their conduct and 
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apprehension of the world.  Indeed Szasz (2004) believes hallucinations to be 
examples of self-deception and calls delusions “lies”, social strategies in order to 
deceive and mitigate social failure: “I view hallucinations as disowned self-
conversations and delusions as stubborn errors or lies.” (p234).  Psychiatric 
diagnoses rely on observation and illness cannot be presupposed from behaviour.  
Similar arguments have followed.   A number of scholars, academics and health 
professionals point out that there is no irrefutable evidence that psychotic symptoms 
are comparable to medical conditions ie; illness or disorder (Boyle, 2002; Ingleby, 
1981).  There is no physical test to ascertain this and the history of medical treatments 
for psychotic disorders are at the least suspect, with deficient evidence for chemical or 
biological cures (Moncrieff, 2007).    
The convincing nature of the assertion that psychotic experiences are indicative of 
illness stems from the rise of positivism and categorisation.  As a scientific enterprise, 
what is termed the bio-medical model of psychosis (Read, Mosher and Bentall, 2004) 
enables “psychiatric power and medical metaphors associated with it” to 
manufacture ‘madness’ across a growing number of societies (Roberts and Hitten, 
2006, p.786) Even though this view is highly persuasive and influential creating a 
meta-narrative linking psychotic experiences with illness, universal acceptance is 
wanting.  There are a number of alternative narratives, or meaning making systems 
and approaches, available that can influence ‘stories’ constructed by those who have 
personal experience.  These will be explored later in part B of this chapter onwards.   
  
Before doing so evidence indicating the prevalence of psychotic experiences among  
‘non-psychiatric’ populations is expanded upon.  This will enable an exploration of 
psychotic experiences beyond medical interpretation, opening up world views that lie 
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outside the physical and practical confinements offered up by the illness model that 
dominates the meaning making systems that make up the meta/grand narrative of 
psychotic experiences.  
A 2.12 Psychotic Like Experiences.  
Clinical need, as defined by psychiatry, is often used to distinguish between normally 
distributed psychotic experiences (PLEs) and psychotic illness.  Psychotic like 
experiences have been reported among the general population (see for example van 
Os et al., 2000; Johns and van Os, 2001) described in terms of a “dimension of the 
human experience” (Stip and Letourneau, 2009).  From an evolutionary perspective 
on the incidence of psychosis in the general population and possible links with 
psychotic illness, Kelleher et al (2010) suggest: ‘the limited success in findings in 
schizophrenia to date may be a result of shared genetic variation between the clinical  
(disease) phenotype and the non-clinical (symptom) phenotype’ (p167).    
  
Among 12,992 house-hold respondents in New Zealand Gale et al (2011) found 7.3 % 
had experienced psychotic-like events.  Visual and auditory hallucinations were most 
commonly reported - 5.3% and 2.8% respectively.  The authors imply that thresholds 
exist whereby conversion from PLEs and psychotic illness potentially occurs.  This 
would depend on, for instance, the number of times a psychotic-like event is 
experienced.  According to van Os et al (2009) PLEs are on the whole transitory 
subclinical states.  It is postulated that PLEs are governed by a psychosis phenotype 
that can express itself, triggered, by as yet to be fully understood circumstances.  
Escher (2010) observes that 5% of undiagnosed children experience verbal 
hallucinations.  In a three-year longitudinal study involving 80 children (mean age, 
12.9 years) who hear voices, of which 50% were not receiving mental health care, 
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Escher et al (2002) found that approximately 60% experienced a gradual reduction 
over time, with the majority ending in discontinuation.  It was found that the majority 
of verbal hallucinations were associated with major life events and that favourable 
outcomes depended on appraisal of the voices by parent(s) and child and less to do 
with the perception itself.  Remberk (2017) in reviewing literature on PLEs makes a 
similar conclusion that for most children and adolescents the experience disappears 
over time.  These findings would support van Os et al’s continuum hypothesis.  In 
order for the phenotype to ‘reveal’ itself and indeed find resolution, exposure to 
significant environmental influences or events needs to occur.      
  
Estimates for the prevalence of PLEs in the general population vary from 1% (Eaton 
et al., 1991) to 17.5% (van Os et al., 2000).   Johns and van Os (2001) argue that 
psychosis is not a separate state removed from normal consciousness.  Rather, it is a 
state that sits on a continuum in normal consciousness.  In a systematic review of 
literature on the psychosis continuum van Os et al (2009) found that ‘The data 
therefore suggest that subclinical psychotic experiences are prevalent, but mostly self-
limiting and of good outcome, although a small proportion go on to develop a clinical 
psychotic disorder’  (p190)  Similarly, Kline et al (2014) in assessing 66 adolescents 
and young adults experiencing PLEs found if respondents described their PLE as 
“neutral or positive” the need for clinical high-risk screening and therefore 
intervention was deemed unnecessary. Persistence and severity of psychotic 
experiences, exposure to environmental risk and ability to cope and relate appear to be 
significant factors in determining if the individual reaches a state of clinical need (van 
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Notwithstanding the evidence presented above, PLEs continue to be associated with 
psychiatric disorders, in particular the onset of severe mental illness such as 
schizophrenia.  It has been noted that when an individual approaches a psychiatrist 
and reports psychotic experiences, there is a strong likelihood that they will be 
diagnosed with a mental illness and receive treatment - most likely pharmacological. 
For instance, Romme and Escher (2000) estimate there is an 80% chance of being 
diagnosed schizophrenic if you tell a psychiatrist that you hear voices. Boyle (2002) 
comments: “voice hearing is likely to lead to a diagnostic label whose social 
functioning has already been devalued” (p266) pointing to a dual pathway to 
becoming schizophrenic.  Rosenhan (1973) found that presenting at a psychiatric unit 
and reporting hearing a single word ‘thud’ in their head was enough to be hospitalised 
and receive a psychiatric diagnosis. With population estimates for auditory 
hallucinations varying between 2-4% (Eaton et al., 1991; Tien 1991) a large number 
of voice hearers could potentially receive treatment for a psychotic disorder.    
  
There has been much focus on early phase psychosis among much of the academic and 
clinical research applying terms such as ‘psychosis proneness’, ‘schizotypy’ or ‘at-risk 
mental states’.  Yet, Kuipers (2008) in a review of literature on early intervention 
informs us that during the early phase of psychosis: “we have no way of yet knowing 
what markers, biological or social, predict better or worse outcomes, or would respond 
to less treatment” (p148).  The upshot of Kuiper’s review, Romme and Esher’s 
observation and the association between PLEs in the general population and the 
psychosis phenotype is that people sharing their PLE experiences with others could 
potentially be subjected to psychiatric classification.  Certainly, speculation prevails 
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linking the presence of PLEs with the onset of psychotic illness attached to biological 
or/and genetic defects inherent in the individual.    
                
Causal links between PLEs, in particular genetic and biological deficits, are assigned to 
such experiences even though PLEs are not uncommon among general populations.  A 
population-based survey in Australia found that 11.7% of 10641 respondents endorsed 
one or more items designed to identify delusion-like experiences (Scott et al.,  
2006).  
  
What is commonly termed the biological or medical model of mental illness has gone 
through a process of globalisation where the physical or material world is placed over 
and above non-material conceptions (spirit, soul) and has, to a large extent, become 
publicly accepted wisdom and an authoritative discourse on psychosis (Kirmayer, 
2006).  Indeed, the public imagination on a materialist representation of human 
behaviour and experience has been promoted at the highest political level.   
President George Bush announced in July 1990 that the 1990s would be designated 
“The Decade of the Brain”. In considering the impact, Jones and Mendell (1999) state  
that:  
  
“Public recognition of the importance of studies of the spinal cord, brain, behaviour 
and mind is evident in the remarkable bipartisan congressional support for the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) in general and neuroscience in particular, during 
the past few years.  There has also been more media attention to breakthroughs in 
neuroscience during Decade of the Brain” and that: “We believe that the DOB has 
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strongly enhance(d) public awareness of the benefits to be derived from brain 
research” (p739).    
 
  
Particular attention is given to neuropsychiatric diseases, worthy of receiving much 
consideration within this scientific enterprise.   
  
To summarise, the continuum hypothesis places serious doubts in establishing a clear 
demarcation between those with PLEs from those with a distinct psychotic illness 
(Stip and Letourneau, 2009).  Further to this, studies demonstrate that individuals with 
no history of psychotic experiences can begin to hallucinate if placed in particular 
settings eg; studies where participants are subjected to sensory deprivation 
environments (see for example Mason and Brady, 2009; Daniel, Lovatt and Mason, 
2014) or under significant stress and/or experiencing disruptions to normal sleep 
behaviour (Barnes et al., 2011).  The implications of such studies, that potentially 
anyone is able to hallucinate, could have far reaching consequences influencing how 
we understand, relate to and construct discourses around psychotic experiences.    A 
normalisation process may follow which a number of ‘alternative’ discourses, ulterior 
meaning making systems and approaches to the deficit models of psychotic 
experiences purport to be offering.   Other descriptions that appear in the literature 
involve theories and ideologies that lay challenges to or ‘problematize’ the dominant 
discourse that is the meta/grand narrative.  These as I described earlier comprise of 
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Part B 2.13 Psychosis and life adversity    
In an 18-month follow-up of a national survey (office for national statistics, 2000) 
carried out in Great Britain, Wiles et al (2006) found a 4.4% incidence rate of 
psychotic experience adding more weight behind a normalising trajectory of psychotic 
experiences.  Further, delusional like experiences were found to be relatively common 
among the general population (Varghese et al., 2008).  The authors found over a third 
of the 310 ‘non-psychotic individuals’ experienced significant levels of psychotic 
experiences and that there was a correlate between delusional like experiences and 
other psychotic symptoms.  Those who reported delusional like experiences were 
likely to experience hallucinations and thought disorder.  Surveys and studies above 
have prompted interest into reasons why psychotic experiences occur in the first 
place, who is most likely to experience psychotic events and what causalities are 
involved.      
Leaving aside arguments around evidence and the strength of theories aligned with 
positivistic notions above, there is substantive proof that psychotic experiences are 
associated with life events where a direct causation is implied.  It has become 
common place to bracket this causative link within a trauma model of psychosis 
inferring universal application (McGrath et al., 2017).  However, I will present that 
the ‘trauma model’ has its own bearing on persons living with psychotic experiences.       
  
B 2.13.1 The undesired consequences of the trauma model  
There are a range of theories and conditions influencing trauma studies, usually 
involving biological, psychological and sociological dimensions.  According to  
Lacqueur (2010) these have become so broad in application that trauma, has become 
“a ‘floating signifier' that denotes any number of ills which have little in common 
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other than the name" (p19).  From a positioning perspective trauma is “to some extent 
a discursive or epiphenomenal construction with political and strategic effects” 
(Eagle, 2014, p3).  Trauma as a concept is compelled by a social system that builds 
hierarchies of worthiness ie; who is most likely or more deserved to be believed to 
experience a traumatic response to life events (Eagle, 2014).  It must be noted that 
even though evidence of causative links between life events and onset of psychosis is 
growing, not everyone who experiences significant life adversities will develop 
psychosis, and not everyone who develops psychotic experiences has reported major 
life adversities (Bentall, 2011).  Moreover, there is a danger that all psychotic events 
become associated with trauma, deep suffering and personal casualty discouraging 
positive dimensions thereof.   The hierarchy referred above is often built upon models 
of illness and disorder, with those acknowledged and categorised left with a “previous 
sense of identity unstable” reluctantly propelled to take up a “subject position of 
victim” (Eagle, 2014, p18).  This compromised subject position reduces the prospect 
of presenting a positive perspective on psychotic experiences.        
Following the above, the discursive nature of trauma as a concept leaves wide open 
questions on its everyday applicability.  Rather than becoming embroiled in a debate 
on what constitutes trauma, its appropriate usage and applicability regarding psychotic 
experiences, or of being accused of taking up a personal position, I have chosen to 
refer to evidence of an array of life adversities that demonstrate increased risk of 
experiencing psychotic events.  As noted, PLES have been found to have a beneficial 
and positive impact on individuals which may be lost if an automatic assumption of 
traumatic causality leading to ‘disablism’ and taking on the ‘sick role’ is made. 
(Under the section titled ‘Recovery, resistance, self-preservation and reclaiming 
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identity’ below I explore further the concept and implications of ‘disablism’ and 
resistance to the ‘sick role’).  
These studies indicate a trajectory of normalising and humanising the psychotic 
experience ie; causality of the psychotic experience is fixed on the environment, 
beyond the individual.  Reasons for their occurrence are understandable, with 
potential to change public discourse and response to the psychotic experience in a 
favourable direction.  However, as I present later below public discourse, dominated 
by the meta/grand narratives does not necessarily flow in that direction.   
 
B 2.14 Life events, life adversities and psychotic experiences  
 
As described above, by focusing on internal deficits the cognitive and biological 
models of psychosis tend to underplay the potential impact of the environment on 
psychotic experiences.   Concerns with environmental risk to developing psychosis 
have been highlighted by a variety of empirical studies.  In a review of childhood 
adversity, psychosis and schizophrenia Read et al (2005) found a high incidence of 
past neglect, physical and sexual abuse among people diagnosed with psychotic 
disorder.  In a retrospective study involving 17,337 participants, Whitfield et al (2005) 
found a five-fold increase in reporting of hallucinations among people who 
experienced adverse childhood events compared to those reporting no adverse 
childhood events.  Romme and Escher (2006) found that 77% of people diagnosed 
with schizophrenia heard voices that were associated with past traumatic experiences  
(eg; childhood neglect, bullying and marital violence).  Read et al (2013) included 
deprivation, isolation and emigration to be contributing factors to developing 
problematic psychotic experiences.  The impact of stressful life events such as 
bereavement (Rees 1971; Olson et al., 1985) is also associated with psychotic 
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experiences.  Stress Vulnerability (Zubin and Springer, 1997) models (whereby an 
increase of life stresses increases the risk of mental ill health) may have something to 
offer here.  Surveys carried out in Britain have shown that within 6 months of a negative 
life event a significant number of individuals experienced psychotic symptoms (Johns 
et al, 2004; Wiles et al., 2006) and that the greater number of adverse events an 
individual is exposed to the more likely they are to develop psychotic experiences 
(Shevlin et al., 2008; Rosen et al., 2017).    
 
Reasons for the occurrence of PLEs becomes understandable, with potential to change 
public discourse and respond to the psychotic experience empathetically.  However, in 
my presentation of public discourse below the meta/grand narrative presides over 
much of the public perceptions of psychotic experiences and in turn how people tend 
to speak about these human experiences.   
 
B 2.15 The social divide  
Moskowitz and Corstens (2007) reviewed characteristics of voices encountered by 
non-psychiatric patients, psychiatric patients with dissociative experiences and those 
formally diagnosed with schizophrenia.  The authors found non-specific differences 
between the voices each group experienced.  Heriot-Maitland et al (2011) also found 
little qualitative differences between clinical and non-clinical groups experiencing 
hallucinations and delusions.  One major difference between these groups was the 
level of validation of psychotic experiences received from participant’s social worlds.  
As with studies quoted in the above section where a positive discourse might enable 
those with psychotic experiences to live more harmoniously with delusions and 
hallucinations, if validation was present, the likelihood for clinical intervention was 
dissipated.  Escher et al (2004) found that among 80 children who heard voices most 
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(85%) associated them with negative life events such as physical and sexual abuse; 
bullying and major lose.  The authors were quick to note that the majority were able to 
cope without professional support.  Similarly, Kelleher et al (2013) in a longitudinal 
study of 13-16 year olds found a dose response to exposure of physical assault and 
bullying - the more severe and prolonged participants were exposed to these traumatic 
events the higher the risk in developing psychosis.  They also found the dose response 
where cessation in exposure to trauma tended to lead to a significant reduction in 
psychotic experiences.            
  
Further to the above and at odds with the genetic theory of psychosis Fisher et al  
(2014) in a comparative study found that among 172 “first presentation psychosis 
cases” familial risk did not account for any significant association between childhood 
physical abuse and psychotic disorder.  In other words, childhood abuse was shown to 
be causatively associated with onset of psychosis independent of genetic factors.  
Fisher et al (2014) (also see 2.14.2 above) point to the importance of the social 
environment in ‘making or breaking’ psychosis.    Notwithstanding divergent views 
on the levels of significance of genetic and social effects influencing the onset of 
psychosis (van Os and McGuffin, 2003) there is reason to believe that theories of 
social causation of psychosis is more beneficial to those with psychotic experiences as 
personal deficiencies can be extinguished, redirected toward external forces ie; life 
events, social circumstances and cultural contexts.  Certainly, a significant number of 
people diagnosed with a psychotic disorder have long expressed frustrations with 
ideologies that have colonised discourses associated with psychotic experiences (eg; 
the ‘biomedical’ model; Speed, 2011).  Dillon (2013a,b) a self-professed voice hearer 
and ex-psychiatric patient believes that  “Clinically loaded language” has led to the 
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silencing of a group in society that would be better served if public recognition of 
social injustices, such as personal trauma, were acknowledged and ‘reclamation’ via  
‘personal storying’, counter narratives and decolonisation of language took place.  The 
emancipatory process described involves a shift in culture where subjectivity 
comprising life events, adversity and social environments take precedence over 
neurobiological and genetic causative explanations as primary routes to psychosis  
(Barrantes-Vidal, 2014; Read, Dillon and Lampshire, 2014).  
    
2.16 Psychosis and culture  
As demonstrated above, theories on psychotic experiences tend to be understood as 
environmentally provoked inextricably linked with internal (biological and 
psychological) failings.  Models aligned to these ‘illness’ or deficit driven theories 
have been shown to create a restrictive and disapproving framework of psychotic 
experiences.  There is ample evidence demonstrating high levels of stigma attached to 
mental illness, in particular psychosis, throughout Westernised countries (Kelly, 2006; 
Thornicroft, 2006; Lakeman et al., 2012; Macgabhann et al., 2010).   Psychotic 
experiences are on the whole unacceptable and threatening to ‘normal’ society 
(Thornicroft et al., 2007).  This high level of unacceptability stems from media 
reporting of psychotic experiences often informed by the deficit models described 
above rendering them beyond and “outside moral order” (Leuder and Thomas, 2001).  
Genetic dispositions and cognitive deficits portray the individual as helpless to resist 
impulsions brought on by psychotic events.  However, psychotic experiences are 
sometimes acceptable and in some social settings encouraged (Jackson and Fulford, 
1997).    
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Psychotic experiences have been associated with mystical experiences, particularly in 
relation to religious practices (Jackson and Fulford, 1997; Bret, 2003.) These authors 
argue that there is significant similarity between mystical experiences and psychotic 
symptoms.  It is therefore difficult to ascertain if they are signs of pathology.  
Shamanistic practices encourage and have been shown to induce psychotic 
experiences - such as hearing voices (eg; of the dead) and visions (Stephen and 
Suryani, 2000).  Shamanistic rituals are in some cases described as cultural invitations 
to psychotic experiences such as visions and hallucinations in order to connect with 
the ‘world beyond’ for example through spirit possession.  Cultural invitations to 
‘other worldly’ experiences also occur where spiritual training takes place as in 
Tibetan vision meditation and among congregations of Christian Charismatic 
Churches eg; hearing the voice of God (Dein and Littlewood, 2007; Luhrmann, 2010.)  
Differences between reporting rates of auditory and visual hallucinations are also 
evident.  Bauer et al (2011) highlight diversities between cultures such as rates of 
reporting of visual hallucinations among West African populations (54% Ghanians 
and 51% Nigerians) against a low rate of 4% among Islamic Pakistanis.   Lurhmann 
(2011) posits that the impact of culture on psychotic experiences is its influence on 
representations of the mind and the learning environment that focuses on particular 
experiences.  Absorption is the ability to focus on the minds ‘power’ to imagine while 
diminishing external distractions of every-day life and is applied when ‘accessing’ 
psychotic experiences in ritualistic and religious settings.  The important point to note 
here is that psychotic experiences can be influenced, encouraged and prompted by 
social occasions.  How people interpret and react to these is greatly influenced by 
expectations set by cultural and social biases.   In the situations described the 
psychotic experience tends to be short lived, benign, managed through ritualistic acts.   
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Devereux (2000[1956]) is adamant that: “the shaman is mentally deranged” (p. 226).  
Stephen and Suryani (2000) and Luhrmann (2010) however make the point that there 
is a fundamental difference between pathological and non-pathological hallucinations.  
In accordance to these observations psychotic experiences that occur, prompted and 
encouraged in religious and ritualistic settings belong to the latter category.  Given the 
distinction made here between psychotic events that occur via ritualistic inducement, 
managed through social settings and those that are brought on by life events out of a 
person’s control it would be reasonable to conclude that they likely belong to the 
category of Psychotic Like Experiences ie; perceived as benign.   
Castillo (2003) argues that functional psychoses can be interpreted as a trance like 
state. Those experiencing transient functional psychoses in non-Western cultures, 
particularly where ritualised meditative trance states are practiced, are 10 times more 
likely to achieve recovery than Western counterparts.  Castillo concludes that:  
  
“egocentrism and a loss of spiritual explanations for psychosis in Western cultures 
constructs a clinical situation in which persons with functional psychoses are treated 
for a biogenetic (incurable) brain disease rather than a curable spiritual illness.”    
  
And that:  
  
“Recognizing cultural differences in symptoms, indigenous diagnoses, and treatment 
for functional psychoses can help explain the dramatic cross-cultural differences in 
outcome.”  (p9)    
A number of reviews have indeed shown considerable variations in prevalence and  
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incidence rates of schizophrenia across cultures (Jablensky, 2000; Goldner et al., 
2002; Saha et al., 2005; McGrath et al., 2008).  The heterogeneity of incidence and 
prevalence rates puts in question a purely biological basis of schizophrenia 
highlighting strong cultural and societal influences.  However, there are those that 
insist that schizophrenia is a cross cultural, global phenomenon.    
2.17 Cross cultural psychiatry  
Psychiatric diagnoses have also been argued to be relevant to and applicable 
regardless of conceivable cultural clashes with psychiatric classification systems  
(Barrett, 2004).  Mzimkulu and Simbayi (2006) investigated Xhosa speaking African 
traditional healers note that symptoms identified by healers were close to DSM-IV 
criteria suggesting that Western and traditional healing systems are able to co-exist.  
The traditional healers believed that casual explanations of psychotic experiences 
involved witchcraft, spirit possession, angered ancestors and genetic predispositions.  
Healing methods used included washing, steaming and inducement to vomit in 
managing and treating psychosis.  Mzimkulu and Simbayi (2006) suggest that in these 
contexts attempts to understand and address psychotic behaviours, engages a common 
response sequence of diagnoses, aetiology and treatment.  Culture, according to these 
authors cannot be used to deny the existence of psychosis and psychotic illness yet 
variances in established systems (eg; Western interventions vs traditional 
interventions) in addressing these specific human experiences exist.                      
Stein (2008) identified three perspectives in comparing Western medicine and 
traditional healing.  The first highlights a stark mismatch between Western medicine 
and traditional healing; the second questions the privileged view of Western medicine 
pointing out that both systems have an element of efficacy; the third that Western 
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medicine and traditional healing comprise social activities reflecting cultural values.  
Each perspective will undoubtedly create different discourses with regards psychosis, 
influencing how society should react to these human experiences.  However, even 
though in some parts of the world traditional healing is commonly utilised by those 
with psychotic experiences, evidence would suggest that Western interventions in the 
form of conventional treatments is becoming increasingly globalised with minimum 
consideration given to cultural diversity (Kirmayer, 2006).    Muga and Jenkins (2008) 
surveying public views of mental health policy in Kenya found that although the 
public endorsed a biopsychosocial view of mental illness (a ‘holistic’ model 
incorporating biology/genetics, psychological and social/environmental influences) 
they expected mental health services to focus on one interventional component – that 
of a biological/pharmacological nature.  Public discourse on mental illness, and by 
association psychosis, it would seem is increasingly dominated by empiricist 
accounting and scientific models with biological underpinnings, largely ignoring 
cultural contexts.  Bracken and Thomas (2010) see this as a major challenge to 
psychiatry: “The fundamental question that faces psychiatry is: … can a discourse be 
produced that … is sensitive to the complexity of our embodied, encultured nature?” 
(p222)     
 
The individual’s ability to relate and cope with psychotic experiences is therefore 
significantly influenced by cultural and social milieus.  These milieus, as 
demonstrated above, are able to provide social circumstances where meaning making 
systems and approaches that embrace and facilitate the psychotic experience can be 
introduced transforming systems and approaches that currently dominate public 
response to the psychotic experience.  Recently, ‘Recovery’ has become part of a new, 
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hopeful and optimistically loaded shift in discourse linked with all that is mental 
health including psychotic experiences.     
     
B 2.18 Recovery, coping and relating  
The idea of recovery originated from patient narratives and is a relatively new, 
imprecise concept in the world of modern mental health services (Bracken, 2007; 
Bellack and Drapalski, 2012).   Recovery has been defined many times and there does 
not appear to be a consensus as to a single definition (Ralph and Corrigan, 2007).  The 
idea of recovery has challenged the pessimistic view of psychosis, its association with 
illness and long-term disability (Barker et al., 1999; Coleman, 1999; Thornhill et al., 
2004; Ralph and Corrigan, 2007).    According to Pilgrim (2008) there are three 
usages of the term recovery:   
  
1. Recovery from invalidation (survival)  
2. Recovery from impairment (rehabilitation)  
3. Recovery from illness (treatment)  
  
Numbers 2 and 3 tend to be institutionally orientated. They emphasise mental illness  
(including psychotic illness) as indicative of disability to be ‘treated’ with actions 
required for rehabilitative purposes. Number 1 orientates toward social influences on 
recovery.  Invalidation toward psychotic persons and strivings to cope (survival) 
involves the individual socially situating themselves, as someone who, among other 
things, critique language used to define them.  Discourses of resistance are at work and 
coping with psychotic experiences are often non-institutional. Much of the recovery 
literature is written by individuals who have redefined themselves beyond psychiatric 
systems and psychiatric diagnoses (eg; Deegan, 1993; May, 2000; Bassman, 2007). The 
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social consequences for non-psychiatric populations who live with psychotic 
experiences is that they find relief and support through non-institutional means.  Based 
on 100 narrative interviews with individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia and in 
reviewing qualitative research on the disorder Davidson (2003) concludes that:     
 
“most of the work of recovery happens in the person’s life outside of treatment  
relationships and settings”.  P203    
 
Social variables therefore play an important part in ‘living outside and beyond mental 
illness’ (Timander and Möller, 2016)  
  
B 2.19 Recovery, resistance, self-preservation and reclaiming 
identity   
Over recent years three studies have been conducted on recovery and mental illness in 
Ireland (Roberts, 2009; Karatlova and Doherty, 2010; Watts, 2012).  Although 
diagnoses of participants was not always specified the importance of social 
opportunities in redefining a place in the world after mental breakdown was 
highlighted, as was discovering communities where social acceptance was found and 
self-acceptance allowed to flourish.  Social opportunities often provided structure to 
cope with the aftermath of major mental health problems (psychosis included) and 
facilitated the relating of experiences – most significantly with peers who have 
experienced their own major mental health problems.  Similarly, Philbin (2009) found 
a level of resistance to psychiatric identification among a group of people who were 
diagnosed with psychotic illness in Ireland.  Several modes of responding to unwanted 
identities were activated.  These involved vindications of a ‘preferred self’,  preserving 
particular self-notions and resisting negative consequences of labelling.    
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The level of resistance to psychiatric identity is illustrated by Timander and Möller 
(2016) in a cross national comparative research project (Sweden and the UK) on 
recovery, where they interviewed 33 participants, self-identified as having gone 
through the recovery process and having used mental health services for a significant 
period.  Participants rejected disablism associated with their mental health problems, 
in particular that which is prescribed by dominant biomedical ideologies; “reclaimed 
and (re)constructed positive identities” (p1056) by attaching and relating their 
recovery to social justice, community (re)connection and healing.  In rejecting illness 
and disablism (or deficits as per the meta/narratives above), social and institutional 
invalidation was resisted.  In all study cases above, discourses tend to focus on 
nonpathological descriptions of mental health problems to achieve revalidation of the 
person.  Recovery involves ‘starting points’ to re-evaluate as to what a person might 
be or/and will become.    
  
Slade and Longden (2015) provide a specific list as to why someone with psychotic 
experiences may choose to resist, avoid and not have contact with the mental health 
system:  
1. they are either not distressed by their experiences, or actively value them  
2. they have a good support network  
3. they choose not to disclose because they fear being stigmatised if they are 
given a diagnosis of a mental illness  
4. they have a non-medical or non-psychological framework for their experiences 
(e.g. supernatural, spiritual, cultural, technological) and do not identify with 
models used in mental health services’  (p22)  
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There is a noteworthy addition to the above list.  Beyond the number of explanations 
described above lies the danger of becoming subservient to and subsumed within a 
paternalistic mental health system where the person with psychosis will be required to 
perform the ‘sick role’ (Moncrieff and Middleton, 2015); or to put it another way 
acquiesce with disablism.  The sick role involves deployment of established rights to 
access expert and state support (such as medical and welfare assistance); being 
excused from a meaningful social role with the ‘sick’ person exempt from 
responsibility for their illness (Parsons, 1991).  The sick role is open to social 
appraisal ie; social norms will dictate what constitutes illness, who is worthy of 
specific supports and what social roles might be expected according to the illness 
described.  Although the ‘sick’ person is not held responsible for their illness, a 
paradox arises as they are expected to demonstrate willingness and exert effort in 
getting well.  In the case of the person labelled psychotic, getting well may involve 
the idea of recovery which is open to a variety of interpretations and outcomes, none 
of which guarantee social inclusion and equality for the psychotic person (McLean, 
2003).   The meta/grand narrative determined by a medical (biological) perspective, 
has long associated psychosis with enduring disability or at the least long-term 
continual threats to mental ill-health and social functioning.  In other words, most 
people identified with psychotic illness are assumed ill or in remission, (Ciudad, 2009; 
Lambert et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2013).  Choosing to resist, avoid and not have 
contact with the mental health system could involve anticipation of the sick role, 
consequences of long-term dependency, social distance and stigma leading to service 
avoidance.  The ‘service avoider’ may also be aware that once caught up in the mental 
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health system the ‘psychotic person’ becomes marked as an individual who remains at 
risk of relapse and continually in remission.   
     
B 2.20 Recovery and remission  
There has been a marrying of the concept of Recovery with Remission with both 
shown to have mutually desirable outcomes (for example social integration - see 
Ahmed, Mabe and Buckley, 2011).  However, a distinct difference between the two 
ideologies remains (Emsley et al., 2011).  Whereas Recovery tends to emphasise 
human and social processes regardless of symptomatology; Remission emphasises 
maintenance and symptom reduction.  For the individual attempting to scribe an 
identity beyond the meta/grand narrative of illness, disability, deficit laden language 
and long-term frailty; coping and relating one’s psychotic experiences becomes 
embroiled in a continuous effort in defining oneself against a backdrop of suspicion 
and social disapproval.      
Fisher and Ahern (2002) observe inherent resistance to recovery within scientific and 
positivist traditions:   
“Currently the bench mark for evidence-based practice is maintenance: symptom 
reduction and medication compliance” (p633).    
As above, individuals who have declared recovered from psychosis point out that it 
involves a deeply personal journey of self-discovery.   It is neither outcome orientated 
nor depends on being symptom free (May, 2004; Timander and Möller, 2016).  A 
challenge has been laid before the idea of recovery with evidence of continued 
existence of chronicity and high remission rates among some of the more severely 
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affected psychiatric patients ie; those with psychotic illnesses.  In a review of 
longitudinal research Jobe and Harrow (2005) conclude:   
“long-term studies that compare schizophrenia patients with other types of patients 
have produced data indicating that, even with current treatments, schizophrenia 
patients as a group show poorer outcome than patients with other types of psychiatric 
disorders; in this sense, schizophrenia is a poor-outcome disorder.”  (p898).   
Nasrallah (2008) states that;   
“Recovery is possible but appears to occur in a minority of patients.  Many patients 
can achieve remission, which enables them to gradually regain various degrees of 
functioning.’ (p20).    
 
According to these authors, any idea of recovery should be mindful of this and that 
recovery does not apply to certain psychiatric populations, in particular those 
diagnosed with psychotic illness.  Others disagree, regarding all such conclusions as 
evidence of persistent discrimination among those who do not understand what is 
required, socially and culturally, to make recovery a reality for people experiencing 
psychosis.  There is an inherent denial of the impact of their own outcome orientated 
research programmes and practices that emphasise stability and maintenance over 
recovery processes (Barker, 2003; Bellack and Drapalski, 2012; Bracken and Thomas, 
2005; Moncrieff and Middleton, 2015; Perkins and Slade, 2012; Timander and 
Möller, 2016; Weiden, 2010)  Consumers of mental health services have contested 
outcome orientated measures of recovery concluding that:   
“In the emerging field of “evidence-based practice,” we know from our full range of 
lived experiences what works because WE ARE THE EVIDENCE!”  
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(National Coalition for Mental Health Recovery)   
     
Much of the literature on recovery and psychosis feature practical, and in many cases, 
observable behaviours in engaging with processes and/or achieving specific outcomes 
(see for example, Roe et al., 2006; Philips et al., 2009.)  These include coping styles, 
techniques and strategies.  However, the practical rarely takes into account sources of 
knowledge that potentially influence the reforming of identity that takes place during 
recovery.  Identifying sources of knowledge that individuals are exposed to and how 
this can be applied to socially situate the individual with regards psychotic 
experiences, coping and relating can be achieved by studying the use of language.  
Yanos et al (2010) illustrate how the language of psychiatric illness can impede 
people’s recovery by imposing an identity of illness and disability.  Morrison (1998) 
concludes that the psychotic experience is not the problem, but the individual’s 
relationship with them, a view echoed by Romme and Escher (2000); Leudar and 
Thomas (2000.)  Yanos et al and Morrison’s observation would indicate that 
discourses are at work with regards understanding and relating to psychotic 
experiences.    
Language dysfunction has been emphasised among those diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, asserted through empirical means (Kuperberg and Caplan, 2003; 
Stephane et al., 2007).  In highlighting significant problems with communicating, a 
danger arises in creating discourses that places the individual experiencing psychosis 
in a position where they may be “considered unworthy or incapable of conversation”  
(Buck-Zerchin, 2007, p19).  On the other hand, promoting ‘Open Dialogue’ during 
psychotic episodes has been emphasized and shown to be fruitful in achieving 
recovery (Seikkula et al., 2000; Seikkula et al., 2003; Seikkula and Alakare, 2007).   
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The Open Dialogue approach facilitates familial discourse to communication 
encouraging the flow of conversation between social actors (usually family, patient 
and health professional).  The aim is to contextualise and better understand the 
psychotic process.  During crisis, attention is paid to linguistic expression and 
construction of language by the individual experiencing psychosis.  Open Dialogue 
does not dwell on thought disordered speech acts (ie; see them as meaningless 
declarations) but engages positively with the psychotic world.  Affirmative discourses 
on the psychotic experience can be constructed and promoted maintaining everyday 
social attachments with the person’s naturally occurring communal world.      
 
Broome (2004) also asserts that individuals in the throes of psychosis can conceivably 
continue to engage in everyday social discourse:  
 “The delusional system would be a language game with one player in a solitary 
solipsistic community, but there is no reason why such an individual could not take 
part, as indeed they do, in other discourses within a wider community” (p39)     
Therefore, tensions between various discourses on psychosis exist.  The point here is 
that each discourse has the potential to impact upon our understanding and readiness 
to relate to people experiencing psychosis.   This in turn impacts on the individual’s 
capacity to engage in meaningful social exchange around their psychotic experiences.  
As Eisenberg (1988) would have it: “what is believed to be true about behaviour 
affects behaviour that it purports to explain” (p1)    
  
To conclude this section, the ability for someone to recover from problematic 
psychotic experiences, including capacity to cope and ability to relate, is not just 
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reliant on taking action, but in repositioning one’s identity through engagement at the 
level of speech and language.     
      
 
2.21Summary conclusion  
A number of ‘models’, frameworks and theories on psychosis and psychotic 
experiences have been presented with an aim to illustrate the extent of knowledge, 
number of depictions and multiple discourses potentially available to people affected 
by this human state.  Each, as described above, have their own challenges and as argued 
their own appeal to people living with psychotic experiences beyond statutory mental 
health systems.   
 
The conceptualisation of psychosis, as a modern phenomenon in Westernised thought 
has, over several centuries, been subject to change.  It has emerged that there is no 
agreed definition or consensus as to causes or pathways into or out of psychotic states; 
or indeed whether they should be feared or revered; facilitated or regulated.  However, 
there appears no doubt that ‘Westernised’ belief systems (and therefore discourse) is 
dominated by a meta/grand-narrative that ‘offers’6  up to the general public a credible 
and convincing account of biological determinism at work, enabling a top-down 
meaning making system and approach implying faults and deficits inherent with 
psychotic experiences. 
 
What is also clear is that most attention has been given to psychotic experiences from 
the subjective, internalised viewpoint. The illness model, and to an extent, cognitive 
models have tended to highlight deficits within a normal/abnormal dichotomy by 
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deploying reality testing techniques and through the development of specific criteria 
that relies heavily on a specific use of phenomenological reporting and objective 
measures.  The social perspective, including the number of cultural studies and theories 
cited have emphasised systems and approaches that have captured the subjective 
experience from single point perspective, drawing attention to the context from which 
psychotic experiences originate and are encountered.  
  
Environmental risks have in some cases been highlighted, social and cultural 
differences and influences have been demonstrated and individualised pathways to 
recovery have been explored.  By linking adverse live events (such as childhood 
neglect) with problematic psychotic experiences; observing the role of rituals in  
‘encouraging’ and facilitating psychotic experiences or studying recovery from the first-
person perspective the individual’s experience is for ever exposed to a number of 
conceptual narratives and in turn specific experiential knowledge bases.  That is to say,  
____________________________________________________________________  
6 I use the word ‘offer’ here as some of the most persuasive high impacting ‘regimes of truth’ have been 
found to induce a sense of choice in what is to be believed.  Yet the choices we make about what we 
believe is compelled, legitimised and sanctioned through methods that are deemed credible at a given 
time, often serving political and societal purposes (Rose, 1999).  For example, science as a human 
enterprise involves a significant degree of rhetoric on what constitutes truth (Reeves, 1998; Ceccarelli, 
2011); in this instance the offering up of a narrative that psychosis is underpinned by biological 
determinates evidenced through scientific practices and methodologies.  The public are left to decide 
what should be believed in relation to this human state, yet deciding on what we are to believe is 
predisposed toward the authoritative voice of medicine and science, in turn gratifying systems and 
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language and discourse is generated around the concepts being studied (in the case 
above constructed through culture, adverse life events and recovery) with limited room 
for alternative accounts to be presented.  
   
The dichotomy of abnormal/normal; irrational/rational; mad/sane between the 
respective psychotic and otherwise human experience is well established contributing 
to social distance, stigma and discrimination experienced by those living with psychotic 
experiences.  The main issue is that the psychotic experience is not the real concern, but 
the ‘site’ of the experience – the psychotic person.  Not only is this a concern for 
Westernised/developed countries but has been observed to be a growing problem for 
developing countries where modernisation of mental health services is being attempted 
even though limited access to professional help remains (Sadik et al., 2010).  The 
biological determinism inferred is buoyed up by a persuasive authority bestowed to 
medicine, publicly warranted through contemporary health systems where 
accountability and concern for patient and public safety is paramount.  What follows is 
the delivery of care designed to satisfy a system that requires clear and transparent 
assessments of health and behaviour including measurements concerning outcomes 
where monitoring the consequences of evidence-based interventions becomes the 
primary focus (Thomas et al., 2012).  Whether intentional or not, portraying the person 
with psychotic experiences as vulnerable and dependent; susceptible to biological 
determinism and faulty processing, therefore requiring intervention can have a silencing 
effect on those with PLEs.  The ‘marked’ individual can take up a position of resistance 
or avoid making themselves ‘known’ to statutory services electing to live at the margins 
of public life in order to escape scrutiny and what might be perceived as intrusive 
practices (Swartz et al., 2003; Van Dorn, et al., 2006).   
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The power to define one’s experiences, and therefore receive a desired response from 
one’s social domain involves careful use of language.   Well established definitions, 
regulation and customary portrayals have the utmost influence over social responses 
to shared experiences associated with challenges to personal wellbeing (Liu, Keeling 
and Hogg, 2016).  Sharing self-experience(s) that have been defined as alien or 
threatening toward the social fabric is to risk exposure to public demise:   
 "The struggle for definition is veritably the struggle for life itself. In the typical 
Western two men fight desperately for the possession of a gun that has been thrown to 
the ground: whoever reaches the weapon first shoots and lives; his adversary is shot 
and dies. In ordinary life, the struggle is not for guns but for words; whoever first 
defines the situation is the victor; his adversary, the victim. For example, in the 
family, husband and wife, mother and child do not get along: who defines who as 
troublesome or mentally sick? [the one] who first seizes the word imposes reality on 
the other: [the one] who defines thus dominates and lives; and [the one] who is 
defined is subjugated and may be killed."  
(Szasz, 1973, p24-25)    
  
The challenge for someone living with psychotic experiences, in this instance those 
living beyond statutory services, is the ability to cope with invalidation (Pilgrim, 
2008) which has obvious consequences on how they might relate this ‘human state’ 
with others.  This is not just a matter of regulating one’s behaviour but being careful 
as to how one might speak about oneself, choosing carefully who and in what 
circumstances psychotic experiences can be shared.  The importance of language 
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comes into play in order to socially situate oneself through discursive means with the 
aim to maintain a credible and acceptable identity.    
The above comprises ‘identity work’ involving the act of positioning oneself in 
relation to another through social representation (Andreouli, 2010).   The resources 
used for purposes of positioning are believed to be examples of discursive objects 
which are “real” and “out there” (Willig, 1999).   Given the stigma surrounding 
mental health problems, in particular psychotic experiences, it may be the case that 
discourses revealed among a group of people with PLEs could be categorised as 
“alternative accounts” (Willig, 1999) ie; outside conventional descriptions. This is a 
pertinent point.  Public misgivings toward the psychotic person’s expression of reality 
may create a substantial challenge while composing credible accounts in order to 
maintain an identity that is socially appropriate.  Discourse analysis can help 
illuminate the discursive nature of constructing discourses that are associated with 
socially and culturally suspect experiences and behaviours - in this case PLEs – in 
order to protect or defend personal identity.     
This study is designed not to understand PLEs per say, but to explore the use of 
(spoken) language by those with PLEs in order to enrich our appreciation of the 
knowledge and discourses they apply to shape their responses when asked about them.    
Discourse analysis as a research methodology takes language as a basis from which to 
extract constructions of accounts of events (Potter and Wetherell, 2007).  It is hoped 
that by studying language and construction of discourse, levels of influence from 
various sources will be revealed, the positions people with PLEs take up will be 
uncovered, effects and consequences of discourse generated at interview revealed.  
Discourse analysis, through consciousness raising, can also help cohorts of socially 
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alienated persons by revealing contradictions and dilemmas within discourses they 
generate that compromise their position and claim to truth (Willig, 1999).   
Willig (2008) informs us that the arbitration of human experience is processed by way 
of history, culture and language.  All three shape and influence the discourse we apply 
in given social situations.  If someone enquires about our recovery our response is 
inevitably based on historical and cultural influences and includes personal experience 
and knowledge of that particular subject.  The same applies to adverse life events and 
culturally generated experiences.  Our use of language is therefore context specific.   
Potter and Wetherell (1987) assert that language is not so much descriptive but 
constitutive.  When we communicate with others our use of language will depend on 
who we are addressing, and what it is we want them to know.  To understand this 
fluid process we need to study language in use.  Ogden (2002) refers to one approach 
to discourse which “does not study the individual words spoken by people but the 
language used to describe aspects of the world”.  
   
Harper (1999) acknowledges challenges to studying discourse in that it has been 
accused of having little practical application.  However, he refers to ‘usefulness’ when 
considering the practical applications of discourse analysis:  
“By usefulness here I do not mean a technical utility in the sense of developing new 
treatment technologies, but refer to whether a particular idea or intervention leads to 
richer understanding and to just and socially responsible outcomes” (p128).    
Considering Harper’s point above and taking into account Willig’s reference to 
discursive objects and alternative accounts this study aims to achieve the following 
from one to one interviews with persons residing in Ireland who self-declare living 
with PLEs:  
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To summarise, the aims and objectives for this study are: 
Aim:   
• To capture and analyse discourses generated at interview by persons 
self-declared as living with Psychotic like Experiences residing in 
Ireland 
• To understand the discursive constructions of participant discourse at 
time of interview 
 
Objectives: 
• To reveal positioning and overall orientation of discourse as appears in 
text generated by participants 
• To reveal the consequences and effects of participant discourse at 
interview such as compromises to positioning and orientation  
• To reveal the presence of systems of power and authority in participant 
discourses that destabilise their intended effects and consequences  
 
Given the lack of qualitative knowledge or information on people living with PLEs, 
the study will be exploratory with potential for action considered during the 
concluding chapters.  The possibility of ‘usefulness’ (or fruitfulness as Potter and 
Wetherell, 2007 put it) to this study lies with the methodology.  
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Chapter 3 - Methodology   
The previous chapter demonstrates that language is a concern for people who 
experience PLEs, is subject to esoteric and public deliberation and that psychosis is 
contested and of interest to a range on interested parties.  While exploring the various 
epistemological and ontological parameters in relation to psychosis and PLEs it has 
been established that they are primarily framed within empirical and positivist 
traditions.  It was also established that there is a range of perspectives from which to 
understand people with psychotic experiences, their lives; ability to cope and relate.  
The range of perspectives available to those who self-identify as having PLEs can be 
called upon when asked to frame these experiences.  These are culturally and socially 
bound, stimulating discourses on PLEs engaging various linguistic mechanisms.  
Theoretical concepts pertaining to the nature and presentation of discourses need to be 
carefully chosen if we are to grasp the usefulness, the constraints, social boundaries 
and degree of linguistic resources available to the person with PLEs.  The remainder 
of this chapter will be spent describing the theoretical constructs and methodology 
that will enable achievement of the aims and objectives as described at the end of the 
previous chapter.         
 
In this chapter two theoretical concepts fundamental to this study are presented.  
Literature will be offered as a way to demonstrate that each concept is complimentary 
to the other in the pursuit of capturing and appreciating meaning embedded in the 
texts from data collection sources.         
1. Social constructionism, as an overarching theoretical framework from which 
broad contextual meaning can be derived.  Social constructionism is  
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facilitative toward understanding competing and at times contradictory social 
and cultural frames of reference.     
2. Discourse analysis as a method to systematically analyse texts in order to 
appreciate the functionality of individual and wider social accounts of events, 
experiences, interpretations and descriptions.     
Each concept will be discussed and presented in order to satisfy the justification for 
the methodological requirements of this study.  I begin with a brief discussion on the 
philosophical positioning in order to provide a rationale for the chosen theoretical 
framework.        
 
3.1 Social constructionism  
Although social constructionsim is not strictly integral to the methodology for this 
study (ie; it is neither a part of the practical administration nor data analysis) it is 
inextricably linked to the overall theoretical positioning helping make sense of 
findings in relation to a wider social perspective.  It therefore warrants a brief mention 
in order to clarify its relationship with methods of analysis and practical 
administration of certain research activities.   
  
Within the methodological framework for this study social constructionism is used as 
a point of reference from which social phenomena derived from findings can be 
understood within social contexts. Social constructionism considers that what we 
know; our sense of reality and course of learning is influenced by the social world we 
inhabit (Burr, 1995).  Unlike social constructivism, which is interested in “methods of 
constructing the self … how it is talked about and theorized in discourse” (Potter and 
Wetherell, 2007: 102), social constructionism focuses on the development of social 
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phenomena in relation to social exchange within given contexts.  Notably, Gergen and 
Gergen (1991) describe social constructionism in terms of social meaning created 
through language; with constructivism concerned with cognitive processes that lead to 
personal meaning.  Kenneth et al (2008) in contrasting social constructionism and 
social constructivism point out that:  
  
‘The term constructivism is sometimes used interchangeably, but most scholarship 
associated with constructivism views processes inherent in the individual mind as 
opposed to human relationships, as the origin’s of people’s constructions of the 
world’ (p160).   
  
The focal point for social constructionism is not the individual as a centre of learning, 
and ‘knowing’, but the interaction between the individual, the social world they 
inhabit and the various meanings that are created as a direct consequence of 
relationships with the social environment.  Therefore, processes of influence, 
knowledge and meaning exchange between individuals, within a variety of social 
contexts are highlighted.         
 
As social constructionism is concerned with knowledge and experience of the world 
derived from social intercourse (not internal states or cognitive processes as it were 
eg; emotions, cognitions, decision making) it should help identify social and 
communal influences on the individual’s ability to live with PLEs.  This might include 
what the individual believes to help or hinder relating to personal experiences 
involving influential relationships, types of knowledge and/or learning that have 
played a role in this process. It is language that is primarily responsible for making 
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possible the exchange of knowledge, experience and learning that create and maintain 
particular world views. Language, as a fundamental medium from which knowledge 
and various social influences can flow is significant within social constructionism:   
  
“Language is capable of transcending the reality of everyday life altogether.  It can 
refer to experiences pertaining to finite provinces of meaning; it can span discrete 
spheres of reality”.   
(Berger and Luckmann,1966, p40).    
  
From a constructionist perspective Tuominen et al (2002) describe discourse as: “the 
vehicle through which the self and the world are articulated, and on the way different 
discourses enable different versions of selves and reality to be built” (p. 273).   
Studying language in use can therefore expose knowledge and linguistic resources 
inherent in discourses around a given subject matter (in this instance PLEs) and 
associated socialisation that takes place.    Social Constructionism, with its emphasis 
on the fickle nature of social reality corresponds with the theoretical leanings of 
discourse analysis where language in use is taken as a variable performative act, 
fluctuating in accordance with the social environment.  In this context studying 
language helps bring to light what might be at stake for participants, such as personal 
identity and social status, revealed through interpretation of text generated at 
interview.  Social and interpersonal context is similarly taken into account where 
issues of power and resistance, at micro and macro levels, can begin to be explored.   
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3.2 Choosing the most appropriate methodology  
At time of writing the author has found that there are few qualitative studies into the 
lives of those living with psychotic experiences living outside/beyond statutory 
services and certainly none that attempt to explore the conceptualisations, the social 
impact and associated discourses created by those living with PLEs in general 
populations.  Further, qualitative studies on psychosis are in danger of taking the 
subjective experience at face value/for granted lacking interpretative power; in 
particular where nuanced data presents itself and technical claims about language 
usage is missing (eg; thematic analysis; see Braun and Clarke, 2006).  I have 
specifically chosen discourse analysis as it has the critical depth required to move 
beyond the descriptive leanings of more popular qualitative research methodologies 
and to factor the complex and shifting nature of social reality as found in language, 
specifically how it effects those with PLEs. 
  
Some analytic techniques are more appropriate to unveiling the discursive nature of 
social influences on discourse than others.  With this in mind I will apply the most 
appropriate method to the task at hand, with superiority of available research positions 
(qualitative, quantitative or mixed design) becoming less of an issue  
(Johnson and Christensen, 2010).  
   
Mixed methodology, though sometimes preferred, is not always necessary or always 
superior to mono-method research: “multi-strategy research should not be considered 
as an approach that is universally applicable or as a panacea … There is no point in 
collecting more data simply on the basis that more is better.” (Bryman, 2010: 52).   
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Bryman (2010) brings a common-sense approach to research design.  What is most 
important is ensuring that the chosen methodology is relevant and applicable to meet 
the demands of this study.  Data collected in a descriptive study such as this one 
(Koopowitz et al 2003) requires analysis that considers the meaning, accounts and 
significance of participants’ (linguistic) practices presented at interview.   
Furthermore, mixed methodology often requires proficient and specialist knowledge 
requiring several experts to be involved in the design and delivery of a variety of 
methodologies adding pressure and additional time to the research process (Bryman, 
2010).  For purpose of clarity and analytic focus I have chosen discourse analysis as a 
mono-method approach for this study.    
  
  
3.3 Discourse analysis  
Burr (2001) and White (2004) are explicit that DA orientates toward Social 
Constructionism in that knowledge and meaning to life experiences is constructed 
through language.  In this sense DA does not accost language in abstract terms, but 
looks to the pragmatic implications of language in use.  Edwards and Middleton 
(1986) assert that discursive analysis adapts a social viewpoint to phenomena often 
taken from a cognitive perspective.  However, the examination of discursive practices 
informed by socially situated influences and interrelatedness is more appropriate here, 
generally overlooked when a purely cognitive approach is taken (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987)      
  
Taken from the perspective of Potter and Wetherell (2007) DA as an analytic 
qualitative technique is designed to make sense of language use in terms of individual 
application, social influences and various social constructions that impact upon this 
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process.  The authors take into account any variability in what is being communicated 
and in turn what is trying to be achieved (performance).   Variability, function and 
construction of social texts are important aspects when trying to understand motives 
and social influences impressing upon the construction of language.  Repertoires 
within texts can be identified, discursive usage and participant resources revealed.   
  
As an analytic technique capable of making sense of social texts in relation to social 
context, variation in accounts, nuances and functionality (eg; motives of the speaker) 
discourse analysis can make sense of varying social realties.  Unlike some traditional 
research methods with a primary aim to categorise responses and identify similarities 
between participant accounts (eg; surveys, polls, thematic analysis), DA looks for 
inconsistencies and compromises, encourages a diversity of interpretations and in turn 
appreciates the fluidity that is required when trying to explore social meaning through 
studying discourse.  As described by White (2004) a cyclical process takes place 
between accounts and action: “descriptive actions and associated actions enabled by 
those descriptions”.  
  
Discourse analysis as described by Potter and Wetherell, (2007) has been chosen for 
analytic purposes because of its focus upon language that is socially constructed and 
action (performance) orientated.  This is important given the pragmatic potential 
presented at the end of the previous chapter that may arise from findings.  Discourse 
analysis from Potter and Wetherell’s perspective is itself dependent on neither a 
developed notion of society nor of human beings and therefore aligned with social 
constructionism.   Willig (1999) presents how discourse analysis can unravel social 
influences and provide social critique which exposes “the ways in which language 
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conspires to legitimate and perpetuate unequal power relations” (p10). Discourse 
analysis focuses on inconsistencies and nuances that can appear in spoken discourse 
(Cameron, 2013) and can reveal dominant discourse(s) that influence the 
discursiveness of participant accounts.           
 
To summarise I have chosen DA as an analytic technique for this study because:  
 
1. It is aligned with social constructionism and therefore facilitative to the discursive 
nature of discourse    
2. Its application leans to mono-methodology bringing clarity and purpose  
3. It is able to reveal the functionality and intentionality motivating application of 
language (eg; how speakers and authors construct social objects)   
4. It is able to reveal effects and consequences of discourse created by identified 
groups in relation to social context     
   
Gee (1999) maintains that DA as an analytic method can bring to light how language 
is able to “enact specific social activities and social identities” (p1).  Positioning 
involves a social activity that engages linguistic strategies in order to preserve a sense 
of identity.  DA can expose the positions social actors assume when taking into 
consideration social contexts (Tirado and Galvez, 2007).    
 
To conclude this section and as part of introducing the succeeding sections of this 
chapter, I will summarily introduce the discursive elements and analytic concepts 
further justifying the chosen methodology and defining what can be achieved. 
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Up to this point in the thesis it has been established that persons sought for this study 
are personally challenged, primarily due to the dominance of deficit laden discourses 
(the meta/grand narrative) that devalues their psychotic experiences.  Social 
conditions and the overall social discourse that is dominated by the meta/grand 
narrative tends to differentiate psychotic experiences from normal human experience 
creating various barriers for persons living with PLEs in achieving social acceptance.   
The meta/grand narrative is well established in Westernised societies, commonly 
found in everyday social discourse attached to a negative assessment of psychotic 
experiences.  Discourse impacts significantly on the processes that “make up” people 
were categories of persons come into being and “new ways for people to be” 
materialise (Hacking 1986: 223) creating a scenario of subjectivity where identity 
formation takes place (Shoshana, 2012).  Discourses that impact on people’s identity 
are often opposed initiating ‘re-constructions’ and counter representations through 
discursive means.  In accordance with the above analyses’ opposition to assessments 
and interpretations that associate psychotic experiences with personal deficits is 
anticipated from study participants who find themselves living under its gaze.  
Opposition involves the ‘reconstruction’ of discourses participants are found to 
oppose.  It is the attempts at reconstruction and counter representations of the 
psychotic experiences, the intention behind these discursive acts that I want to capture 
during one-one conversations with persons living with PLEs beyond/outside statutory 
mental health services.  In particular, the positioning taken up by participants, their 
orientation, the effects and consequences of discourses presented at interview.    
 
However, as already stated, discourses are never detached or fully removed from 
social context.  Social conditions impact on the way we can speak about social objects 
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(eg; psychotic experiences) and determines the availability of knowledge from which 
we can draw on in order to construct a credible account of events. Accordingly, 
discourses are essentially discursive and to an extent adaptable toward social 
conditions involving compromises, ideological dilemmas and various levels of 
inconsistency.  Variability and fluidity therefore comprise discourse formation which 
I expect to find in participant discourse at interview.   This involves discursive 
constructions where I can identify resistance and opposition to a discourse through 
positioning taken up by participants in relation to other discourses.  Having 
established the means by which participants have positioned themselves, I will be able 
to reveal the orientation of discourse constructed at interview ie; how and what 
participants oppose, the direction they want to take the discourse and their intended 
aims.  There are of course consequences and effects of discourse and these will be 
generated by participants which I will be able to reveal through analysing the 
discursive performances captured at interview ie; how successful they are likely to 
meet the intended aims as established through participant orientation.   In establishing 
the orientation of discourse generated at interview and in revealing the effects and 
consequences of discursive performances I am in a position to consider how these are 
impacted, influenced, compromised by wider social conditions and dominant meaning 
making systems.  Through the ‘layered’ application of discourse analyses just 
described, I finish with a fruitful ending exploring and identifying social systems and 
dialogical spaces that potentially further the direction of a discourse desired by 
participants.  Below I provide a more detailed definition of the conceptual and 
technical elements involved in the chosen methodology that enable me to meet the 
aims and objectives of this study and reach the end point whereby a level of 
fruitfulness can be achieved.  
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In summarising the sequence of analyses as described above and in order to achieve 
maximum clarity the aims and objectives of the study are: 
Aims: 
•  To interview persons residing in Ireland who volunteer to share their 
experiences living with PLEs   
• To capture and analyse discourses generated at interview by persons 
self-declared as living with Psychotic like Experiences residing in 
Ireland 
Objectives: 
• To reveal the discursive constructions of participant discourse at time 
of interview 
• To reveal positioning taken up and overall orientation of discourse as 
appears in text generated by participants 
• To reveal the consequences and effects of participant discourse at 
interview such as compromises and dilemmas in relation to positioning 
and orientation 
 
3.4 Role and positioning   
As highlighted on a number of occasions maintaining a credible identity is a persistent  
 
challenge for anyone wishing to share their psychotic experiences.  Wetherell (1998) 
describes how identity is heavily influenced by social determinates involving the 
availability of knowledge resources: “Subject positions, and thus the identities of 
participants in social life, are determined by discourses and in this sense are prior, 
already constituted, and could be read off or predicted from knowledge of the relevant 
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discourse.”  (p400)   That said, Davies and Harre (1990) describe positioning in terms 
of agency:  
  
“Once having taken up a particular position as one's own, a person inevitably sees the 
world from the vantage point of that position… made relevant within the particular 
discursive practice in which they are positioned…a possibility of notional choice is 
inevitably involved because there are many and contradictory discursive practices 
that each person could engage in.” (p 46)    
  
Being an active agent during conversation requires a number of linguistic 
mechanisms. Knowledge and linguistic resources have the potential to socially situate 
the individual implying roles in the form of stereotypes and social identity (Sabat and 
Harre, 1999).   The notion of role has been shown to be inadequate in linguistic and 
social constructionist terms.   For example, according to expectant roles, enactments 
between patient and psychiatrist are believed to be typical and relatively static - the 
paternal practitioner; the passive patient (Ziółkowska, 2012). Yet, through linguistic 
analysis psychiatric patients have been shown to assert their identity through 
disengagement/engagement strategies (Chase et al., 2010).  During conversations 
people often assume ‘positions’ which are understood as “discursive constructions of 
personal narrations” (Tirado and Galvez, 2007.)  Orientation toward particular 
expertise and linguistic resources can help reveal the formation of subject positions 
that take place during social intercourse (Wetherell, 1998).  Acts of positioning 
confirm people as active agents during interactions where actual socialisation and the 
construction of discourse unfold (Tirado and Gálvez, 2007).  With regards participants 
for this study, the adaptation of a particular position on psychotic experiences (eg; 
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medical or spiritual interpretation or account) will be dependent on linguistic systems 
that are able to maximise the utilization of available knowledge resource.  
Mickenautsch (2012) describes knowledge as that which, “has been defined as true 
and justified belief” (p6).  In discourse terms this translates into what the participant 
believes to be true, making conscious effort in justifying this belief through discursive 
means; accordingly adapting a particular position toward a social object (the psychotic 
experience).  
 
3.5 Subject positions and discursiveness  
People tend to believe they have a “sense of who they are” (Djité, 2006).  However, 
Wetherell (1998) asserts fluidity and incompleteness of personal identity.  In 
conversation this involves participant orientations in response to ‘troubled and 
untroubled subject positions.’  Here it is important to distinguish between subjectivity 
and subject positions in the context of discourse.    
  
Subjectivity involves consensual regulation via “pre-existing discourses that structure 
the field of possible actions”; subject position “refers to a position within a discourse”  
(Epstein, 2011, p343).  In other words, subjectivity is that which is already ‘out there’ 
(eg; the psychosis meta/grand narrative referred to earlier) made available throughout 
and within the bounds of social and political configurations; a subject position is taken 
up by a social actor in relation to or in response to discourses that impacts them.   
Epstein goes on to explain: “Only subject-positions are produced by discourses … It 
is a place-holder, a linguistic category, the I/we of a discourse.” By contrast, 
“subjectivity is a much more extensive, and consequently unwieldy, category, where 
all the hyperindividualized characteristics of identity are relegated — including those 
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that are not so readily transferable” (Epstein, 2011, p343).    Discourse encountered 
during subject position supposes agency with regards to knowledge and choice of 
language used, during for example, defence of one’s identity.  This can be captured at 
a discursive level.  Epstein (2011) states that: “The distinction between subject-
positions and subjectivities becomes operative once the analysis shifts beyond the 
individual level.” (p344).   
 
This research is designed to study discourse at the individual level.  However, 
subjectivity, as something that might be warranted/unwarranted; accepted  
or resisted needs to be factored in order to conceive social pressures on participants in 
relation to their ability to account for their psychotic experiences.    
 
To facilitate and capture the complex ‘richness’ of spoken data involving a socially 
defined ‘problematic’ human experience (in this case psychotic experiences) I take 
my lead from Wetherell (1998) who recommends a synthetic and eclectic approach to 
discourse analysis.  A broadened approach facilitates and captures the formation and 
meaning behind texts paying attention to the discursive nature at one end and the 
social, contextual backdrop at the other.  Wetherell (1998) includes in the list of 
potential criteria involved in an evaluation of text: variability, ideological dilemmas 
and interpretative repertoires.   To this list, for the purpose of this study, I include 
consistency and will explain later why I emphasise ‘Lived’ ideologies within the 
realm of ideological dilemmas and have chosen discursive repertoires over 
interpretative repertoires.  Variability, consistency, (lived) ideological dilemmas and 
discursive repertoires are deemed appropriate units arising out of text in order to 
account for subjectivity (pre-existing discourses found in participant’s accounts) and 
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subjective positioning (position taken up within a discourse) involved in the 
construction of discourse during interview.  These units will be duly described and 
rationalised within the parameters of this study.    
3.6 Variability and consistency  
Although, as already noted, people with PLEs are liable to share a sense of (to varying 
degrees) invalidation of their experiences, presentations of events, explanations and 
meaning making is not expected to be homogenous among participants.     Patterns 
involving similarities and disparities, found within and between texts produced, helps 
contextualise “functions and effects” of discourses therein involving “two closely-
related phases; 1) ‘variability – differences in either the content or form of accounts’ 
2) consistency – the identification of features shared by accounts” (Elliott, 1996, p66).  
The effect of each account is understood in terms of observable impact; the function 
in terms of what is the perceived objective of the participant’s account.  Elliott warns 
that: “for much of the time functions are not available for study but must be 
hypothesized and become the end-point of the analysis” (Elliott, 1996, p66).  In other 
words, an attempt to understand the tensions and interface between context, proximal 
and distal influences on the construction of discourse emanating from participant 
accounts of PLEs will be applied here.          
 
3.7 ‘Lived’ ideological dilemmas   
Discourse involves discussions around ‘social objects’.  A social object can be an 
idea, practice, a concept, a belief, a ‘truth’ about the world that engages social 
interaction between persons.  Conversations revolve around social objects and 
discourses emerge.  As an example, with regards this thesis, at the stage of interview 
 
  117  
the primary social object between interviewer and interviewee is psychotic 
experiences.    However, dilemmas arise out of social objects, in particular those that 
are contestable and socially problematic - where ideologies clash.  Weinberg (2014, 
citing Billig et al., 1998) describes ideological dilemmas as:     
 
‘”contradictory principles and practices that emerge as discourses in the society or 
culture as a whole, taken as the common sense of those communities, and not 
necessarily perceived by a person as simultaneously contradictory ideologies … 
ideological ideals and principles may be fought out internally by an individual but 
they are present in the culture at large as well, making them the building blocks 
available for individuals’ thoughts on a matter, as well as on the construction of 
individual identity. They are the taken-for-granted notions in a society … The 
discourses that develop as the common sense of a society contain both their ‘own 
thesis and antithesis” (p89)  
  
Challenges that arise from day to day interactions with ‘contradictory principles and 
practices’, at individual and cultural levels, involves ongoing transitory processes and 
human activity that is referred to as: ‘Lived ideology’.  Lived ideologies are therefore 
different to the traditional conceptualisation of ideologies where they are believed to 
be relatively permanent, consistent and fixed conceptualisations as how ‘things should 
be’.  Lived ideology is described in terms of “non-formalised consciousness” (Billig 
et al., 1998).’  ‘Contradictions’, ‘thesis and antithesis’ that appear in (lived) 
ideological dilemmas surfaced at interview, within the confines of this study as 
variabilities (above) and/or discursive repertoires described below.  Also noteworthy 
is Weinberg’s observation that dilemmas “may not necessarily (be) perceived by a 
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person as simultaneously contradictory”.  This opens up the possibility that 
participants may not always be aware of contradictions within their own 
representations of events (or indeed positioning).  I tended to these 
‘preconscious/subconscious’ oversights that can be revealed through careful reading 
and re-reading of the text.   By way of illustration, Tucker (2009) using discursive 
analysis noted that a small number of service users initially spoke positively about 
having received a diagnoses of schizophrenia (it provided a helpful framework to 
explain experiences of personal distress).   However, they were found having to 
readjust their narratives to avert the negative consequences of a “diagnoses for life” 
linked with long term risk to self and the public.  Self-control was of issue here where 
participants positioned themselves as having no control over initial levels of distress 
yet claiming control and autonomy over actions beyond crisis.   An argument could 
therefore be made that schizophrenia, was an illness imposing distress on sufferers, 
but not linked with endangerment.   This is a paradoxical duality of sorts, a dilemma 
that people with psychotic experiences frequently encounter and one linked to this 
study.  Weinberg (2014) describes the detection of “contradictory themes” that can 
arise within the text in identifying lived ideological dilemmas. Participants may enact 
a lived ideological dilemma through discursive means using a variety of knowledge 
sources which are often enveloped within repertoires.  Cultural repertoires are evident 
in delusional thinking and have been shown to be integral to the meaning making 
process engaged by people experiencing psychotic symptoms (Larsen, 2004).  In 
revealing influences of wider social systems and subsequent compromises within 
participant positioning I will identify the presence of lived ideologies, variability and 
consistency found in their discourse.  These discursive acts can be commonly found in 
repertoires constructed by participants at interview – described below.   
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3.8 Repertoires   
Burr (1995) refers to repertoires as elements of discourse such as rhetorical devices 
able to imbue agency to a speech actor in order to achieve effect.  Grayson (1998) 
defines repertoires in terms of symbolic capital - coherent ways of describing 
something, such as a set of words; use of metaphor, facts in order to present credible 
accounts on particular states of the world.  Potter and Wetherell (2007) describe 
repertoires in terms of metaphors and figures of speech.  Repertoire usage is 
influenced by the various positions adopted by social players.  It stands that they are 
neither socially neutral nor value free.      
  
There is a certain social familiarity with repertoires.  However, variability and 
ideology exists through-out their usage.   Gergen (1989) uses the terms “warranting 
convention” and “warranting voice” to depict the intentionality behind repertoire 
usage that appear within discourses.   In order for repertoires to be effective, 
knowledge and experience available to the actor is utilized and discourse engaged. 
Repertoires can be used to present a credible moral position or defend a particular 
perspective on a given topic/social object.  These are often inconsistent as the actor 
presents different accounts according to the social environment and audience engaged.  
Studying spoken discourse can include the exploration of the usage of language in 
order to understand what is being said and achieved - in this case through the 
presentation of repertoires by participants of this study in relation to PLEs.  
 
3.9 Discursive repertoires, not interpretative repertoires?  
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The term interpretative repertoire has been used to study an “interpretative 
community’s” construction of theories, ideas and rhetoric as might appear within 
scientific communities (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984) or schoolteachers (McCreary, 
2011).  However, given the exploratory nature of this study and that participants may 
not necessarily present as a single social entity (therefore not appear as an obvious 
community or social movement) interpretative repertoires may not apply.  Taken from  
Wetherell et al (2001) Enberg (2011) describes discursive repertoires which are:   
  
“patterns of meaning which evaluate our experiences and narrate events from a 
personal view-point. They create versions of reality which are always ideological, that 
is, constructed according to the values of the author or speaker.” (p83).    
  
In analytic terms, locating discursive repertoires is not necessarily dependent on taken 
for granted, identifiable or well-known communities.  Coherent patterns are merely 
taken from individuals with comparable experiences or similar social situations  
(Dean, 2003; Lin, 2007).  Given the ‘hidden’ nature of PLEs in the community it is 
expected that study participants will come from a range of backgrounds; not 
necessarily within specific social circles or a homogenous collective.   For reasons 
given discursive repertoires are chosen for this study as opposed to interpretative 
repertoires.  Presupposing that the targeted participant group make up an interpretative 
community would restrict the exploratory nature of this study, including the inhibition 
of variabilities involved in positions taken up and assuming a collective identity prior 
to analyses.  
     
The discursive nature of the identified repertoires can bring to bare the intentionality 
of the speaker and functionality inherent in discourses presented.  To understand the 
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social influences in relation to PLEs, meaning can be derived not from direct 
experience, but accounts of lived experience validated through repertoire usage.   
  
Below is a list of repertoires (identified by Edwards and Potter, 1992) that speech 
actors may utilize in order to present a credible account of events.  These were chosen 
for their wide applicability and particular focus on discursive nature of the creation of 
discourse during interview, found as major components during analysis:  
 
1. Category entitlement  
Expert knowledge is often expected from a person having a certain position 
(role).  In the case of this study experience of PLEs may be presented by 
participants as a form of expertise.   
2. Vivid description  
To make an account appear authentic by providing concrete details.  
3. Narrative  
If an account might be doubted, its plausibility can be increased by making it 
appear inevitable in a sequence of events.  
4. Systematic vagueness  
The use of vague and inexplicit accounts to defend an account against 
refutation. The account does not offer an argument and so cannot easily lend 
itself to criticism.  
5. Empiricist accounting  
The use of scientific (objective) language in an argument, to raise the power of  
'phenomena' over the power of people, who are seen as passive agents.  
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6. Rhetoric of argument  
Presenting an account as a series of logical statements, so that the agent is seen 
as something external to the speaker/actor.  
 
7. Extreme case formulation  
The drawing of extreme examples to make a version of events appear more 
plausible and the account more effective.  
8. Consensus and corroboration  
Noting the agreement between different witnesses to give an account more 
credibility and plausibility  
  
Additional to the list of repertoires above are linguistic patterns that may arise during 
analysis.  These include utterances that do not change the meaning of an account, but 
can enhance its impact by adding a punctuation effect in order to emphasise or change 
direction of discourse.  This is achieved by drawing attention to a significant moment 
during an account, strategically shift the topic or reformulate the effect of a repertoire.   
These are typically called discourse markers (Castro, 2009) examples of which are:  
‘you know’, ‘well then’, but can also appear in the form of laughter (Doona, 2016).  
Laughter and discourse markers highlight linguistic twists found during analysis when 
participants appear to be managing the structure and course of conversation; moments 
that generally operate at a conscious level.     
   
In conclusion, an eclectic approach to discourse analysis was applied, having the 
incumbent flexibility to facilitate, encourage and make sense of diverse social realities 
that appear in discourses around PLEs from a first-person perspective.  Variability, 
consistency, lived ideological dilemmas and discursive repertoires that emerge from 
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texts, produced by participants, were noted.  These were analysed and ‘coupled’ with 
‘social stimulants’ (eg; application of knowledge and wherewithal) at a macro level 
that have impacted on discourses that emerged during interview.  This approach, as 
argued, facilitates the exploratory nature of this thesis with regards social burdens on 
those who experience PLEs, such as invalidation, revealed by way of positioning 
taken up by participants at interview.  This enhanced the appreciation of invalidation 
as expressed through language by those with PLEs, and to explore how these might 
become representative of living with and accounting for PLEs in Western societies at 
a discourse level.       
Transcriptions, data collection procedures and techniques for analysing texts derived 
from interview, were adapted and proceduralised according to instructions set out by 
Potter and Wetherell, (2007) below.    
  
3.10 Interviews  
Apprehending variability and invoking participant positioning  
In order to meet the aims of this study facilitation of one-to-one semi structure 
interviews that invokes variability and diversity among a number of individuals with 
PLEs residing in Ireland needs to take places.  DA allows for active intervention 
during interview to achieve maximum exposure of discursive accounts (Potter and  
Wetherell, 2007).  Interviewers are active participants and can ‘intervene’ during 
interview in order to exploit interpretative contexts.  In essence, the interviewer is 
integral to the discourse produced during interview and can shape questions in order 
to appeal to levels of diversity and variation that participants present.  Potter and 
Wetherell (2007) suggest constructing a “confrontative arena than is normal, 
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dropping the formal procedures which act as a device to restrict variation” by 
generating interpretative accounts such as “alternative or problematic views or facts”, 
(p164).    
 
This allows me in my role as interviewer to draw out potential “troubled and 
untroubled subject positions” taken up by interviewees as referred to earlier. I 
presented a number of accounts of PLEs (taken from the literature review) to the 
interviewee in order to draw out the discursive nature of their presentation of 
experiences and further illuminate declared social influences.  This will help clarify 
positioning that participants assume, elicit intentions behind the accounts offered and 
allowing participant’s interpretative resources to be fully explored and engaged.  For 
instance, if the respondent seems to be offering up a non-biological/non-medical 
interpretation of their PLEs I will offer up a biological/medical interpretation as an 
alternative in order to expose the extent of the discursive nature of their account.  
However, Potter and Wetherell (2007) insist that interview questions need to be well 
planned and consistent, and that any intended intervention from the interviewer needs 
to be scheduled to achieve a level of coherence for purposes of analysis.  The 
interview schedule can be found in appendix A with the intended intervention for 
purposes described offered near the end of the interview after interviewees have 
communicated descriptions, explanations, and social and relational influences over 
their interpretations of their PLEs.   
             
3.11 Transcription  
Transcribing qualitative data from an audio recorder is an interpretative act and not a 
technical exercise (Baily, 2008).  There is a danger of trying to emulate positivistic 
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research in the belief that something objective can be derived from interview texts 
(Scollon, 2003).  Bucholtz (2007) makes the point that standardisation is becoming 
less of a requirement.  Strategically, transcription of spoken text should be modified 
and adapted to meet study aims and objectives.  Some analysts talk in terms of 
arguing for a more summative interpretation and presentation of text that might 
constitute more “accurate” representations of participants’ “voices”. (Jaffe, 2007).  
For the purposes of this thesis “content and context … resembled to normal texts” is 
deemed the appropriate level for interpretation (Bondarouk and Ruël, 2004, p9) in 
order that “pragmatic acts (e.g. directive, prohibition, claim” can be identified 
(Edwards, p322).    
 
Careful reading and re-reading of the text is always emphasised.  The transcription 
should be as detailed as is necessary:   
 
“for many sorts of research questions, the fine detail of timing and intonation are not 
crucial, and indeed they can interfere with the readability of the transcript, 
particularly when dealing with extended sequences and for people unused to the 
system”   
(Potter and Wetherell, 2007, p166).    
  
Potter and Wetherell (1987) describe repertoires in terms of the same phenomenon 
accounted for within text or among a number of speakers that is a: “relatively 
internally consistent, bounded language unit” (p.171).  In other words, they tend to 
appear as units of texts where statements and rhetoric might appear.  Lived ideological 
dilemmas are also likely to appear as units of text (see for example Weinberg, 2014).  
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The discursive performance of repertoires and lived ideological dilemmas are 
appeared along lines of variability and consistency.  Micro-interpretation of 
transcripts (intonations, phonetics) is not required in the case of this study as the focus 
will be on ‘sizable’ portions of text.  In the findings chapter I present transcripts in 
paragraphs and sequences of talk between interviewer and interviewee with a 
minimum of grammatical interpretation or influence.  Tucker’s (2009) adaptation of 
Potter and Wetherell’s (2007) recommended technique was applied.  This is inserted 
immediately below.   
 
Transcript Notation taken from Tuckers (2009) adaptation of Potter and 
Wetherell (2007)  
  
(.)  
short pause, less than one second; numbers used in brackets to indicate number 
of seconds of pause  
[]  square brackets used for brief comments by other person  
_  underlining refers to emphasis  
F  capitals with underlining to indicate severe emphasis  
""   
quote marks used when speaker drawing on third party talk  
()  used when that section of talk was not entirely clear; inaudible sections 
marked by stating inaudible in brackets  
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This allowed for sufficient flexibility to facilitate the exploratory nature of this thesis.  
As transcription involves significant time and intimate interaction with data it benefits 
and becomes an integral part of analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 2007; Cameron, 2013). 
 
3.12 Coding   
Chunks of text are initially categorised in order to create a manageable amount of 
information to rigorously decipher at a later stage.  Categories were carefully coded 
according to the research question.  In the case of this study repertoires, discursive 
performances (eg; discourse markers) and ideological dilemmas related to social 
influences associated with PLEs was selected.  Potter and Wetherell (2007) insist that 
analysis involves identifying instances in relation to the subject matter, not the 
frequency of categories as occurs in other qualitative analysis.  Identifying frequency 
of category tends to place boundaries on the interpretation of text.  DA allows even 
vaguely related texts to be considered for categorisation.  The same body of text may 
appear in a number of categories.  In line with these recommendations, categorisation 
was recorded according to discursive patterns, associated repertoires and ideological 
dilemmas with noted intentions (eg; positioning) made by participants.      
  
3.13Analysis  
Potter and Wetherell (2007) assert that analysis that takes place within the discourse 
analysis paradigm is novel and difficult to describe.  Looking at text from transcripts 
is not like an academic exercise such as reading a book, working on the gist of the 
message conveyed and summarising.  The person(s) analysing text in the spirit of 
discourse analysis needs to get out of the habit of reading texts in this way and 
concentrate on identifying such things as nuances, contradictions and vagueness.  This 
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helps decipher intentions of the participant, potential influences on the accounts they 
are offering, linguistic compromises and adjustments they might make.  As a 
discourse analyst and as part of the process of reflexivity as described in 3.15, I 
critically reflected on my own ‘sense making’ of the text to minimise contamination 
of subjective values and techniques: “The analyst asks: Why am I reading this 
passage in this way?  What features produce this reading?” (Potter and Wetherell, 
2007, p168)  
 
Several phases of analysis are engaged at this stage.  Patterns, function and 
consequence are identified.  The analysis forms a hypothesis based on functions and 
effects identified within the text with linguistic evidence produced.         
  
3.14 Validation        
Once hypothesis are generated validation of findings is required.  Potter and Wetherell  
(2007) describe several techniques to validate findings - coherence, participants’ 
orientation, new problems and fruitfulness.   
  
1. Coherence involves looking for exceptions to a hypothesis in order to confirm 
or challenge an explanatory framework.  If the exceptions noted are 
significantly removed from the explanatory framework assessment will 
become necessary.  If there are special features of the exception that indicates   
obvious differences between the exceptions and hypothesis then the 
explanatory framework is confirmed.  If no special features of the exceptions 
are identified, then the exclusive nature of the arrangement is scrutinised.  
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Approval and refutation of the explanatory framework depend on the plausibly 
in explaining differences.    
 
2. Participants’ orientation requires the analyst match their noted 
consistencies/inconsistencies that takes place during interaction against that of 
what the participant notices.  This is evidenced through participant attempts to 
resolve, for example, contradictory accounts that appear through for example 
an ‘interpretative device’ presented at the same point of conversation.  If the 
participants’ orientation does not include inconsistencies that the analyst notes 
as significant then validity of the findings is in question.  The analyst should  
not be led by their own interpretation, but that which the participant orientates 
toward with regards their own practice.    
3. New problems involve the participant’s resourcefulness to solve linguistic 
problems that occur during interaction and new problems that arise from the 
solution offered.  The secondary (latter) system acts as a validity check to the 
primary (former).  This indicates that linguistic resources are being applied, 
therefore orientation is being enacted.       
4. Fruitfulness is according to Potter and Wetherell the most prevailing element 
of validity check in discourse analysis.  If the scope of an analytic scheme is 
proven to make sense of new kinds of discourse, generate novel explanations 
ie; generate fresh solutions to the problems in a particular research area 
validity is likely to be assured.       
 
In applying these validity checks I am confident that the production of findings is 
credible and in writing up the remainder of the thesis.   
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3.15 Reflexivity and intersubjectivity  
Much of the credibility that qualitative research hinges on is based on the ability 
(and willingness) of the researcher(s) to demonstrate that they have reflected on 
and addressed potential and “actual” influences on participant responses where 
“social identity and that of the speaker is impacting on the intelligibility to her of 
what [the speaker] is saying and how she is saying it” (Fricker, 2007, p. 169, as 
cited by LeBlanc and Kinsella, 2016, p73).  The researcher must be transparent, 
admit to being in a position to transfer their own biases onto participants 
including personal values, beliefs, ideologies and experiences (Willig, 2013).  
However, ‘taking sides’, where the analyser chooses to sympathise or censure 
text during analysis will allow an antithetical approach to discourse analysis to 
develop.  Taking sides comes from a researcher’s sense of duty or moral 
obligation toward a social cause ending with their analysis presented in a way 
that their aim appears to be to ‘enlist’ the reader (Antaki et al., 2003).  Potter and 
Wetherwell (2007) claim that the discourse analyst should be transparent about 
their intentions about the research and honest about consequences of their 
influence over research design, implementation and analysis.  In other words, my 
involvement in the aforementioned process of conducting discourse analysis 
should exhibit self-critique and self-appraisal in order to protect the credibility of 
their research inquiry.  Conclusions need to be believable and plausible.  There 
are several other ways that credibility of any research project can be maintained: 
   
   
1. That, I, the researcher provides a detailed description of method and context,  
 
  131  
 
thereby thinking about the ways certain knowledge was selected in the first 
place  
2. That, I, the researcher acknowledges potential biases emanating from his own 
experiences/interpretation (in relation to PLEs) and clearly states these 
where/when appropriate.  Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009) conclude that “This 
could be arranged at the beginning of the project, in the middle of it, just 
before starting composing a text, and/or during its final revision” (p315).    
  
3. These often appear under the umbrella of reflexivity; as significant and 
necessary in the validation process.  In qualitative research terms reflexivity 
relates to issues that arise when researchers become part of the social world 
they are studying (Koch and Harrington, 1998).    
  
The effects are wide ranging:  
  
"A researcher's background and position will affect what they choose to investigate, 
the angle of investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this purpose, the 
findings considered most appropriate, and the framing and communication of 
conclusions" (Malterud, 2001, p. 483-484).    
  
Potter and Wetherwell (2007) state that reflexivity as traditionally defined does not 
apply to discourse analysis, that the task of the researcher is:   
  
 
‘not to document or describe problems of reflexivity but to give a practical 
demonstration of their effect’ (p183).    
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Noted below are two areas of related concern – 1. the impact of the presence of the 
interviewer and interactions between interviewer and participant on discursive 
accounts as presented at interview; 2. the potential for personal orientation of the 
researcher to dominate the analyses of data and presentation of findings.   Below, as 
an additional step of achieving credibility for this study, I take a further reflexive step 
involving ethical dilemmas to be considered including my own role and positioning as 
interviewer, analyser and in presenting findings.             
  
3.16 Presence of the interviewer and interactions during 
interview   
Following from the above, significant is the recruitment for this study whereby the 
researcher declares his self-experience.  There is a strong possibility that recruits 
assume that he has comparable experiences to their own thereby positioning him as an  
‘insider’; someone who naturally understands and accepts their interpretation of 
accounts. Beresford (2005) suggests that this “closeness” exists and is a significant 
factor in improving the quality of research adding that the traditional belief that  
‘distance, neutrality and objectivity’ are the only currencies to achieving findings of 
any real worth are at risk of delivering distorted evidence.  The practice of objectivity 
creates distance in what should be a collaborative, non-hierarchical arrangement 
between researcher and participant (Dowling, 2006) creating barriers to participants 
providing open, authentic and genuine responses to questions at interview.   In 
contextual and discourse terms, as described, the potential consequence of closeness is 
that participants may be particularly open to share their experiences with the 
researcher with an expectation of non-confrontation or questioning of their accounts; 
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or indeed reciprocal exchange of experiences taking place at interview.  Identification 
of the researcher’s influence on discursive accounts presented at interview (as per 
participant expectations) will become part of the analysis and presented in the findings 
eg; participants assuming consensus or corroboration between researcher/interviewer 
and interviewee.    
 
My own role and positioning also had a bearing on the discursive constructions and 
discourse as presented by study participants at interview.   As described in chapter 1 
(1.4) I adapted a reserved position during interviews, as is my general approach when 
interacting with peers on a regular basis.  It is my presence as someone who declares 
having ‘lived history of mental health problems’ (Recruitment Flier, Appendix C) that 
most likely impacted on participant responses, not necessarily the line of questioning.   
Rapport between interviewer and interviewee has been shown to materialise during 
research where peer to peer interviewing with ‘hardest to reach’ groups takes place 
(eg: the homeless and persons with chronic drug addiction; Harding, Whitfield and 
Stillwell, 2010).  Based on the likelihood for rapport to be built up between myself 
and participants, ethical challenges can arise.  Rapport involves assumed or built up 
trust between myself and participant with the potential for participants to believe I am, 
by virtue of having similar experiences, ‘on their side’ when it comes to personal 
positioning or accounts of psychotic experiences.  To put it another way, participants 
likely assumed I am an ‘insider’ (Zempi, 2016; Pustulka, Bell and Trabka, 2019) 
corroborating their version of events.  I reveal incidences when participants identify 
with me as an insider during analyses of text generated at interview and will present 
their significance in the findings. Given the chosen methodology, aims and objectives 
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it is possible tensions would arise for myself as interviewer and researcher as my 
intentions, having carried out the analyses and presented findings, is to question the 
effectiveness and consequences of participant discourse, particularly through 
orientation.  I am aware that this level of critique and critical analyses may go against 
expectations that participants may have of me; specifically, those found to position 
myself as insider acting as corroborator to participant’s version of events.   According 
to Pustulka, Bell and Trabka (2019) researchers identified as insiders are often 
conflicted in their role, with nuanced positionality taking place during the research 
process.  I was and continue to be conscious of this ethical challenge and will discuss 
this when presenting findings and near the end of the thesis.  Below I present similar 
challenges when analysing data and how I propose to overcome these.  
 
  
3.17 Researcher orientation during analyses and presentation 
of findings.  
Further to and specific to analysis, Potter and Wetherell (2007) acknowledge potential 
problems:  
 “our accounts of how people’s language use is constructed are themselves 
constructions” (p,182).  
  
Notable, is the researcher’s personal experience of PLEs (referred to the first person 
here on in); over 20 years’ active involvement with the ‘user/survivor movement’ with 
a shared concern about the power of psychiatry, its practices and its ideological 
dominance over mental health systems (Hölling, 2001; Morrison, 2003).  I continue to 
engage and collaborate with a range of stakeholders (service users, ex-service users, 
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carers/family members, academics and professional groups) in pursuing a ‘rights 
based’ and citizenship informed mental health system.  The user/survivor movement, 
of which I belong is acknowledged as a ‘complex social movement’ involving a 
diversity of views, political positions and ideologies (Hölling, 2001; Morrison, 2003).  
It is this diversity that I have witnessed, engaged and at times facilitated and will use 
my advantage in the context of this study - in particular my willingness and ability to 
hold a number of different views, opinions, positions and experiences from a range of 
stakeholder groups.  Here participant orientation, as per validity check above, acted as 
a ‘buffer’ to encourage relegation of my (the analyst) personal orientation whilst 
interpreting the data.  It is the participants orientation that is used to guide and 
safeguard the analyses from interpretative bias.     
  
 Finally, one often understated aspect to reflexivity is the influence and role of 
research supervisor over design, implementation and analysis of data. Dowling (2006) 
contends that:   
“reflection on reflexivity is not disputed” yet: “self-reflexivity is not the achievement of 
'introspection' as an isolated mind in private contemplation, but always involves an 
intersubjective process of vibrant tension between oneself as a subject and as an 
object. To create this tension, a relationship with a research supervisor such as that 
achieved in clinical supervision is needed” (p8).    
  
It is time spent with the researcher’s supervisors that was added to the reflexive 
dimension to this study.  Supervisors are expected to critically examine analysis of 
text, questioning the researcher on their presentation and interpretation of data.      On 
this basis and considering reflexivity as presented above the credibility of this 
research should stand up to scrutiny.     
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3.18 Ethics  
Research involving interviews with potentially vulnerable people is best suited to the  
‘ethics as process’ approach (Cutcliffe and Ramcharan, 2002; Ramcharan, 2006), 
requiring continuous consent and an ongoing option to withdraw.   This approach will 
be applied during interaction with participants.    
  
Ethics was granted from DCU ethics committee, originally June 2011.  The 
methodology has since been revised.  It was agreed between the student and 
supervisors, that Participatory Action Research (PAR) was not essential to the aims of 
the research as was originally proposed.  The methods of recruitment, data collection 
and discourse analysis remain the same. The discernible difference, apart from 
theoretical framework for the methodology, is the extent and pattern of engagement 
with the study sample once they have been recruited. In PAR it is necessary to engage 
the sample group in a collective participatory research activity where they would have 
a principal role in determining the onward process in the research inquiry (Kindon, 
Pain and Kesby, 2007). Although, in the revised methodology the same number of 
participants would be recruited, it is no longer necessary to engage them in a 
participatory process as part of the overall study.  It was agreed that PAR would 
present an unnecessary challenge in terms of time and effort to the already intensive 
process involved in data analysis of complex discourses.  See Appendix B for ethical 
approval after submitting revision of methodology.       
  
It was made clear to participants that, beyond interview, data collected would become 
the intellectual property of the researcher, subject to his interpretation and 
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representation (Nunkoosing, 2005).  Participants were required to agree to individual 
interviews before proceeding and that would be their sole involvement.  It is 
acknowledged that research participants can become distressed as a direct 
consequence of questions presented at interview.  However, based on the experience 
of the researcher’s involvement in user-led research (Walsh and Boyle, 2009) and a 
large-scale study in which participants became troubled about questions that were of a 
personal nature (experiences of trauma), participants tend to be positive and optimistic 
about the potential impact of the research and their role therein, usually deciding to 
proceed (Cromer et al., 2006).  Further, Knapik (2006) notes that contrary to some 
concerns that study participants may be passive during interview, they tend to seek 
and expect interaction, use the time to create dialogue, being curious, keen to explore 
the research topic.  I have found this to be the case in studies that I have been involved 
in, as interviewer or interviewee and in the case of this particular study.     
 
Even though optimistic implications for participants have been noted, there remains a 
potential risk that they would become distressed or withdraw due to the personal 
nature of the subject matter which, as presented in Chapter 2 can invoke life events 
that are distressing (see for example 2.24).  Measures to counter such an event and/or 
provide support to participants post interview was offered prior to proceeding with the 
interview, below. 
 
1. Ethics as process was applied (Cutcliffe and Ramcharan, 2002; Ramcharan, 
2006 above) ensuring continuous consent and that participants were aware of the 
ongoing option to withdraw during interview. 
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2.Participants were offered a number of supports in the event they became 
upset or distressed as a consequence of the conversation during interview. 
(Appendix F)  
3.As part of the number of support options, participants were also invited to 
contact the researcher, post interview, if they reconsidered consent and/or if 
additional support was required.  Regards the former, the option of 
withdrawing consent would be discussed and if required transcripts of the 
interview destroyed.  In the event the latter occurred, the researcher would 
discuss the nature of concern expressed by the participant, and if necessary, 
explore options for appropriate support using competencies and knowledges 
the researcher acquired working in the world of peer advocacy.  It was made 
clear to participants that a timeline to contact the researcher and rectify any of 
the above, post interview, was three months in accordance to length of time 
expected to transcribe the interview and, in some cases, begin analysis.  
However, the researcher explained that this timeline was not strict and that the 
participant could contact the researcher with personal concerns outside the 
three month timeline.                
 
The selection and interview schedule below address specific ethical concerns such as 
safety, wellness to participate, transparency and choice to engage/disengage.  
  
The revised methodology was passed by DCU ethics committee, March 2012 
(Appendix B).    
  
3.19 Sample size  
Sample size is rationalised according to the analytic framework described below.    
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Within Discourse Analysis sample size depends on the “analytic objective and the 
data source” (Starks and Trinidad, 2007) and is not “dependent on sample size” 
(Potter and Wetherell, 2007).  Given figures on the incidences of PLEs in the general 
population it might appear that there is a large number of people living in the 
community who could potentially volunteer to participate.  However, Potter and 
Wetherell (2007) state that with regard to DA:  
“Because one is interested in language use rather than the people generating the 
language and because a large number of linguistic patterns are likely to emerge from 
a few people, small samples or a few interviews are generally quite adequate for 
investigating an interesting and practically important range of phenomena”.    
(p161)  
 
The authors also assert that DA is labour-intensive and that there is a danger of getting  
“bogged down” in “large bodies of transcript”.  Worth highlighting is the likelihood 
that people experiencing PLEs would belong, in research terms, to the category of 
“hard to reach groups” or “hidden populations” (Shaghaghi et al., 2011).   This is 
based on a high probability of personal experience of social invalidation, potential 
alienation and isolation as alluded to earlier and the dispersed nature of this group.     
     
Given these words of caution and that meaningful data is not necessarily dependent on 
sample size the researcher believes between 15 and 20 to be a realistic and 
manageable number of participants, ideally made up of equal numbers of both gender 
representing groups 1 and 2 included in the participant criteria below.   Large numbers 
of participants are also not required given that this study is exploratory and therefore 
 
  140  
anticipated to lead to wider investigation into the lives of those with PLEs in Western 
societies.  Similarities in world views and subsequent meaning within discourse 
between those who have used services and those who have not should surface during 
the analytic process.     
  
 
3.20 Participant criteria  
Minimum age of participants was 18 years; all self-identified as having significant 
experience of PLEs and belong to any gender.  Those who express florid psychotic 
experiences/states or significant impairments during interview will be excluded.    
Inclusion criteria:  
1. ‘dropped out’ of mental health services or  
2. never used them.  
They must declare living with PLEs with no professional support for at least three 
years up to the period of selection and self-identify as successfully living with their 
experiences.  This length of time is used to indicate that the individual has been a  
‘successful avoider’ - someone who has over time learnt how to integrate their 
psychotic like experiences within their daily living.  This length of time has been 
applied to indicate successful coping in a research project (sometimes referred to as 
stichting weerklank) targeting a similar participant group.  Stichting weerklank is 
described as: “a foundation for people who hear voices, see visions or other unusual 
perceptions” (http://www.stemmenhoren.nl/welkom). Romme and Escher (1989) and 
Bak et al (2003) provide evidence that it is the severity of psychotic experience (not 
necessarily associated distress) and coping strategies deployed that distinguishes 
between those who need and seek out care and those who do not.  In accordance with 
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the above, three years living with Psychotic Like Experiences without professional 
indicated successful coping strategies deployed by the individual.     
Participants were also expected to be willing to share their PLEs with the researcher.  
  
   
3.21 Recruitment  
Participants will be recruited via advertisements distributed among organisational and 
individual networks and posted on social networking internet sites.    
    
Purposive sampling will be initiated using the following mediums, where a standard 
advertisement will be posted and utilised for recruitment (Appendix E):  
1. Social networking internet sites eg; face book linked to various mental health 
groups and organisations (see Appendix D)  
2. Direct advertising through already established organisational and individual 
networks.  See Appendix D for a list of organisations that the principal 
investigator targeted.  
3. From the above recruitment strategies numbers of recruits would potentially 
increase through naturally occurring ‘word of mouth’ and snowballing 
activities -  recommended by Shaghaghi et al (2011) to recruit hard to reach 
groups or hidden populations, ie; initial participants encouraged to pass on 
information and invites to peers and similar others throughout their social 
networks to take part in the study.   
    
A standardised advert was placed/disseminated for recruitment purposes.  This 
included an invite for volunteers to register interest in participating using contact 
details provided.  Participants were able to choose from several means to register 
interest (email, text or phone) where they were expected to leave a telephone number 
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and a preferred time for the researcher to contact them.  A follow up telephone call 
was then initiated by the principal investigator to ensure volunteers are fully aware of 
what the selection process and interview entails and arrangements to meet agreed.  
They were asked a number of questions in order to establish that they meet some 
initial criteria in order to proceed and also to provide some useful demographics prior 
to interview (Appendix E).  If, having listened to an explanation about the research 
and the individual decided to proceed, a meeting was arranged for interview purposes.    
 
3.22 Selection and interview schedule  
An assessment schedule was utilised for the purposes of selection, with volunteers 
asked to complete two assessments/questionnaires to ensure they meet the criteria to 
participate.  The CAPE (1 below) was used to identify the presence of PLEs and 
provide some descriptive information on the participant group.  A Brief Psychiatric 
Rating Scale (2 below) was then used for the purposes to assess capacity to 
participate.     
  
1. The Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences developed by van os,  
Verdoux and Hanssen (see CAPE42: http://www.cape42.homestead.com/). 
The CAPE is a self-report questionnaire rating affective and nonaffective 
psychotic experiences (positive, negative and depressive features).  The CAPE 
measures frequency of, as well as distress associated with, subclinical 
psychotic experience based on a score measured on a 4-point scale.  In testing 
the CAPE, Konings et al (2006) found it to be both reliable and valid as a 
selfreport instrument within the dimensional (spectrum) of psychotic 
experiences.  The dimensional approach is concerned with variances of 
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experiences on a continuum across populations and sub-groups.  The 
dimensional approach, of which the CAPE is framed, is applicable to non-
clinical groups and is therefore appropriate to this research.  
The CAPE will be scored according to instructions set out by van os, Verdoux 
and Hanssen 
(http://cape42.homestead.com/files/CAPEdimensionscore2003.pdf).  The 
researcher has been in correspondence with the team of developers of the 
CAPE.  They agreed to give advice as to scoring if required.  This was not 
necessary.  The CAPE was used to verify people’s descriptions of their PLEs 
and from which to compare incidences of PLEs against that reported in 
general populations.  
    
2. The Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale.  
The Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS, Overall and Gorham, 1962) is an 
18 item assessment scale.  It is applicable for research rated purposes, with an 
anchored 7 point scale for each item used to measure positive, negative and 
affective psychiatric symptoms.  This includes mood, behavioral indicators 
and psychic experiences that signify levels of psychiatric difficulties. The first 
14 items are self-assessment, with the final 4 completed according to the 
assessor’s observations.  The BPRS is one of the most commonly used 
instruments to evaluate levels of psychopathology in individuals (Leucht et al,  
2005; Rush et al, 2008).  In assessing the ‘cut off values’ of the BPRS Leucht 
et al (2005) determined that an individual score of 53 or more suggested that 
the individual’s psychotic experiences, at time of interview, is of clinical 
significance raising concern for their mental health.  This may lead to 
termination of the interview with advice to seek professional help and 
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encouragement to use a contact provided where guidance and support would 
be offered to the individual.     
 
However, a clinically significant score on the BPRS does not indicate ability to cope 
and live successfully with psychotic experiences.  Studies previously presented in the 
literature review showed that it is not the level of distress or nature of the psychotic 
experience that is of issue but the ability to cope and integrate experiences into 
normal, everyday life.   The BPRs was therefore used to elicit concern for the 
individual and prompt a discussion as to progressing to interview for any volunteer 
found to emulate this score.  The ethics as a process approach comes firmly into focus 
here where a participant is found to emulate the BPRS score of 53 prompting a 
discussion if progression to interview is appropriate.   
  
It must be noted at this stage that four participants were found to emulate a score of 53 
on the BPRS prior to interview (53, 58, 57 and 64) and were presented with this 
information as being potentially problematic.  However, all described their ‘mental 
state’ at interview as normal, nothing exceptional according to their every-day 
experience, seeking to proceed on this basis.  At this point, choice to discontinue the 
interview at any stage was offered, with participants encouraged to use any of the 
supports or interventions as appears in the list at the end of the Ethics section of this 
chapter.  All volunteers decided to proceed with no-one contacting the researcher post 
interview.  Having gone through the sequence above participants were asked to sign a 
consent form (appendix G).    
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Both the CAPE and BPRS are in the public domain, no longer copy righted or under 
license. Permission to use them is therefore not necessary.    
Recruitment, selection and interviews were conducted over a 12-month period, 
August 2012 – July 2013, following ethical approval.  
    
Interviews were expected to take no more than one hour and were audio taped.  Data 
was transcribed in accordance with Tucker’s (2009) adaptation of Potter and  
Wetherell’s (2007) guidelines, then analysed as described above by Potter and 
Wetherell (2007).   A total of 16 volunteers participated in the interview.  Tables 1 
below illustrates the range of PLEs participants recorded using the self-reporting 
questionnaire CAPE, Table 2 illustrates levels of distress as recorded in CAPE 
associated with PLEs; table 3 presents demographic and historical information on 
participants.  The significance of the information presented in these tables is 
summarily discussed at the end of this section.     
 
The CAPE was utilised to confirm experience of PLEs with volunteer participants 
prior to interview ie; help ascertain eligibility to participate.  Tables 1 and 2 below are 
used for illustrative purposes indicating cumulative range and breadth of participant’s 
experience of PLES including associated distress levels.  PLES are itemised under 
three dimensions, below.  It must be emphasised that the presentation of this 
information is for descriptive purposes only.  However, as explained below there is an 
interesting offshoot to this information, specifically related to ethics.      
   
Items under the positive dimension are associated with positive symptoms of  
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psychosis (eg; hallucinations, ‘unusual/bizarre’ experiences, paranoia, grandiosity and 
magical thinking); the depressive dimension associated with depressive symptoms; 
the negative dimension associated with negative symptoms of psychosis (the latter 
two dimensions capturing experiences such as social withdrawal, flattening or absence 
of mood (emptiness and avolition), (Schlier et al., 2015).    
  
Table 1 represents; 1. the total number of items selected by participants across the 3 
dimensions, against a maximum number available; 2. The lowest number of items 
selected by a participant across the dimensions and highest number selected by a 
participant; 3.  the mean items across the dimensions selected by participants against 
that which is available.  With a significant number of items across the dimensions 
selected/self-reported by participants, each volunteer progressed to interview. 
 
At a personal level, as someone who has conducted research into mental health, 
specifically where I declare my personal experience of significant mental health 
problems, I have found the general approach taken by ethics committees to be overly 
paternalistic.  On the face of it, there appears to be a disproportionate concern for 
researchers with self-experience and the impact of study proposals that capture first 
person perspectives. My experience is borne out by Holland (2007), an academic 
researcher and someone declared as being diagnosed with a mental health problem, 
who has found, at least on one occasion, university ethics committees to be overly 
cautious toward researchers who have no professional background or clinical 
expertise, questioning their ability to deal with emergency situations, emphasising the 
need for screening.  Holland presents this is an example of ‘ethics creep’ with a 
“framework designed for medical research being applied to qualitative research” 
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(p897).  She also presents the case that participants with mental health problems are 
assumed and readily positioned as “vulnerable others”.  With this in mind, my 
approach to gain ethical approval for this study was guarded, aimed to appease and 
address any foreseen concerns or paternal reactions from the ethics committee.  I 
wanted to proceed without delay, keen to progress and interact with study participants.  
The Cape, and in particular the BPRS were included in the research proposal in direct 
response to my previous research experiences, accumulated knowledge and 
established relationships with other researchers with self-experience of mental health 
problems.  On reflection, the screening tools were perhaps excessive and unnecessary 
with potential to influence participant responses such as mistrust and discourse 
contamination.  However, as I present later, these potential effects on participant 
responses were not borne out during interview.  Below I have summarised the scores 
from the screening tools as I believe it would be disingenuous or dishonest not to 
declare, present, or at least briefly remark on these.  In doing so I etch out anything 
significant that arise related to this study.     
           
3.23Table 1: CAPE 3 - dimension summary scores  




              N=16  





per participant  
3. Mean total of 
items selected 
by participants  
 





197 (out of a  
 
possible total 16x20  
= 320)  
Lowest number of 
items selected - 3   
  
Highest number of 
items selected - 20  





96 (out of a possible 
total 16x8 = 128)  
Low – 4  
High - 8  
6 (out of 8)  
Negative 
dimension  
152 (out of a 
possible total 16x14  
= 224)  
Low – 3  
High - 13  
9.5 (out of 14)  
(14 items 
available)  
   
Total  345 (out of a possible 
total  
maximum 672)   
Low – 16  
High – 40  
27.5 (out of 42)  
  
 3.24 Levels of distress per dimension as reported by 
participants  
Table 2 reveals levels of distress against each dimension of PLE as reported by 
participants.  As CAPE was used primarily to help determine eligibility to participate 
in the interview through detection of personal experience of PLEs, distress levels as 
part of CAPE were deemed irrelevant regards progress to interview.  From an ethical 
point of view levels of distress and psychotic experiences that may impact the ability 
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of volunteers to participate was determined by the Brief Psychiatric Scale (see above).  
However, given the CAPE captures levels of distress, it was deemed reasonable and 
prudent to score these as reported by participants post interview, consider and relate 
anything significant that arises from this data set.   
 
Dimension  1. Total distress  
 
levels  










dimension   
3. Mean level  
of distress 
reported per 




score of  
 114 (out of possible  
960)  
Lowest level of 
distress reported –  
0 (x4)   
  
7 (out of possible 
maximum of 60)  
distress -  
20x3x16 = 960)  
 Highest level of 
distress reported – 
32 (out of possible  
20x3 = 60)  
 
 





distress -  
8x3x16 = 384)  
63 (out of possible  
384)  
Lowest level of 
distress reported –  
0 (x2)   
  
Highest level of 
distress reported – 
11 (out of possible  
8x3 = 24)  
4 (out of possible 





distress - 14 
x3x16 = 672)  
96 (out of possible  
672)   
 
Lowest level of 
distress reported –  
0 (x3)   
  
Highest level of 
distress reported – 
17 (out of possible  
14x3 = 42)  
6 (out of possible 
maximum of 42)  
Total  273 (possible 
maximum score of  
distress - 2016)   
N/A  17 (out of possible  
126)  
   
With a total accumulative distress score of 273 reported by the 16 participants against 
a possible maximum 2016 (column 1); a mean total across participant distress scores 
of 17 out of a possible maximum 126 (column 3), distress levels would appear to be 
minimal.  This may be indicative of successful coping/living with PLEs giving further 
justification to interview those who emulated BPRS scores that would raise clinical 
concern.   Worth noting is that two out of the four participants emulating the BPRS 
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score of 53 (the latter 57 and 64 BPRS scores above) had average distress scores on 
the CAPE in accordance with mean scores of the group as per Table 1 (respectively - 
8 on the positive dimension, 5 depressive dimension, 8 negative dimension; 6 on the 
positive dimension, 5 depressive dimension, 8 negative dimension).  This illustrates 
the point above that elevated presence of psychosis (symptoms in terms of BPRS) are 
not indicative of the ability of individuals to live successfully and integrate psychotic 
experiences in their everyday life.  
 
3.25 Demographics   
As part of data collection some basic demographic and historical information was 
collected prior to interview.  This is summarised below comprising gender ratio (row 
1), age range and mean (row 2); information provided by the 9 participants who have 
experience of mental health services including last time they accessed these services 
(represented as range), extent of experience using services representing as time spent 
using services (row 3).  Worth noting and perhaps significant to this study is that the 
range and mean age of participants represents a mid to elderly age group and that no 
one from what might be termed younger generations (30 years and below) are 
represented in the study.      
  
1. Gender  10 male; 6 female      
2. Age  Range – 41 - 67  Mean – 51.5     
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3. Experience of  
Service use  
9 participants  Range - Last time 
accessed services 
3 years – 50 
years prior to 
interview  
Length of time 
using services –   
minimum 6 
months; 
maximum 50  
years  
  
To summarise this section, participants were asked to complete the CAPE 
questionnaire to help confirm they had experience of PLEs prior to interview.  All 
volunteers were felt to meet the criteria and progress to interview. Table 1 represents 
accumulative experiences of PLEs as reported by participants over the three 
dimensions within the CAPE questionnaire.  This was used for illustrative purposes 
revealing the breadth and range of PLEs participants experienced.   Score Levels of 
distress associated with the three dimensions across CAPE (table 2) were minimal, 
indicating participant ability to cope, live with and integrate PLES in their day to day 
life.  To highlight this point, two of the highest recorded levels of psychosis, as 
indicated through BPRS scores (potentially raising clinical and therefore ethical 
concern) threw up an anomaly whereby the same individuals self-recorded close to the 
group mean levels of distress through CAPE.  This illustrates the point raised that 
elevated presence of psychosis (symptoms in terms of BPRS) do not necessarily 
correlate with the ability of individuals to live successfully and integrate psychotic 
experiences in their everyday life.  Lastly, demographics revealed that participants 
represented an age group corresponding with middle to old age.  The ‘younger 
generation’ of 30 years and below are therefore not represented in this study.   This 
may be significant and will be discussed later in the thesis.        
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3.26 Chapter Summary 
Before presenting findings, chapter 4, I want to summarise how my approach to data 
collection and analysis lends credibility in establishing findings.  Greckhamer and Cilesiz 
(2014) make the point that although transparency is vital in helping readers understand how 
qualitative researchers arrive at a particular interpretation of data, an inevitable 
simplification in articulating this process exists.  These authors raise a specific case for 
discourse analysis involving a certain level of idiosyncrasy lending itself toward 
“interpretation and judgement … shaped by an individual researcher’s epistemological 
assumptions and values” (p425)  The high dependency on interpretation is extenuated by 
the lack of ‘formulaic or mechanical’ approaches that accompanies other qualitative 
approaches such as thematic analysis.   To achieve an appropriate level of transparency 
researchers applying discourse analysis need to present decision-making processes that have 
moved them from interpretation to findings.   With this in mind, I am confident that I have 
presented an adequate level of transparency and trustworthiness regards my analysis of data 
and that the findings I arrive at are credible.      
 
Firstly, specific to decision-making whilst interpreting data I have presented in appendix H 
an example of analysis that transpired, contributing to a specific finding.  I also presented a 
number of validity checks (3.14) I applied in order to help validate findings. 
 
Secondly, I have described my role and position in the research process and potential to 
influence participant expectations and responses to questions during interview (1.4, 3.15, 
3.16).  To restate, I remain sympathetic with anyone who constructs narratives of resistance 
against the meta/grand narratives, but respect and accept another’s meaning making 
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decision making regardless of my own epistemological commitments, personal values or 
inclination to ‘taking sides’ (more below).  I believe I reserved my own opinion and 
judgements during interview and remained impartial to participant’s personal construction 
and discursive accounts of psychotic experiences.  That said, during analysis I was vigilant 
toward any comment I might make, or of any evidence of any influence that my presence 
may have (ie; as an insider, 3.16 above) on participant responses and presented this in the 
findings.   
 
Further, I will describe the practical steps taken to ensure the analyses of data I carried out 
is further understood.  Throughout this process I re-examined and critically reviewed my 
analysis, whilst reflecting on my own interpretative biases and influence during interview 
on participant responses.  This is in line with discourse analysis, as analysis of text does not 
allow a linear process to arise such as weighting of one piece of text over another, or a 
hierarchy of patterns and categorisation to develop, but rather to appreciate and identify the 
interdependence of text as naturally occurs in everyday speech. 
 
Having transcribed the text, I examined elements of the data such as potential meaning of 
words and sentences.  From these elements I developed themes and identified patterns that 
make up various repertoires related to the research question.   This was done on computer 
using the text highlighting function on word.   Discursive patterns were identified such as 
the function of discourse markers which helped reveal discursive strategies, positioning and 
orientation of the discourse found within the text.   The presence of compromises, 
contradictions and dilemmas allowed me to reveal the challenges and barriers to 
constructing a discourse in line with participant orientation at interview.  This served as a 
broadening of context beyond the spoken word, helping to meet the aims and objectives of 
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the study.  The validation criteria 3.14 was used to ensure analysis was meeting the aims 
and objectives expected of a study applying discourse analysis.  To risk repetition, an 
example of analyses of a small piece of transcript can be found in appendix H. 
 
Finally, an added dimension to research credibility is authenticity.  Authenticity is 
dependent on expectations - to paraphrase Daza (2008) and in context of this thesis - of 
‘being a good researcher’, whilst continuing to be a ‘good peer’ with similar persons who 
have lived experience of PLEs - participants.  The position as researcher is not fixed, but 
discursively shaped, his/her role being ‘played out’ during interview (how the researcher 
might be imagined), and a shift in positioning taking place whilst conducting analysis and 
presenting findings.  As a researcher taken as an insider, I am aware that expectations from 
participants will likely err on ‘naturalized discourse’ where they assume a solution to a 
problem.  However, I am applying a methodology that ‘denatuarilzes’ participant discourse 
(Greckhamer and Cilesiz, 2014), drawing their discourse into a wider context uncovering 
discursive performances that are found to be contrary to and compromise participant 
intentions as revealed through their orientation.  The process of denaturalizing participant 
discourse goes against my own ‘naturalized’ position as someone who feels a strong 
affiliation with anyone who lives with PLEs and ‘chooses’ to live with these experiences 
outside culturally dominant meaning making systems.  Daza (2008) describes situations 
where researchers are expected to reciprocate world views of the participant group, yet their 
chosen methodology presents findings contrary to this expectation.  Researchers in this 
position often experience personal discomfort, ambivalence and complications in their 
positioning whilst conducting discourse analysis (Daza, 2008).  I can report that I 
experienced discomfort during analysis and presenting findings as discourse constructed by 
participants were found to be greatly compromised in accordance with the wider social 
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context.  As a result, my own positioning, as someone who had optimistic notions that the 
participant discourses might present something radical and new shifted.  I describe my 
personal discomfort, and to an extent frustration whilst going through analyses and 
presenting findings in an epilogue at the end of this thesis.  Regardless of levels of personal 
discomfort, ambivalence and complications to my positioning I remained committed to the 
chosen methodology.  I argue that my commitment, regardless of personal struggles and 
apprehensive shift in positioning brings a certain trustworthiness and authentication to 
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Chapter 4 – Findings  
To restate from directly above, Dominance or subordination of any element of 
discourse should not become part of ‘doing discourse analysis’ (Antaki et al., 2003).    
There is a danger of organising patterns or categorisation of features of speech 
hierarchically, interfering with the discursive nature of discourse - a simplification of 
the natural production of text.   
Allowing dominance or subordination during discourse analysis can indicate ‘taking 
sides’ as already alluded above, Chapter 3, where the aim of the researcher is to draw 
the reader into a social cause.          
  
Considering the above, the sequencing of the findings below is presented to satisfy the 
aims and objectives of this study.  While groupings of patterns of talk/features of 
speech are presented, distinct hierarchies, privileging or taking sides is avoided 
through the validation process described in chapter 3 and acknowledgement of the 
interrelatedness that occurs throughout the text presented in the findings below.  The 
identification of repertoires is the primary focus of this analysis; unravelling of their 
usage (revealing various discursive practices) with regards linguistic performance in 
identity work, participant positioning and their usage leading to consequences and 
effects involving dilemmas.   These interrelated elements are revealed to highlight 
issues of social power and tensions that arise during the course of ‘meaning in use’  
(Holzscheiter,2013) that took place at interview.   Vis a vis: 1. Formation of identity 2. 
How/what positioning was achieved through the aforementioned; 3. personal and 
social consequences; leading to:4. A number of dilemmatic challenges (eg; undesired 
compromises and unforeseen consequences).  Direct quotes from participants appear 
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in italics, in inverted commas.  Anonymisation maintained by representing 
participants according to the order they were interviewed ie; first participant 
interviewed is P1, the final becomes p17.        
  
I begin with Figure 1 below illustrating the discursive patterns identified during 
analyses; their interrelatedness made visible.  This is presented as an aid to help the 
reader follow the sequence of categorisation as presented in the findings below.     
 
 
Figure 1  
4.2 Summary description of Figure 1  
At the centre of Figure 1 the repertoire Category Entitlement represents participants’ 
core positioning claiming an expertise through the lived experience.  From this central 
core stems various sub-categories arising from discursive performances to achieve and 
4.1 Figure 1 Category Entitlement as Core Positioning, 
Consequences and Dilemmas   
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defend the category entitlement.  The Emergence of Expertise (top left) is made up of 
discursive patterns that reveal how participants account for their acquisition of 
expertise through various knowledges and experiences secured to an individualised, 
personalised and internalised space.  Here participants create a barrier to inquisition 
from external, objective forces in order to maintain credibility and protect their 
identity.  Top right represents Consequences of Entitlement made up of a number of 
dilemmas at stake, involving social impact on participants holding and maintaining 
this expertise given communal and social settings they operate, the main effect being 
the silencing of the PLE and a number of ‘challenges’, namely diminished certainty to 
participant claims of expertise centred on the lived experience.  The dilemmas bring 
discursive performances into a wider context by revealing their orientation.  Bottom 
right, Dilemmas (Ideological and Lived Ideological), reveals contradictions, 
ambiguities and inconsistencies with regards principles and practices participants 
appended to their positioning.  This includes a specific dichotomy (mind/body 
dualism, bottom left) detracting from sources of power and authority participants 
would be required to address if transformations are to take place to accomplish 
facilitation and social acceptance of the psychotic experience.  Below I present 
findings from analyses of the data.  More illustrations will appear throughout this 
Chapter to help bring clarification at significant junctures of the findings.       
   
4.3 The lived experience as Category Entitlement   
Contradiction in talk is a common occurrence.  It often signifies issues a speaker is 
encountering when tending to matters of context and social interaction.   
Contradictions were found throughout the data, most notably over interpretations and 
representations of psychotic experiences.  Several discursive patterns emerged from 
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the data highlighting efforts made by participants to get to an end point of building 
credible knowledge of psychotic experiences, whereby the right of the person with 
direct experience to define and interpret their PLEs was promoted and defended.  
Multi layering of linguistic performances accompanied this complex endeavour.  
Discursive patterns to achieve Category Entitlement (expert knowledge proclaimed 
from a particular position) were engaged; presented below.  An Emergence of 
expertise and confirmation of Lived Experience as Category Entitlement came about 
through discursive acts leading to the following repertoires: 1. Neglected Source of 
Knowledge 2. Validation through the Intrapersonal 3. Beyond doubt.     
 
4.4 The emergence of expertise  
During interviews participants presented their PLEs as needing to be accepted; 
experiences that, with the passing of time were believed to be a natural part of the 
human condition, described as; “ordinary”, “normal”, “everyday”.  In contrast, 
participants also described their psychotic experiences as very personal, individual, 
unique and exceptional often referring to their “specialness”.  There was a distinct 
orientation of participant discourse toward ownership over the psychotic experience 
with entitlement to define, interpret and find acceptance contingent upon the lived 
experience.   Entitlement to expertise in psychotic experiences could only emerge 
from a personal ‘journey’ toward validation resulting in a realisation that psychotic 
experiences were to be valued, ‘embraced’.  One could not get to the point of 
expertise without having gone through this journey.     
 
Whether participants began their journey into the world of psychotic experiences 
through early environments such as family heritage, childhood inquisitiveness in 
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nature, mythology or major life events; narratives that positioned them as an expert in 
their own right were constructed, primarily through rhetorical devices.  In terms of 
discursive repertoires this would present as events or accounts that were often fateful, 
subject to destiny.   Expertise has traditionally been associated with knowledge, 
qualifications, skills and experience sufficient enough to demonstrate competency and 
trustworthiness beyond what would be expected of a novice or layperson.  
Grundmann (2017) notes that prestige and legitimacy precedes a request for expert 
advice or guidance and that expertise is relational “mediating between knowledge 
production and application’ (p45).  The challenge for participants is to build a 
personal profile that would satisfy the above criteria.  
 
4.5 A neglected source of knowledge  
Overall, scientific (objective) measures were rarely used to bolster participant claims 
to expertise.  However, there was a notable use of empiricist accounting in positioning 
people with self-experience as bequeathed with an aptitude neglected by the greater 
community.  In the lead up to the excerpt below P11 draws upon an anthropological 
study carried out in Ballybran, Co Kerry, by Nancy Scheper-Hughes in the 1970s.    
 
P11 described how Scheper-Hughes “ran all sorts of psychological tests on the people 
in the village” only to find those with the greatest insights “into the cracks in the  
Ballybran community weren’t anybody who’d gone to university or were supposed to 
know something (1) they were these people” (the institutionalised):     
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“ they were hopeless cases as far as they were concerned (.) in Tralee mental hospital 
(.) very hopeless and some of them were very very depressed from what I could see 
(1) so what is it that they could see (1) is it that they were a more sensitive or what? 
(.) is it like you (.) D.E Bird before he got the minor’s lamp (.) Sir Humphreys Davy’s 
invention (.) in order to see there was gas in the mines they were bringing birds in so 
they’d fall down first (.) or they’d fall out (1) now maybe now they have modern 
equipment I don’t know (1) are these people more sensitive to things and they pick up 
the cracks in society which everyone else is denying (1) do you understand me? (1) 
possibly so (.) that was her (.) she was an American (.) she had no axe to grind (.) she 
wasn’t a protestant (.) Catholic dissenter or anything like that (.) she was just an 
anthropologist (.) she ran a number of psychological tests and that was her opinion.”  
  
Above P11 uses corroborating evidence and rhetorical devices advocating a re-
evaluation of the social worth of patients from Tralee mental hospital.  He initially 
presents psychological tests applied by a renowned academic as a credible source 
implying that those residing in a local mental hospital have greater insight than the 
general population.    People with mental health problems are often believed to lack 
insight, but in this case, it is the general population that is labelled with this mental 
deficit.  Qualifications or social status is irrelevant (or may even be a barrier) to 
achieving this insight.     When P11 describes the hospital population as being “very (.) 
very depressed from what I can see” he leaves no doubt that the origins of their 
depression is inextricably linked to social contexts.  The description of the birds that 
would “fall down first (.) or they’d fall out” provides a useful analogy of the fate of 
people who are exposed to environmental (social) toxics.   It follows that the 
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institutionalised act as a social barometer to the harmful “cracks” in society that the 
local population is in denial of.  It is unclear if their ‘insight’ into the “cracks” of 
society lead to their downfall, or if they gained insight because of their downfall.  
Either way, society would do well to acknowledge and listen to their plight with the 
discernible question: “what it is they could see that others could not?”  They are 
victim to the failings of society and representative of a social conscience that requires 
attention.    
  
Describing the institutionalised as ‘hopeless’, “as far as they were concerned” implies 
that those residing in Tralee mental hospital were being judged by the local 
community to be of little value, condemned to long-term dependency.  Given P11’s 
positioning of the Tralee mental hospital population of the time, it would be 
reasonable to assume that the statement whereby he asks if they are “more sensitive to 
things” was of a rhetorical nature ie; was not delivered to elicit an answer.   The real 
question that P11 asks appears at the end of the sentence: “do you understand me?” 
appealing to the interviewer to agree with the former part of his statement.     Finally, 
the credentials of Scheper-Hughes and the credibility of her work was boosted by 
declaring objectivity and independence to her conclusions by stating that she had “no 
axe to grind”, had no affiliation, religiously or patriotically, toward the local 
community.     
  
The examples of corroboration, the use of analogy and rhetorical question ending in 
appeal for agreement encourages the interviewer to regard the mental health inpatient, 
as being undervalued, potentially possessing a ‘gift’; an authority in their own right.   
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The discursive formation that shaped P11’s account of the mental patient, was 
apparent across interviews.  The result of this linguistic twist is that persons living 
with mental health problems, and by association psychosis, are ‘truth holders’, who, if 
given the opportunity could become ‘truth tellers’.  The truth they hold could benefit 
society.   In these circumstances the ‘truth holder’ is afforded little credibility as their 
reality is enveloped by a social order that has negative social consequences.  The 
social order does not only involve institutionalised care as above, but an attachment  
(whether accepted or not), to established orders of truth.  If a person becomes attached 
to this social order, trustworthiness and competency is no-longer social currency.   
Moving from truth holder to truth teller requires a break, a questioning, a challenge, a 
modification, a (re)positioning of one’s relationship with the order.  Participants in their 
discursiveness shifted from a truth told, via others, to one that is individual, personalised 
used to good effect to further substantiate the authority of the truth holder validated 
through the intrapersonal.    
 
 4.6  Validation through the intrapersonal   
Conventional knowledge and public perception of psychosis proposes to rid the 
individual from the experience ie; cure.   However, if cure is unachievable, managing 
or integrating the experience is the next best option.  This includes a requirement to 
reject or challenge the experience comprising an assumption that it is intolerable or 
unacceptable to the individual living with the psychotic experience.  Under these 
conditions, positive aspects of the psychotic experience becomes “a neglected 
secondary discourse” (Richards, 2008, p24).  People living with psychotic 
experiences are implicated in a social milieu subverting their ability to know what is 
in their best interest.  In accordance with this there is no learning to be derived from 
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persons living with psychotic experiences who might have an alternative perspective 
to the meta/grand narratives.  Constructing a positive account of the psychotic 
experience ie; attaching value to the experience (even though it may create distress for 
the individual) becomes difficult and challenging.  If the source of expertise (self-
experience) is devalued through social disapproval, then the task becomes one of 
repositioning the source of knowledge and subsequent expertise. The extract below 
demonstrates an awareness of this particular challenge and how it can be overcome by 
attaching value, at an intrapersonal level, to psychotic experiences:    
 
P12: “Why do I live inside my head so much? (.) Why do I listen to voices? (1) And I 
was dismissed a lot as a child (.) teenager (.) young man (1) I was dismissed (.) you 
know that idea of being dismissed and I was never dismissed by the voices in my head 
(1) they pay loads of attention to me (.) I get a lot from them even if it’s not always 
positive (1) they never dismiss me”   
  
Prior to making the above statement P12 shared a life of rejection, trauma and 
misadventure.  The voices he describes distressed him greatly, to a point where he 
attempted to drill a hole in his skull to release the resulting mental anguish.   He 
begins by asking two questions “Why do I live inside my head so much? (.) Why do I 
listen to voices?”  These are rhetorical questions, as he leaves no space for a reply, 
responding to the questions in a continuous sequence of talk.  Rhetorical questions are 
described by Rhode (2006) as biased, statements that are: “assertive, yet 
uninformative: instead of informing any discourse participant, rhetorical questions 
are redundant and serve to synchronize Speaker and Addressee beliefs.” (p134).  
Further, Rhode notes that they imply an answer with an anticipated obviousness and 
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predictability.  Putting this in context, the intention behind the sequence of talk above 
is to move efficiently from the initial question to an answer corresponding to: ‘I’ll tell 
you why.’ This is an assertive act using irony to position the participant as victim to 
circumstances, having no choice but to trust and accept something that is personally 
hurtful and injurious due to the extent of social rejection experienced (the lesser of 
two evils).  Synchronization is achieved as the interviewer is denied the chance to 
respond, becoming a silent conspirator deterred from questioning P12’s assertion of 
truth.  The psychotic experience is assured through the intrapersonal value declared.    
This establishes self-experience as a credible and incontrovertible source of 
knowledge of psychotic experiences.  The ‘truth holder’ is afforded unique status in 
making a truth claim, providing impetus for the individual to protect their integrity by 
claiming expertise through specialist (self) knowledge.     
  
As with the use of empiricist accounting, previously presented by P11 above, other 
acts of corroboration were reported.  These served to endorse the social benefits of 
psychotic experiences with consequences to becoming an expert intrinsically linked 
with self-experience.  Claims to specialist knowledge (ultimately expertise) was also 
used to denounce a single measure of psychosis (purely physiological) in order to 
broaden understanding of its origin and dismiss any negative consequences thereof.   
In the lead up to the below, P1 narrated his life’s experiences involving interpersonal 
struggles with family and friends and battles with the psychiatric system.  Throughout 
this sequence of talk he questions the expert opinions from practicing psychiatrists.   
What he called ‘survivors’ of the psychiatric system led him to an independent  
 
therapist whom he found aggregable to his needs:    
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 “[name of therapist] said that people like me were special (.) I believe that (1) I firmly 
believe that now (1) the organizations that I’m involved with (.) what I’m reading and 
what’s coming across in all these organizations is there is a spiritual thing (.) mind (.) 
body and soul and it’s not a chemical imbalance”  
P1  
  
P1 uses a statement from his therapist to confirm that he and others like him are  
“special”.  He adds that what he is reading and from organisations that he is “involved 
with” confirm his belief that the origin of psychotic experiences is “not a chemical 
imbalance” but holistic, involving spirit, “mind (.) body and soul”.  Given that he does 
not elaborate on each concept or how they might interact, a vagueness prevails. 
However, the inclusive manner with which P1 challenges and ultimately rejects medical 
terminology includes a multi-layering of corroborative sources (practitioner, literature, 
groups) substantiating a claim to consensual knowledge greater than that from a single 
point - medical expertise.  The validation of self-experience, the positive remarks from 
his therapist combined with sources of self-learning (‘what I’m reading’) and 
interaction with organizations confirms his claim to specialness, including others like 
him.  This serves to discredit medical expertise and protect his identity against negative 
consequences of a medical explanation of psychotic experiences.    
  
The above discourses (P11, P12 and P1) place people with psychotic experiences in a 
privileged position through the exclusive knowledge dependent on self-experience.   
The self-contained, private nature, interiority involved with self-experience, makes it 
difficult or potentially impossible to refute.  This creates a secure and self-assured 
knowledge base from which to claim a ‘specialism’ (expertise) on psychotic 
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experiences. Through discursive means (corroboration, consensus, metaphors, 
rhetoric, category entitlement) a truth claim toward an authoritative position is 
achieved.   The basis for the truth claim, as presented by participants, is knowledge 
co-existing/dependent on personal experience; the subjective.  Taking the subjective 
as the foundation of truth provides an impetus for the establishment of an expertise 
outside/beyond traditional conceptions - the Expert by Experience.  The ‘neglected 
secondary discourse’ becomes foregrounded through the lived experience.  
Establishing the truth that lies ‘within’ involves the cementing of its foundation, 
beyond doubt.  
Category Entitlement lay a foundation for an unquestionable Truth, as presented by 
participants.   
 4.7  Beyond doubt  
In order to create a discourse that serves to elevate one’s identity, one needs to have 
an understanding as to the standards and conditions with which it is measured.  This 
includes what might be believable and socially acceptable.  It also involves 
knowledge from which one can attach one’s identity to.  Knowledge that is likely to 
be at odds with social conditions and standards of measurement may be met with 
incredulity; subject to ridicule.  Knowledge does not operate in a vacuum nor can it 
exist in total isolation from social discourses or social convention.  It therefore follows 
that the attachment of personal identity to sources of knowledge requires a level of 
awareness; conscious effort in order to address public doubt, disbelief or suspicion.  
This is of particular importance to those who hold a reality that is judged dubious in 
nature, in this instance psychotic (like) experiences.  Creating a discourse from this 
difficult starting point requires persuasive accounts of alternate realities and world 
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views involving high levels of conviction and commitment to personal beliefs.  In the 
extracts below this included performances that involved denouncement, 
differentiation and diversionary performances.  
   
When asked to describe their psychotic experiences or consider a contrary theory from 
what they presented at interview (eg; medical or cognitive) participants invariably 
rejected the terminology outright and/or pointed to an intrinsic bias or predisposed 
consequences of the language.  Below P4 responds to an offering up of an alternative 
view of his PLEs; in terms of biology and cognition (‘faulty processing’):  
  
“You see (.) it depends on the frame of reference (1) like if you take that frame of 
reference which you (.) that you’re a physical body and you can’t escape those (.) and 
therefore that’s the reality you have to answer within that reality (.) and that causes 
problems for me because I don’t subscribe to that reality so much anymore”  
P4  
  
P4 refers to the biological theory of psychosis as a “frame of reference”’ that fails to 
look beyond the body.  The “frame” is restrictive: 2you can’t escape those (.) and 
therefore that’s the reality you have to answer within that reality” personally 
damaging closing off the possibilities beyond itself.  This demonstrates an awareness, 
on behalf of participants, of the rational structures and evaluative terms that 
accompany the meta/grand narratives of psychosis.  It is as if the physical body is 
literally or figuratively trapped within these terms and structures.  By rejecting 
frameworks that are steeped in particular rational methodologies, pointing to loaded 
and problematic language that causes personal problems, the opening for an 
 
  170  
alternative, less restrictive understanding of psychosis is anticipated.  A world beyond 
the physical, the material, creates an ontological opening for participants to create a 
world that may not be accessible through conventional means (eg; objectivity) or/and 
open to alternative ways of testing.    
  
Discursive accounts also involved the use of metaphors and abstract ideas used to 
reinforce a “truth claim” that is “beyond doubt” (Holbraad, 2012); one with self-
experience at the centre purposefully preserving a preferred self (Potter and Wetherell, 
2007; Andersson, 2008).  In discourse, metaphors are often linked with abstract ideas.  
The application of a metaphor involves the comparison of a familiar concept or idea 
with a more complex one, thereby helping others understand what is being expressed 
ultimately creating meaning around an experience that is significant, or preferable to 
the user.  By way of example this includes improved understanding of biological 
processes related to health and wellbeing (Reisfield and Wilson, 2004). Metaphors can 
also indicate limitations of rationality and attract an emotional response from others 
(Welcomer et al, 2000; Nguyen and McCallum, 2016).  
  
Participants deployed metaphors, analogies and corroborative statements while 
describing the occurrence or origin of psychotic experiences.  These included words 
and terminologies comprising energies, spirits (animal or human), nature, mystical, 
mythical and ‘otherworldly’ domains with metaphysical subtexts.  They were inclined 
to be difficult to confront due to their reliance on individual experiences, personal 
beliefs and their tendency to be mind-dependent ie; constructed through narratives 
involving the ‘imagination’7. As confirmation to the significance of the imagination to 
participant accounts P9, prior to the extract below, confirms that the world with which 
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he operates has imaginary quality, one by its very nature is difficult to demolish: “if 
its less visible(.) it means it becomes a harder place to destroy”.   This leaves little 
doubt of the conscious power, of the level of diffusion, of commitment to and strength 
of belief, to an authority bestowed to the psychotic experience.    
      
Below P9, someone familiar with Shamanism, describes how people can be affected 
when they become overwhelmed by personal experiences and how the Shaman culture 
appreciates their plight:    
     
“in my observation (.) when they’re traumatic experiences they fall into that category 
of lower world experiences and the lower world for the Shama’s is understand that 
things can be quite messy (.) things are very undifferentiated (1) for me it’s where the 
energy of creation itself are being pushed up in through the bedrock of consciousness 
(.) and as a consequence (.) if you meet those energies you can get messed around 
because they haven’t differentiated like the way lava hasn’t differentiated yet to lava 
rock”  P9  
  
 P9 begins with a self-avowed corroborative statement - that what is to follow is based  
 
on personal observation.  Not only has he lived with PLEs, but has also supported and 
witnessed others living through the experience.   
_____________________________________________________________________  
7 Here imagination is taken as descriptions and depictions designed to draw audiences into a narrative 
where ‘locations, objects, and events in the scenes (are) to be imagined’.   The presentation of an event 
transports audiences into ‘new worlds’ compartmentalized from the ‘real world’ (Clark and Van Der 
Wege, 2015, p419)  
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This amounts to a ‘layering’ of corroboration to his views.  Through Shamanism he 
“understands that things can be quite messy”, that traumatic experiences are 
compelled; “being pushed up through the bedrock of consciousness”’ and that a 
consequence is a struggle with realities, hence the differentiation.  The use of 
metaphors and analogy provides graphic imagery that draws upon natural sources 
“bedrock”’, “lava” etc providing examples of the “energy of creation” presenting little 
doubt that psychotic experiences belong to natural processes and that the worlds with 
which Shamanism operates and conceives exists, is genuine and appropriate to 
facilitate the psychotic experience.    
  
The vivid, somewhat imaginary description of such events is appealing, framed as 
natural occurrences taking the psychotic experience beyond rational structures and 
evaluative terms normally associated with a materialism that determines biological 
and cognitive theories.  This enables participants to take the functioning and 
interpretation of psychotic experience to another place, one that is diffuse; somewhat 
uninhibited by standard convention.    
    
Presenting a moral and conceivable response to psychotic experiences where it is 
attached to an ‘imagining’ consciousness may not be enough to satisfy social 
conditions, or to put it another way demands from a dominant Westernised system of 
logic and rationality.  What would be considered a psychotic experience would 
therefore warrant corroboration from sources beyond the experience itself, from 
reliable witnesses, in order to garner credibility to accounts.  Additional to 
renunciation of the terms and structures with which medical and cognitive models of 
psychosis are aligned were discourses that defused or neutralised any chance of a 
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counterchallenge to a reality involving an event that might be judged psychotic.  
Laughter combined with corroboration from credible observers were used to defuse 
any dispute to an event involving a PLE.    
  
In the extract below laughter is used in triumphalist terms.  At the request of the 
interviewer to describe ‘extraordinary, or ‘exceptional’ experiences which others may 
judge psychotic P15 describes a recurring event in his life where his clairvoyant 
abilities come to life.  Prior to this he recalls how as a child his mother “said” he was  
“special”, leading him to believe he was ‘unique’, “very open and sensitive to a lot of 
things”:      
  
“Well it’s like me going to a film (1)and I sit down and I try to stop myself from 
knowing the end of it (.) cos I’d go tu tu tu and I’d say (.) and I’d write it on my hand 
(2) myself and my wife we’d watch the film and I’d put me hand up and I’d say this is 
the ending (1) that’d be two hours later (1) [laughs] and she’d say why do you watch 
films in the first place.”  P15   
  
 
At first glance it may appear that laughter serves to play down the clairvoyant event 
described ie; making light of the (inevitable) outcome.  However, what precedes the 
laughter is a vague description of events (for instance P15 could have been specific 
about the name of a film when this occurred), and corroboration from a witness; his 
wife.  Both combined work to support the accuracy of the sequence presented.   
Laughter arrives at a point where P15’s predictions unfold followed by a wry 
comment from his wife where she shares her frustration with his predictive adeptness.   
Laughter is used to mark a significant occurrence in the account – of a triumphalist 
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moment, where the story arrives at an ‘aha’ or a ‘gotcha’ moment involving a 
frustrated bystander.  P15’s wife acts as a credible and trustworthy witness to P15’s 
predictive abilities.  Her frustration is presented as an independent authentic response 
to P15’s predictive powers.  An alternative interpretation could have been that P15  
was lucky to have guessed the ending of the film.  However, potential to question the 
account or any vagueness is overcome by the level of corroboration achieved through 
his wife, making it difficult to question the narrative offered up thereby, at least from  
P15’s perspective, safeguarding the account.  The account is presented as authentic, a 
reality beyond doubt, not to be judged or dismissed.     
   
At this point it is worth restating the case that participants are likely to accept the 
interviewer as an ‘insider’ (as per Chapter 3, Methodology). Knapik (2006) noted that 
study participants tend not to be passive during interview, actively seek and anticipate 
interaction, willingly enter into meaningful dialogue, tending to be curious about the 
research topic.  The interviewer’s self-experience and subsequent circumstances 
created around the interview, the high likelihood of self-determined involvement may 
well have produced conditions where participants would not expect an examination 
(questioning) of their accounts.  The likelihood of participants to present accounts that 
they would not normally share is increased, converse to satisfying social norms.   
 
Beresford’s (2005) emphasises, as per methodology chapter, on the closeness between 
peers involved in research (interviewer and interviewee) of high probability of 
receiving an open and genuine response also comes into play here.   Given 
observations noted here and the expectation that the interviewer would be accepted as 
an insider, the interviewer/researcher believes he is assumed, by participants, a natural 
corroborator to accounts and realities presented at interview.  In such circumstances 
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vagueness as applied by P15 above would be expected to go unchallenged; find 
acceptance, be believable.  Additional, as already alluded, is awareness on behalf of 
participants that their PLEs sit outside ‘normal’, culturally acceptable experience.   
That they are sharing their experiences in the study context where they admit to being 
discerning when deciding to share their PLEs beyond certain social parameters provides 
further evidence that the researcher interviewer is accepted as an ‘insider’.           
  
As a result of the above extracts, self-experience, whether through bodily sensations 
or mental activity, holds a special place.  For participants, self-experience is 
sacrosanct.  The reality that lies therein is irrefutable, cannot be judged by others; 
beyond criticism.   Corroboration, denouncement, empiricist accounting, rhetoric and 
competent use of metaphors and analogies serve to protect the deeply personal PLE 
from cynical enquiry, diverting alternative interpretations.  These discourses are 
deployed to achieve ‘fact constructions’ through substantiation that those living with 
PLEs are reliable and credible sources of knowledge (Potter, 1996) and self-
experience.  This demonstrates a high level of participant commitment in defending 
their PLEs (beyond the meta/grand narratives) situating them within other narratives 
or world views eg; incorporating spiritual domains.   Category Entitlement, the core 
position of expert (by experience) is staked through the lived experience, fixed to an 
internal space that is impossible to penetrate or/and difficult to contest.  The core 
positioning of category entitlement acts as a defence for the individual against social 
forces that might question their reality, specifically those that judge the psychotic 
experience as a sign of personal deficit or associate it with malfunction.  I present later 
the individual benefits of this core positioning in maintaining emotional and 
psychological equilibrium (Chapter 5, Discussion, 5.1 – 5.3.5).   
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Below, Figure 2 brings clarity, in the order of findings as they are presented so far.  I 
illustrate what participants, to this point have discursively achieved.   
Figure 2 Establishing and defending the right to an expertise through 
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Discursive performances establish and validate an assured expertise (by experience; 
‘specialism’).  Moving clockwise from the top of the diagram, The Emergence of 
Expertise can only be achieved through the lived experience, where a realisation and 
legitimisation of the psychotic experience takes place.  The legitimisation of the 
psychotic experience involves various declarations that the experience is a Neglected 
Source of Knowledge, socially valuable, held by those with self-experience (Truth 
Holders) corroborated by independent observers (eg; P11).  The Truth Holders are the 
only ones in a position, through their lived experience, to speak an inconvenient social 
truth, becoming Truth Tellers.   A secondary layer of Validation occurs through the 
Intrapersonal where a repositioning of expertise is achieved, challenging traditional 
conceptions thereof, where self-knowledge (subjectivity, Expert by Experience) 
trumps external, objective sources of expert knowledge; again corroborated through 
independent observers (eg; P12 and P1).   From establishing the journey to establish 
this expertise, participants place the truth held by the Truth Holder, Beyond doubt, out 
of reach of material rationalisation.  This is once more corroborated by an independent 
observer (P15). Overall, the expertise (or specialism), knowledge derived from the 
lived experience is presented as reliable, reflecting a social reality that is neglected, 
yet socially valuable.    Through the application of rhetorical devices participants were 
able to present situations where their expertise, attached to personal gifts, 
corroborated by others is irrefutable, beyond doubt creating a defence against 
inquisitions that might discredit their identity.  
 Although this is significant for the individual, the primary objective here is to reveal 
the effects and consequences of their discourse drawing this out into a wider context.  
One of the major effects of maintaining positioning, via category entitlement is a 
number of ‘dilemmas at stake’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992) that participants face.   
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Dilemma at stake comprises the possibility of an account being undermined as a 
product of the speaker or inferred self-interest.  It follows that dilemma at stake 
suggests ‘identity work’.  Orientation begins to surface where participants present 
accounts of events that protect and maintain their integrity leading to compromises 
with social convention.  Dilemmas at stake were revealed through participant accounts 
involving interactions with the social world, with specific pragmatic consequences.  It 
is these dilemmas that draw participant discourse into a wider context.  Performances 
involving dilemmas revealed participant orientation where they seek social change in 
favour of the psychotic experience.  However, efforts to achieve social change 
(aligned with social convention), were found to conflict with self-declared principles, 
below.         
 
4.8 Dilemmas at Stake – Invisibility and ambiguity  
The lengths to which participants went to resist devaluing of the psychotic experience 
and defend against critical examination demonstrates a high level of commitment to 
the reality therein.   Through discursive means, participants presented a credible and 
convincing account of the benefits and ‘wisdoms’ that accompany psychotic 
experiences.  Holding a position, through an orientation of positivity in favour of the 
psychotic experience (even when they may have been hurtful) and a claim to expertise 
attached to a secure and impervious internalized space had consequences for 
participants.  Even though attempts to normalize the PLE was made, an awareness 
prevailed of sustained social disapproval toward the psychotic experience.  Difficulty 
in moving beyond stereotypes, and balancing accountability were also evident.  
Patterns of talk with regards consequences included covert performances, 
accountability, subversive enactments and self-doubt arose from the text.  Discursive 
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accounts exposed compromises and contradictions in participant positioning through 
dilemmas at stake involving choice, acts of aversion and ambiguity.   
 
 4.9  Dilemmas and choice  
Participants emphasised transitory/transformative processes involved in learning to 
live with psychotic experiences.  Discourses consequently become subject to 
modification in accordance with social learning ie; how to adapt to (perceived) social 
and cultural responses to the psychotic experience.   Discourses involve various 
challenges, requiring (often subtle) shifts and changes to linguistic performances 
according to the social environment (proximal and distal) with the intention to 
maintain a credible identity.  Inconsistencies and variability that emerge from 
discourse led to dilemmas.  Dictionary definitions of dilemmas comprise choices 
people are often faced with.  By way of example: “a situation which a difficult choice 
has to be made between two different things you could do”  
(Cambridge Dictionary, 2017; 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/dilemmadictionary definition); “A 
situation in which a difficult choice has to be made between two or more alternatives, 
especially ones that are equally undesirable.”  (Oxford Dictionary, 2017; 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/dilemma).  Definitions imply conscious 
effort on behalf of those making difficult choices.    
 
Positioning taken up by participants, through the creation of category entitlement, is 
achieved consciously.  As described below participant positioning has conceivably led 
to consequences.  The possibility that the consequences have unforeseen effects such 
as ending in exclusionary practices is explored.   
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4.10 A discerning silence  
Below P8 describes how she feels judged, compelled to be discerning about her 
experiences and daily interaction with people who do not share the psychotic 
experience:  
  
“Spirituality and working with the vulnerable (.) other world experiences put the fear 
of god into people to use the term because its fear of the unknown(.) and if people 
fear the unknown they can abuse it or they can diss (1) it so there’s that aspect as 
well (1) I mean there is people in my family who I said are wonderful (.) older (.) old 
catholic people and they think, they’re worried for me because I’m not towing the 
party line (.) and they sense there’s something about me that they don’t understand 
(.) and again its fear of the unknown (.) and they’re good people (1) that’s why the 
discernment comes in”   P8  
  
P8 begins with assigning spirituality and vulnerable people to “other world 
experiences”.   The “other world experiences” cause fear and misunderstanding 
among the ill-informed because they belong to “the unknown”.  These reactions can 
lead to ‘abuse’ of the experience and pressure to conform to traditional religion.  P8 
goes on to describe some people suspicious of the experience as “wonderful” and 
“good people”.  They happen to be family members described as “old catholic 
people”.   The people chosen and description provided to illustrate the level of 
suspicion of the experience enables P8 to shift the focus of vulnerability from those 
with PLEs (where she begins) to those who misunderstand, misrepresent and 
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potentially manipulate the experience.  In describing the ill-informed in terms of 
“old”, “wonderful” “good” people, one is left assuming, they are naive, well-meaning 
in their actions.  As P8 demonstrates tolerance and empathy toward people that are 
judgmental toward the world with which she operates she can elevate her position 
through the creation of a ‘moral order’ (Bergmann, 1998).  In this instance, P8 has 
established personal ethical principles incumbent upon a standard of responsibility 
toward others (Tileaga˘, 2010).  The discernment with which she ends is presented as 
a measure to protect those who struggle to accept the experience.  This operates as a 
rhetorical device whereby P8 orientates the discourse - that she has little choice but to 
take up a position of social responsibility.  The discernment with which she ends is 
presented as a measure to protect those who naively judge the experience.      
 
Further, the experience (psychotic) does not resolve through organized religion 
(Catholicism) but through spirituality orientating P8 toward the “spiritual but not 
religious” camp described further by Kenneson (2015) as “those who wear it as a 
badge of honor, that a deeper, more authentic form of spirituality is available apart 
from religious institutions.”  (p11).  Kenneson points out that those who take up this 
position argue that their spirituality is more inclusive, individualised, personally 
meaningful and less restrictive than organized institutionalized religion.  Declaring a 
spirituality that transcends institutionalized practice (beyond Catholic traditions) adds 
credence to P8’s moral order.         
    
It is worth noting that she chooses to use family members to exemplify a moral 
dilemma she faces.  The inclusion of family members as conspirators against the 
psychotic experience, combined with “old Catholic” traditions is particularly 
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significant here.  Commitment to family cohesion and solidarity (through religious 
obligations etc) remains common throughout Irish Society (Gray et al, 2016).  If P8 
were to threaten family stability by challenging the status quo (becoming less 
discerning) she may be at risk of being judged a dissenter.  The account therefore 
brings into focus a dilemma of stake for P8 where self-interest is sacrificed for the 
benefit of family cohesion.    
  
Analysis of the above extract exalts those living with PLEs.  However, it also 
demonstrates consequences of the position participants have taken up.  This includes a 
social conscience leading to a moral position that allows the continuation of suspicion 
and social dissociation from the psychotic experience.  P8 does not overtly defend the 
psychotic experience or confront those who are mistrustful and dismissive of it.  The 
issue here is not one of P8’s intentions, but the effect of her decision to take evasive 
action.     She therefore accedes and corroborates, via social obligations, a covert 
social arrangement that acts to consciously ‘regulate’ the sharing of the psychotic 
experience.  This puts at risk communicating any benefits the psychotic experience 
may offer fellow human beings. The consequences of P8’s positioning and rhetorical 
devices deployed leads her to moderate the possibility or viability of dialogue at the 
cost of social arrangements with regards such things as the Irish family and religious 
traditions.  If P8 were to openly declare her PLEs and challenge those who are 
mistrustful of the experiences she might be in danger of upsetting the status quo.  The 
effects of her actions is that she acquiesces with the social conditions and communal 
settings.   Other discursive accounts lead to additional concessions at the behest of a 
widening dialogue about psychotic experiences.     
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4.11 Universalization and the aversion of collective action  
Text created at interview determined how participants are united in their commitment 
to an expertise secured to a unique, distinctive, deeply personal experience of PLEs; 
resistant to the meta/grand narratives that dominate cultural responses to psychotic 
experiences.  There would appear, by virtue of the shared positions participants have 
taken up, that a collective identity is being formed and/or is already in existence.  Au 
(2010) underlines three elements defining collective identities.  I place in brackets 
alongside each element, corresponding features and positioning shared by 
participants.  1. Salience of a shared characteristic (PLEs), 2. Group consciousness of 
the same problem (social exclusion, inequality); 3.  opposition to a dominant order 
(the meta/grand narratives).  Matching each element with features and positioning as 
presented in text at interview, participants do appear to meet the criteria of a collective 
identity.   That said, collective identities often involve calls to action, a desire for 
social change propelled by an ‘imagined’, or ‘figured world’:   
  
‘a realm of interpretation and action generated by the participants of a movement 
through their shared activities and commitments that imagines the terrain of struggle, 
the powers of opponents, and the possibilities of a changed world.  (Holland et al, 
2008, p97).   
 
Collective identities are naturally linked with social movements which have a 
‘Cultural-symbolic component’ (Platt and Williams, 2002) in this case the lived 
experience and PLES attached to that which is understood as a democratic right to 
equality, inclusion, social participation. In order for a collective to achieve social 
change it would likely be required to ‘procure popular support’, gain public attention, 
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garner public sympathy.  Given participants seek social acceptance of psychotic 
experiences the desire for social change is evident. The collective identity is attached 
to participant positioning through category entitlement (expert by experience), the 
desire for social change determined by democratic ideals.  
 
Participants’ motivation for social change involved an anticipated shift in culture 
based on a globalised, humanitarian, universal, at times celestial world view with 
which they are engaged.   It is “very encompassing’ and holistic; (‘that big spiritual 
thing” involving “every faith”, P8); it requires “raised consciousness” and “raised 
awareness” (P13) at individual and community levels leading to personal 
responsibility for health and healing. Corroboration for this shift in culture, for a 
raised awareness of the presence and need for an altered world view comes from an  
‘imagined’ or ‘figured’ world found in participant discourse.  Below P6 when 
prompted by the interviewer to expand on her use of the term spirituality describes 
how she believes (as did others) that there is an ongoing transformative shift bringing 
the immaterial and material together, the physical and spiritual domains.        
  
JW: ‘I’m not sure if it’s called a spiritual dimension (.) so it’s just kind of interesting 
what you were saying?  
  
P6: “so there’s a sense of oneness that I’m a part of (.) so it’s kind of like in terms of 
the chakra’s, (1) it’s a very higher chakra awareness but then there’s also a 
transcendent experience (.) but there’s also a descending that’s really only happened 
over the last ten years of spirit coming into matter (.) you know (.) of coming more 
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fully into physical form and more fully on to planet earth (.) this physical reality (1) 
yeah (.) so it’s like an energetic expansion upwards and downwards and vertically.”  
  
Text generated by P6 above leaves open the prospect that she is part of a collective 
identity by locating a connectiveness through: “a sense of oneness that I’m part of”.   
The oneness involves energies that are situated in the body “Chakras” that go beyond 
(‘transcendent’)/are conjoined with a multi-directional expansion of energy: “upwards 
and downwards and vertically”.  The discourse marker “you know” is situated as a 
matter of fact (more below on its usage) to corroborate the assuredness that spirit is: 
“coming into matter”, “coming more fully into physical form on to planet earth”; 
“over the last ten years”. The discourse created by P6 engages metaphysical 
properties such as time, space, existence, cause and effect.  These are representative of 
accounts offered by participants, conditional to the ‘figured world’ declared at 
interview.  The collective identity is not attributed to identifiable groups, or socially 
mobilised collectives but through a consensual world view made up of universal 
properties; concepts that are debateable, for the most part formless, having a 
vagueness as to their direct interaction with the material world (metaphysical).  This is 
corroborated through self-affirmed statements and experience (“there’s a sense of” 
and “transcendent”).  The collective identity goes beyond what unites participants in 
their opposition to the meta/grand narratives and subsequent social consequences as 
they see it, but engages realms, dominions, domains that make up an imagined world 
beyond materialism.  Holland et al (2008) claim that collective identities are 
‘multifaceted and dynamic cultural productions which form and reform … defy static 
description’ with the concept itself resisting definition (p97).  The nature of collective 
identities is often messy; involving ‘coalescing, splintering and reshaping of 
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movements’ engaged, responding to and influenced by ‘shifting fields of power, 
politics and economy’ (Holland et al, 2008, p106).  Perhaps it is a recognition of the 
messiness of collective identities that leads participants to avoid the creation of or 
involvement in a social movement involving identifiable groups, or socially mobilised 
collectives.  Here, participant positioning allows for a collective identity to be 
declared but fails to engage or acknowledge necessary steps toward the creation of a 
social movement that would be required to achieve the social change they aspire - that 
of equality, inclusion, social participation for those who experience psychotic 
experiences.  To put it another way, participant orientation (involving 
preference/choice?) toward a collective identity whilst precluding the possibility of 
involvement in collective action on behalf of/with those with psychotic experiences 
diminishes the prospect for appropriate and/or significant change in social responses 
to those living with said experiences.  Once again social dialogue is averted, silencing 
the psychotic experience.   This relates to another layer of participant discretion 
specifically creating a barrier between the private self (experience) and the public (the 
other) hindering further opportunity to transform social response to psychotic 
experiences.  
  
4.12 Silencing through the creation of ‘an-other’  
Regulating, moderating the sharing of the psychotic experience can corroborate 
circumstances whereby a ‘them and us’, an ‘othering’ between those living with 
psychotic experiences and those who do not arises and persists.  The claim that the 
psychotic experience belongs to the individual, the insistence that it cannot be 
questioned because of the interiority involved, creates a privileged position for those 
who have experience of PLEs.  However, the consequence of this positioning is the 
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maintenance (creation?) of social distance; of closing down opportunities for 
dialogue, of creating an ‘us and them’, an ‘otherness’ without naming it so.    
  
 
The ‘us and them’, the otherness is created by exclusionary practices from the other.  
Otherness involves discourses that distinguishes moral and political judgments 
between/within groups emphasising effects of superiority and inferiority (Brons, 
2015; Dervin, 2015).  Superiority is usually portioned out by those who enforce the 
concept of ‘abnormal’ (Goggin, Steele and Cadwallader, 2017) through models, 
classifications and practices directed at groups who have been characterised as 
disabled, disadvantaged, deficit laden (Priya, 2015; Roberts and Schiavenato, 2017).   
The claim to specialness, to an expertise beyond reproach and the creation of a moral 
order arising from participant discourse positions those with PLEs in opposition to a 
disability/deficit model of psychosis (ie; disablism and the meta/grand narrative as per 
chapter 2). The traditional concept of otherness, is therefore challenged, reversed 
through a superiority constructed by participants, fashioned by those who are 
‘abnormalised’ through cultural norms, and social arrangements.  However, through 
acts of silencing the psychotic experience (averting public dialogue), deficit models of 
psychosis (ie; the meta/grand narratives) are allowed to dominate cultural norms and a 
direct challenge averted.  P10 creates a layer of otherness and superiority attached to 
participant narratives.   Below he shows the level of caution toward the meta/grand 
narratives of psychosis and how, through the lived experience he has learnt to 
embrace the psychotic experience. 
  
At the outset of an interview with P10, an ex-psychiatric patient, he unequivocally 
dismissed the term psychotic or psychosis as defined by psychiatry, describing his 
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experiences as “normal” and with purpose (having the “ability” to hear voices).  He 
later adds that while caught up in the psychiatric system he “learned in many ways to 
adopt my belief system to fit in theirs” but has since come to understand psychiatry as  
“misguided on understanding of life experiences”.   He also couldn’t understand why 
there is a need to: “run to counsellors (1) or get ourselves into this thing that we can’t 
“run to counsellors (1) or get ourselves into this thing that we can’t do nothing unless 
we have actually counselling about it (.) or that we fit within this model.”  
  
Prior to the response below P10, was asked his opinion on the concepts of fear and 
coping and if they are ever applicable to psychotic experiences.  He admitted that he 
was fearful when he initially began to hear voices.  This was due to an uneasiness 
created by a lack of social reference from which to frame or understand the 
experience.   
  
“I have nothing to cope with because the voices are part of me (.) it’s not about 
coping with me (.) it’s about living with things that are part of me(.)  that at times 
maybe confuse me or excite me (.) the same as any other things (.) so it wouldn’t be 
about coping (1) it would be about living with it (2) I suppose it’s primarily because I 
don’t see my experiences fitting anywhere within a psychological or psychiatric 
model(.) because their understanding and my experiences don’t make any sense to 
me (.) it actually makes me (2) when I started to try and make what I believe will fit 
within their model I actually believe then that the psychosis is actually within that 
framework (1) a psychiatric framework (.) they’ve created their own psychosis 
because for me that way of understanding is an insight (.) and it’s an insight into 
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human being (.) and psychiatry tries to deny the fact that people are human beings.”  
P10  
  
P10 rejects the idea that he may be coping with voices declaring that they are a part of  
 
who he is.  He is “living with” voices that can “confuse or excite” him.  Psychiatric or 
psychological models do not match his understanding or experience of hearing voices.   
By trying to “fit within their model” P10 is positioning himself as someone who is 
reasonable, has tried to facilitate the models that he ended up rejecting.  P10 shifts the 
site of psychosis, from those labelled psychotic, onto those who have developed 
treatment models of psychosis.  Psychiatry, in particular denies: “the fact that people 
are human beings”.  This would indicate a dehumanising aspect to psychiatric models 
of psychosis.  The othering in this case does not involve individuals but expert, 
professional groups that are associated with these models; models that have created 
their own psychosis due to lack of insight which P10 has gained through ‘living with’ 
the experience.  Living with vs the modelling, the conceptualising of the psychotic 
experience becomes the basis for the othering that is created here.  To put it another 
way, there becomes the ‘(with)in’ crowd, and the ‘(with)out’ crowd.  
  
Note also, a vagueness persists as no description, exploration or definition of these 
models is presented or discussed.  The rejection of the term coping at the beginning of 
this extract requires further analysis.    
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4.13 The divided or cohesive self  
Coping would bring with it the possibility of creating a distinction between a healthy 
unified self and an unhealthy divided self.  In other words, through the initial rejection 
of the concept of psychosis, taking issue with the term coping and relocating personal 
failings (ie; lack of insight), PM is able to divert social discourses of personal deficit, 
concepts of illness, disability and personal failings onto ‘the other’ - psychiatric and 
psychological experts aligned with deficit (meta/grand narratives) models of 
psychosis.    To accept the terms psychosis and coping would allow a weakening of 
privileges and/or declared expertise attached to a cohesive self-based on the lived 
experience.  Further, a secondary consequence of this positioning is that the othering 
that is created through a generalised dismissal of these models opens up the potential 
for criticism – as being too crude, lacking detailed analysis.   
 
Indeed, the otherness created goes as far as closing off all possibility of ‘outsiders’ (in 
particular those aligned with the meta/grand narratives) being able to empathise or 
relate with the psychotic experience.  Participant P13 is an individual who did not 
engage mainstream mental health services with regards his psychotic experiences.  
When asked how his psychotic experiences impacted his social relations; if he shares 
his experience with others who might have or have not experienced PLEs declared 
that there is “no facility for it”, that: “if you went into the mental health services (.) 
what the fuck would they say to you if you start talking the way I am now?”  He 
continues by dismissing the possibility that the ‘other’ (those associated with the 
meta/grand narratives) have the capability to understand or help the individual living 
with the psychotic experience:          
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“sure the person you’re talking to hasn’t a clue (.) what you’re on about (.) they’re not 
on that journey (1) they don’t understand you at all so they can’t help you (1) there’s 
no way they can help” P13  
  
P13 sates that there is no “facility” for psychotic experiences followed by a rhetorical 
question: “what would they say if you start talking the way I am now?”.  This is 
answered in the statement directly above ending with an assertion that: “there’s no 
way they can help”.  The impact of the rhetorical twist is the rejection of those who 
are associated with mainstream mental health services by shutting out the possibility 
of helping or understanding (“hasn’t a clue”’) the person with psychotic experiences 
unless having gone through a similar ‘journey’.  This creates a strict demarcation, a 
definitive line between those who are in a position to help and understand the 
psychotic person/experience, and those who are not.    
  
The exclusionary nature with which participants position themselves, morally and 
authoritatively; the enclosed space of an experience that can only be apprehended or 
understood through sharing, declaring and/or dialoguing (yet withheld); the acts of 
aversion leaves those without the experience (the other) little choice but to make 
assumptions or speculate about the experience.  To put it another way, the ‘knowledge 
gap’ can therefore be conveniently bridged by cultural norms or socially informed 
conceptualisations such as that offered up by the meta/grand narratives of psychosis.  
This is the very thing participants are trying to avoid.  The continuing dominance of 
cultural norms or/and socially informed conceptualisations of psychosis goes 
unchallenged, allowing various practices of social exclusion to persist.   
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Further, awareness of the impact of openly declaring psychotic experiences, vis a vis 
responsibility and commitment to social arrangements, is apparent.  Participant 
discourses, including the latter extract from P10 when he dismisses psychiatric or 
psychological models of psychosis and the otherness created, implies awareness of the 
cultural dominance of said models.  To reject these models in the manner with which 
it is done is to knowingly oppose the concept of ‘abnormal’ or ideas of personal 
deficit as informed by the meta/grand narratives.  Participants are therefore conscious 
of the social dominance of these meta/grand narratives.      
 
Consequences, as revealed to this point, permit a continued ignorance, disapproval 
and suspicion toward the psychotic experience.  Under such conditions the 
opportunity to promote empathy is weakened and discriminating practices that 
disapprove the psychotic experience allowed to persist.  Participants present the need 
to make psychotic experiences more visible, whilst ‘constructing’ the need for a 
measure of ‘hiddenness’ (Farrelya, 2015).  At the heart of this hiddenness referred is 
risk – that mental health problems are associated with dangerousness - toward the self  
(eg; suicide) and toward the public – often rendering sufferers helpless at the whim of 
disease processes.    Farrelya (2015), describes how the influence of media constructs a 
hiddenness, similar to a hidden epidemic, whereby mental health problems are often 
under-reported, concealed from public view, a situation explained and understood 
through the acknowledgement of the existence of stigma and discrimination compelling 
‘sufferers’ to remain silent about their affliction.      
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The hiddenness presents as a dilemma at stake, were proclamations for the need to 
modify public responses to mental health (specifically psychotic experiences) 
consistently appears in text, yet, in order to divert claims of self-interest, maintain 
personal integrity and credibility to their accounts, participants are faced with, or on 
occasions choose to avert public dialogue presenting moral and social inhibitors that 
compel or oblige them to remain silent.  Participant’s discourse also reveals attempts 
to maintain images of a whole cohesive person (not divided), stabile in their identity 
in order to divert disablism and the deficit model of psychosis (a divided 
self/incohesive self). Participants are choosing difference over integration whilst 
isolating the thing they represent.  Another dilemma at stake arises from exposure of 
personal uncertainty destabilizing claims of an individualised, specialised expertise.  
At this stage, participant orientation is revealed, where disablism is rejected, as per the 
meta/grand narrative, normalisation and social acceptance of the psychotic experience 
is desired.  However, dilemmas arise from this orientation when matched against core 
positioning as represented through Category Entitlement.  Figure 3 below illustrates 
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To begin, Dilemmas entail difficult Choices involving compromises and/or 
contradictions.  Moving from the top to bottom, from left to right, participants 
established a Moral Order by declaring social responsibility toward others who are ill 
prepared to accept the psychotic experience (a Discerning Silence, Participant 8).   
The moral order established a reasoned silence surrounding the experience.  
Participant’s desire (orientation) to Normalise the psychotic experience, involved 
declarations that it is a natural human experience, open to all.   This had Exclusionary 
consequences as participants’ call to universalise the psychotic experience through a 
sense of oneness and social acceptance (Participant 6 and Participant 8) failed to 
 
  195  
initiate the practicalities (eg; engaging public dialogue) and collective action required 
to create the desired social change.    Further acts of exclusion appeared when 
participants maintained a position of Privilege through the lived experience creating a 
demarcation, a definitive boundary based on criteria of superiority/inferiority ‘shutting 
out’ the ‘without’ group (Participant 10) diminishing the possibility to be understood.  
The creation of an ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ made up of those who have or continue to live 
with the psychotic experience and those who do not (the ‘within’ and ‘without’ groups 
respectively) created another layer of exclusion.  This contradicted the desire to 
universalise the psychotic experience, as participant’s determinations to remain within 
established social convention and expectation involving democratic ideals eg; 
inclusion and equality were compromised.  Finally, participants were faced with a 
dilemma involving a dichotomy that is reflective of everyday social conditions.  
Conscious effort was made to maintain a Unified/healthy self against a backdrop 
where a Divided/unhealthy self is associated with the psychotic experience.   This led 
participants into a situation where they chose difference over integration 
compromising efforts to achieve social approval of the psychotic experience.  All of 
the above feature’s participant orientation toward social acceptance of the psychotic 
experience yet presents a number of challenges and problematic consequences - that 
of a continuing silence toward the psychotic experience.  Below I present findings that 
widen these issues further considering their effects and consequences against 
prevailing social conditions. 
4.14 Diminishing claims to expertise through the need for  
Order and presence of Ambiguity   
The use of metaphors analogically and figuratively applied has already been discussed 
above.  The purpose of the metaphor has been established, however questions as to 
 
  196  
usefulness in accordance with participant’s wanting to avoid or counter the 
meta/grand narratives of psychosis need to be considered further, specifically those 
that might undermine their claim to an independent individualised expertise based on 
a cohesive, stable identity leading to dilemmas at stake.    
 
 4.14.1  Parallel use of language  
Participants often used metaphors of a technical or mechanical nature (physical 
phenomena) to describe processes involving their psychotic experiences.  Skelton et al 
(2002) found similar use of metaphors within medical practice interpreted as attempts  
“to repackage the psychological as the mechanical. That is, the doctor’s metaphorical 
system may be regarded as an appropriate way of imposing ordered calm on a 
disparate mass of expressive data”. (p117) Rosenman (2008) observes that 
psychiatric (diagnostic) concepts “are built on embedded metaphors now treated as 
literal facts”, (p391) creating a bridge “between literal and metaphorical knowledge’ 
(p395).  The above points to a disconnect between everyday use of metaphors 
involving psychological and emotional problems and clinical interpretation.  
However, if participants applied metaphors that are of a mechanical nature or/and 
encourage comparable order in their usage they may be reflective of the same clinical 
systems, or at least demonstrate inconsistency or incompatibility with the direction of 
linguistic travel so desired ie; separate their discourse from descriptions and 
interpretations as applied by the meta/grand narratives. 
 
Below, P1, originally diagnosed with Bi-Polar disorder describes one of his first 
encounters with psychiatry whilst an inpatient in a psychiatric hospital where his 
professional background influenced his thinking around his ‘psychotic breakdown’.  
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Prior to this his psychiatrist offered to “repair” P1 stating: “ if the fuse blew (1) I’d 
investigate the circuit” to which P1 replied: ‘you’re not investigating my circuit the 
way you’re talking here” 
He goes on to describe his experience with psychiatry:   
  
“the consultant came around again and he said he recommend ECT because of my 
severe depression (.) and being an electrician I thought maybe it might jog the 
electronics in my body (.) in my brain at the time (.) which I believed it was (.) you 
know electrical impulses going to wherever(1) so I agreed to have it”    
  
P1 describes his initial rejection of his psychiatrist’s analogy to treat his condition.  
However, it is apparent that he is not resistant to the analogy per say, but to the 
description of the (intrusive?) intervention – “to investigate his fuse”.   Later, he 
considers ECT as a worthwhile treatment for his depression.  This is based on an 
analogised comparison between symptoms of depression and faulty electronics in his 
brain.  He confirms his commitment to this analogy by agreeing to accept ECT which 
“might jog the electronics” in his body or/and his brain.  The cause has been 
established (analogically), the treatment recommended and accepted.    
 
Further on, P1 describes how ECT left him feeling like a “Zombie” not knowing 
where he was; experiencing headaches, left feeling disillusioned with psychiatry.   
Mechanistic analogies did not appear again in the text generated at interview.   
However, when the following question was put to P1 by the interviewer: ‘What would 
you say to someone who would say that we are biological (.) so is there not a 
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biological part of it (.) what would you say to that?’ P1 began to describe “biological” 
and “chemical” influences (eg; serotonin) on emotional health paraphrasing his 
psychotherapist who described how: “the further back the diaphragm goes back (.) 
the more happy chemicals go through”.  The question put to P1 likely prompted this 
response.  However as described earlier, this does not constitute interference but acts 
as an activation to provoke a response, invoking participant positioning by creating a 
confrontative arena (as per methodology chapter, 3.10).  I was a bit apprehensive 
putting this question to participants.  My concern was that it would be perceived as a 
cynical ploy, placed during conversation as an overt challenge, querying participant’s 
interpretation and motivation in constructing their reality.  There was a potential for 
participants to be suspicious toward my intentions, to withdraw or ‘close down’ the 
conversation, no longer accepting me as an insider.  Although this trepidation existed, 
participant responses to this question did not lead to withdrawal or reluctance to 
continue.   There was no perceived suspicion or closing down of the conversation, nor 
could I find evidence in the text of any shift in levels of openness and positioning 
from participants.   This was also found to be the case with the response from P7 
below, p201 when I again created a confrontative arena.    
  
P1 believed that spirit, mind, body, soul, and that a balance in life style comprising 
nutrition, exercise, meditation are necessary in maintaining good mental health and 
that (as referenced earlier under the theme above (Validation, through the 
intrapersonal) his mental health issues do not constitute “a chemical imbalance”.  
Nevertheless, there was ambiguity with regards biological influences and personal 
responsibility in maintaining good mental health: “we cause the chemical imbalance 
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in ourselves (1) it’s not inherent in us (.) but we cause it through our ups and downs 
(1) now I don’t know would you agree with that?”    
  
Above, P1 asks the interviewer/researcher for his opinion - if he agrees with his 
analysis that chemical imbalance is: “not inherent in us (.) but we cause it through our 
ups and downs.”  This indicates uncertainty on P1’s behalf.  Secondly, it is a 
statement that is unclear; contradictory.  Something inherent suggests permanency, 
something essential, or a characteristic attribute; of nature or habit  
(https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/inherent; 
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/inherent 1/08/2017).   
 
P1 questions if the chemical imbalance is something that occurs naturally, subject to 
natural or inherited characteristics or attributes; or if we cause it through our actions 
(eg; life choices?).  It is difficult to know if the “ups and downs” he refers to are 
casual in terms of choices made or inherent, subject to natural idiosyncratic processes.  
The lack of clarification brings with it ambiguity.  However, the main issue at stake 
here is not one of clarity, but emotional burden, a sign of uncertainty and need for 
assurance, which is contrary to the position of assuredness attached to the specialism 
and expertise (as per Category Entitlement) declared by participants.  The exposure of 
ambiguity can be explained through positioning, again pointing to a dilemma at stake 
with particular effects and consequences.   
 
 4.14.2  Ambiguity and positioning   
According to Hong (2015) the presence of ambiguity and uncertainty during 
conversation indicates position-taking involving personal affect and subjectivity – 
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visa-vis “my style of being in the world” (p201)   In other words, position-taking in 
the context of P1 above is akin to an admission that he is struggling with words to 
describe his mental health struggles (“I don’t know”) and contradictions thereof.  The 
question put to the interviewer/researcher (“would you agree with that?”) is an 
appeal, to understand or respond to his predicament.  There were other examples of 
appeals directed at the interviewer/researcher seeking corroboration, empathy or/and 
sympathy signifying participant’s dilemmatic challenges involving personal affect and 
positioning.  These present a dilemma at stake where statements of fatality and 
causality conflicts assertions of sureness, competency, personal responsibility toward 
the psychotic experience.  In one hand he is saying he is sure that there is no chemical 
imbalance involved, on the other he is questioning whether there is personal 
responsibility or seeks clarification for same.  Similar examples of this uncertainty are 
revealed in the discursive practice as illustrated through the act of petitioning.   
 
 4.14.3  Petitioning  
The use of the term ‘You know’ commonly appeared throughout texts.  This was 
specifically directed at the interviewer in order to elicit empathy or sympathy toward 
the interviewee.  ‘You know’ appeared as 1) assumptive remarks (taking for granted 
that the interviewer understood the participant’s experiences or beliefs or knew what 
the participant was referring to 2); as matters of fact (that there was no other way of 
understanding or interpreting an event or experience).  In line with the author’s 
interpretation of the use of the term ‘you know’, Laserna et al (2014) found, as a 
discourse marker, it is applied when the speaker is seeking and/or inferring agreement 
from the listener of a state of affairs or an account during conversation.    
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P6 speaks of her childhood experiences and how this might have influenced the 
appearance of some of her PLEs (later described in terms of high levels of 
suspiciousness):    
  
 
“I grew up in an area (.) a very rough working class area (.) it was very aggressive and 
very violent (1) I was quite afraid of other people and other kids you know (.) and I 
wanted to withdraw”  
  
P6 gives an account of her childhood where she experienced social/environmental 
impositions (aggression and violence) on her emotional welfare.  “You know” is 
situated post description of these impositions and just prior to a description of 
conceivable adverse impact (wanting to withdraw).   This is delivered to reinforce a 
matter of fact whilst encouraging sympathy (based on the fact that P6 could not 
assume that the interviewer would share this specific experience), positioning P6 as a 
casualty of social/environmental circumstances.  Moreover, “You know” inviting a 
sympathetic response, signifies a request for affirmation, indicating diffidence and 
personal uncertainty.    
  
An associative use of language appears in the application of the question: “do you 
understand me?” usually found at the end of a participant’s sentence.  This was used 
for similar purposes (P11 above) ie; to encourage an empathetic, sympathetic response 
(in the above example, to the participant’s beliefs and experiences).  Below, P11 
appeals to the interviewer to understand and agree with his analyses of social 
conditions:    
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“I seen something recently where 40% of society thought mental health patients 
weren’t trustworthy(.) and 60% wouldn’t employ them (1) I thought they were talking 
about politicians (1) I thought they were talking about bankers (.) I thought they were 
talking about developers do you understand me? (1) and they do things on a vast 
scale  
 
(2) they had a responsibility (.) they abdicated that responsibility as soon as the thing 
fell apart (1) they paid themselves big money because they were so talented (.) I’m 
not completely mad (.) they’re not talented (1) bitter stream begets bitter water (.) a 
crystal stream begets crystal (1) it’s as simple as that (1) a German can’t beget a 
Yugoslavian (.) do you understand me? (.) in that sense (.) Unless they emigrate there 
and sign up for citizenship (.) do you understand me?  (.) How do I say it to make you 
understand (.) eh?”  
  
P11 compares the treatment of people with mental health problems to those who are 
questionably corrupt yet thought to be ‘talented’.  Metaphors are put to good use 
comparing pure water with water that has been contaminated and a race, 
Yugoslavian’s, that suffered at the hands of unwanted forces during World War 2.   
One is left to suppose that mental health patients are the pure and the innocent; not 
corrupt, the oppressed at the hands of an aggressive force.  He implores the 
interviewer to agree with his observations of people with major mental health 
problems being judged and by association being subjected to social injustice.  He is 
asking approval from the interviewer through understanding and accepting how 
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society, according to his analyses, really operates. The repeated use of “do you 
understand?” gives rise to his need to be understood, an appeal for corroboration 
through empathy.  The extract ends with an appeal, a pronouncement, an avowal that 
he is uncertain if he has got his message across and/or is struggling to find the right 
words or find clear descriptions to illustrate his point – “How do I say it to make you 
understand (.) eh?”    
 
The above extracts demonstrate a desire, expressed by participants, to be understood; 
for a sympathetic/empathetic response to the linguistic challenges, social, institutional 
and environmental impositions raised and endured ie; social injustices and emotional 
burden.  This exposes a level of ambiguity and uncertainty, a desire for affirmation of  
‘being in the world’ that involves problematic personal affect that gives an impression 
of susceptibility, compromising self-assuredness of an independent and competent 
expertise secured to the subjective, that is self-experience. This illustrates self-doubt, 
potentially displacing self-experience from a secure position of certitude and personal 
responsibility to one of vulnerability.  A dilemma at stake arises from this dual 
positioning whereby the authoritative knowledge base, staked by participants, is 
diminished through a reliance on others to affirm and respond to a state of emotional 
(or psychological) ambiguity; the latter being part of the meta/grand narratives ie; 
persons with psychosis predisposed to vulnerability and dependency.     Further, 
returning to the beginning of this section, in particular P1’s contradictory positioning 
and use of metaphors (technological and/or mechanical), it would appear that this has 
been applied serving similar functions to that which reflects clinical need and 
interpretation ie; the need for assuredness, or/and order.  This may inadvertently serve 
to bridge the gap between literal knowledge as per the meta/grand narratives and 
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metaphorical knowledge that becomes culturally acceptable.  Similar use of 
metaphors appeared at various junctures in text generated by participants. Examples 
included: “Energetic blockage”, “energetic field”, “downloading”, “being plugged in”.  
Their usage potentially influenced by the functions of technical language, erring 
toward cognitive processing models developed by the meta/grand narratives where 
order is required or/and desired.    
  
This is perhaps to be expected where culturally: “discourses are overshadowed by 
'other' dominant discourses, and therefore derive from and feed back into existing 
prevalent discourses” (Talbot, 1996, p226).  However, the appearance of existing, 
prevalent discourses attaches a vulnerability to participants, creating doubt as to social 
independence and expert opinion as asserted at interview through Category 
Entitlement.      
 
To conclude this section, text generated by participants revealed efforts to defend an 
identity attached to the PLE, whilst exposing a number of dilemmas at stake.  The 
dilemmas at stake, the effects and consequences of these repertoires are revealed in 
terms of discursive performances that are contrary to original positioning taken up by 
participants; vis-à-vis expert by experience and the need for social change laying forth 
a number of challenges for participants.  
 
Summarily they are: 1.  Remaining silent and averting public dialogue about  
psychotic experiences whilst proclaiming a need for modifications in public response 
to said experiences.  2.   Whilst the expert positioning is confidently asserted by 
participants, uncertainty, ambiguity, efforts to resist notions of a divided self, 
maintaining a cohesive self and a need for order was exposed running contrary to the 
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assuredness declared.  An added dilemmatic dimension appeared in the form of Lived 
Ideological Dilemmas.  The ideologies referred to are the principles and practices 
imparted by participants (eg; the creation of a moral order (p8, A Discerning Silence); 
the claim to expertise); the dilemmas arise from the inconsistencies and variability 
that appear in the text contrary to the aforementioned.  These are presented below.    
 
4.15 Ideological dilemmas   
In choosing difference over integration, rejecting normalization associated with the 
meta/grand narratives of psychosis, participants are trying to avoid assimilation whilst 
remaining hidden.  Simultaneously, they are promoting moral principles of inclusivity 
and equality.   
  
A principle of morality can only exist in competition with or in opposition to practices 
that conflict it. In discourse terms Billig (1991) puts it: “we cannot understand the 
meaning of a piece of reasoned discourse, unless we know what counter positions are 
being implicitly or explicitly rejected” (p44).  Counter positions to the meta/grand 
narratives of psychosis is apparent throughout participant interviews.  However, 
taking up a counter position comprises choices that may not have the desired effect 
such as consequences above.  Below, choices will be explored, and rhetorical devices 
deployed as appears in text.  This will help appreciate the ideological dilemmas 
arising from interview.      
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 4.15.1  The appropriateness of Lived Ideological Dilemmas  
Discourse theory on ideological dilemmas contrast ideology with common sense 
notions, culturally established social ‘truths’, conventions and realities.  This includes 
tensions between such things as individual autonomy and social obligations; sources 
of authority and implementing/promoting equality (Billig et al, 1988; Condor and 
Gibson, 2007).  In other words, it is commonplace to declare, claim or align oneself 
with an established principled position such as the right to vote, yet carry out practices 
that contradict these revealed through, for instance, speech acts.  Social actors operate 
under these conditions; often faced with ideological challenges on a daily basis – they 
are therefore lived ideological dilemmas.  Here, there is a widening social context to 
be considered beyond personal identity; where effects and consequences of 
positioning through discursive performances is matched against discourses of 
morality, socially and culturally determined eg; those of democracy, equality, 
inclusivity.     
   
4.15.2 Democratic ideals and the attenuation of claims to truth  
Principles aligned with common sense notions, culturally established social ‘truths’ 
and realities such as acceptance and diversity; autonomy and egalitarianism were 
present in participant discourses (ie; their lived ideologies).   Given the 
aforementioned; manifestations of exclusivity found within text (the Otherness) it 
would appear incompatible with prevailing moral positioning taken up by participants.  
Inclusivity, equality; principles of diversity and autonomy bring with them notions of 
liberality and democratic ideals ie; promoting freedoms to choose, define and create 
personal meaning around experiences.  There is an acknowledgment and an 
acceptance here that experiences can be open to a number of interpretations, up for 
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public debate, subject to personal opinion, including ones informed by the meta/grand 
narratives. The following question was put to P2 who replied in accordance with the 
above principles:  
  
JW: “What would you say to people who say they have psychosis (.) that’s how they 
describe themselves (.) they’ve gone to see a doctor and they’ve got a diagnosis for 
instance and they medicate (.) and they say that’s where I’m at (.) and that’s what I 
understand (.) and I’m happy with that (1) what would you say?”  
  
P2: “I’d say (.) then stay where you are (1) f you’re happy that’s fine (.) I have no 
problem with where you’re at and the only person I can deal with in my life is me”  
  
P2 states that she has no issue with someone with psychotic experiences who finds  
‘happiness’ in medicine.  Her focus is on personal responsibility: “the only person I 
can deal with in my life is me.”  Prior to this statement P2 (as did most other 
participants) warned of the debilitating effects of psychiatric medicine; how it hinders 
the natural process living and dealing with problematic psychotic experiences.  In 
extended unbroken text to the initial question P2 describes how she doesn’t “need 
anyone outside” herself, having “reached a connection with a higher power that has 
guided me this whole way”.  She ends this extended response reiterating her 
commitment to democratic ideals: “But (.) if somebody else needs to (1) and the 
medication works and going to the doctor (.) and they’re ok doing that (.) I say they 
should be free to do that”.  That the person may be ill informed, that P2 may have a 
better solution or that social or environmental influences may have a bearing on the 
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individual’s appreciation of their psychotic experiences (for example beyond 
medicine) is secondary to the democratic ideals of choice and autonomy.   
 
There are several critical elements that arise from this moral positioning leading to a 
lived ideological dilemma for participants:  
  
1. That systems of institutional or political authority that participants are critical of 
ie; those associated with the meta/grand narratives, go unchallenged and/or 
indiscriminately accepted.  
2. The truth; personal beliefs of psychotic experiences that participants hold to  
(eg; spiritual framing/‘higher power’) is in danger of becoming undermined as 
other versions of truth are just as legitimate and worthy of consideration. 
  
Participants are left appeasing established ‘every day/common sense’ vis-a-vis 
embedded democratic ideals, whilst simultaneously holding to a personal truth that 
may not satisfy the analytic systems that dominate democratic societies, yet allow 
circumstances where the thing they resist (meta/grand narratives) continues to be 
facilitated/legitimised.  The risk for participants becomes one of being exposed as 
being exclusive; dogmatic and anti-democratic forcefully asserting their truth onto 
others.  In order to avoid such exposure, they are obliged to dislocate the certitude of 
their ‘truth’.    
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4.16 Unique, deeply personal experience yet ordinary/every 
day  
The need to dislocate truths attached to personal experience of PLEs incites another 
dilemmatic challenge for participants.  Participants claim stake to an expertise secured 
to a unique, distinctive, deeply personal experience of PLEs.  However, this is set 
against an assertion that psychotic experiences are universal, within the reach of all, 
its ordinariness and everydayness emphasised.  Tension arises from these competing 
positions involving social acceptability, normalisation and individualisation.  The 
proposition that everyone has the ability to ‘realise’ the gift of psychosis; that it is 
within their reach, commitment and personal effort, necessitates personal effort and 
commitment.  The level of commitment, as above, leads to conflicts with democratic 
ideals participants espouse.      
  
P 3 has never engaged mental health services but has experienced hallucinations 
which he links with life events (eg; death and bereavement).  He intuitively interprets 
these psychotic events finding corroboration from various sources - from reading, 
research and talking to people with similar experiences.  He describes psychotic 
events as: “normal (.) ordinary (.) quite common”.  His journey led to contact with  
“people who are distressed”, his engagement with same becoming ‘a form of 
vocation’; adding that he uses ‘the word [vocation] advisably’.  Following these 
assertions, taking into account descriptions and affirmations made by participants 
from previous interviews, the interviewer/researcher put the following question to P 3 
which was interjected before completion.  The interjection was indicative of the 
eagerness of participants to respond and take charge of the direction of linguistic 
travel during interview.  
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JW: “So it sounds as if you’re (.) I’m not saying you’re gifted but there’s a sense  
of…”  
  
P 3: “Well I think we, everybody is gifted (.) just in different ways and some people 
never wake up to their gift because the wakening up process can be (1) as in my case 
(.) I woke up to some gifts that I realized I have but I believe that everybody else has 
the same kind of gift (.) but they haven’t woken up to them because if you’ve 
wakened up to some of these gifts they become responsibilities (.) and that can be (.) 
not demanding but they can be (.) literally a responsibility to respond to them or else 
to be irresponsible and step back from them (1) if you step back from them I think you 
diminish yourself (.) if you try to live up to them I think you can enhance yourself (.) 
enhance your life and make your life much more meaningful.”     
 
Interjections in conversation indicates emotional intentions of a speaker interrupting 
the flow of another.  This can include perceived conditions of dominance (eg; men 
dominating women; see Zimmerman and West, 1975) or “high involvement” 
(Tannen, 1994) an eagerness to engage, indicating that the subject matter is of 
particular significance or importance to the ‘interjector’. Given earlier claims that 
participants are found to be an empowered and willing cohort regards participation, it 
is likely that it is eagerness (‘high involvement’) that motivated P 3’s intervention 
when the question was put to him by the interviewer/researcher.  Moreover, the issue 
of self-interest was evident in the discourse above, involving ‘self-initiated self-repair’ 
- a speech act that is initiated and performed by a speaker in order to correct any 
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ambiguity surrounding a potential trouble source (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2008).  The 
act of self-initiated self-repair requires conscious effort, is often applied to maximise 
clarity and rectify any potential misunderstanding of a word or phrase through self-
interruption and/or editing (Schiffrin, 2006).     
  
In the case of P 3 above he brings attention to the use of the word “vocation” as it 
applies to his self-found “gifts” cautioning that it is used “advisably”.  The cautioning 
operates as self-initiated self-repair.  Vocation is commonly linked with acts of 
occupation, career or profession, but can also have religious connotations eg: a calling 
into priesthood.  As P 3’s cautioning toward the word vocation is not explored it 
would be presumptive as to what, in the given context, his specific issue(s) with the 
word is.  However, following his cautioning of the appropriateness/applicability of the 
word vocation the words gift and responsibility appear.    
  
 
A gift is something understood as something given, received and/or something that a 
person may be endowed with eg; a skill, competency or intuitive ability.  The word 
responsibility implies something we become/are expected/obliged to be accountable 
to/for.  P 3 describes the realisation of his gift of PLEs as enabling him to help those 
in distress.  This orientates his PLE in the direction of personal endowment as 
described above.  The added dimension of responsibility that he refers to resonates 
choice with regards to realising or developing personal endowment.   In order to  
‘wake up’ to the gift(s) of psychosis; to utilise and “enhance your life and make your 
life much more meaningful” the benefactor has: “a responsibility to respond to them 
or else to be irresponsible and step back from them”.  The consequences of stepping  
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back is that you “diminish yourself”.  It follows that the ‘specialness’, the expertise 
that participants declare can only be obtained if the individual becomes responsible 
for/toward the psychotic experience.    
  
The principle of choice in engaging the psychotic experience is also emphasised by 
P13.  Prior to the statement below, and similar to P3, he extolled the virtues of the 
psychotic experience, believing it had a healing dimension that everyone can learn 
from:       
  
“so you either have to be willing to go through that or you don’t go through that (1) 
that’s a choice you make”  P 13  
  
The individual has to be “willing and choose to engage the PLE in order to ‘discover’ 
its healing powers and wisdoms therein.   Here, the everyday principles of choice and 
autonomy, reflective of socially and culturally established discourses of morality 
determined by democratic ideals are being promoted by participants.   However, even 
though these culturally established principles are endorsed and promoted by 
participants, contradictory positions exist, whereby alignment with democratic ideals 
becomes conflicted through the creation of a social hierarchy, expanded below.  
    
4.17 An unintended hierarchy?  
Common to ‘democratised’ societies is the liberalisation of the individual, of the right 
to social participation, of being recognised as an individual with unique opinions, 
beliefs, practices and needs (Thelan, 2014).  Choice and autonomy lie at the heart of 
the aforementioned.  P3 uses the principle of autonomy to distinguish between those 
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who indulge the psychotic experience for the benefits of their own personal 
development and for social good ie; to help people who are distressed and those who 
do not. 8  According to participants there are a number of routes to encounter the 
psychotic experience, some of which merge or co-occur - 1) inducement through 
human intervention, often in group settings (eg; hylotropic breathing) 2) experiences 
inherited/handed down via previous lives lived (eg; reincarnation) 3) traumatic life 
events.  Choice may be involved in any or all of these routes eg; choosing to engage 
human intervention (1) to induce the psychotic experience which may become 
associated with previous lives (2) or/and traumatic life events (3).     
  
However, choice to enter the psychotic experience was not always explicitly stated by 




8  By way of demonstrating the interrelatedness of the discursive nature of participant’s positioning,  
 
evidence of a social hierarchy as appears in text has already been constructed through the ‘other’, the 
creation of an us and them.  However, the distinction here is that ‘the other’ serves as a measure of 
resistance to dominant ideals and cultural norms (meta-grand narratives) constructing a superiority 
serving to protect personal identity (dilemma at stake with exclusionary consequences); the hierarchy 
above is constructed in a way that participants are claiming to live out, assume dominant ideals and 
cultural norms assimilating and acquiescing to social practices and expectations yet perform 
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Psychotic Like Experiences have been shown to be relatively common throughout 
populations (see chapter 2).  However, this information also leaves us with a current 
fact that the great majority of individuals throughout general populations do not share 
the psychotic experience.   The potential for any-one to experience PLEs has also 
been alluded, however the proviso would be that an element of choice would be 
required of the person who does not share the experience, in order to engage it and 
reap its personal and social benefits. Here, the dilemma (challenge) lies at two levels.  
  
Firstly, there is an insistence to normalise, through the encouragement and promotion 
of the psychotic experience thereby initiating social acceptability, whilst claiming 
stake to an expertise secured to a unique, distinctive, deeply personal experience. 
Participant positioning of personalised expertise becomes diluted through the 
universalisation of the experience.   Under these conditions being endowed with a gift, 
maintaining a level of ‘specialness’ attached to personalised expertise becomes 
standardised, mundane, everyday even banal.   Any claim to expertise (or specialism), 
as culturally understood, is undermined through the commonality of the experience.   
  
Secondly, responsibility for/toward the psychotic experience becomes dependent upon 
the willingness of the benefactor to utilise and ‘harvest’ the experience.  This creates a 
distinction between those who engage the psychotic experience and those who refuse, 
are unwilling, are afraid to or remain ‘stuck’ in their psychotic world.  This orientates 
toward judgemental and exclusionary practices. The former diminishes and negates 
participant claims to an individualised, specialised expertise; the latter creates an 
exclusivity, a social hierarchy that inhibits the social flatness endorsed by 
democratised and liberalised societies that participants consent to ie; through their 
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universalization all psychotic experiences are of equal value and that people should be 
judged according to their willingness to accept and/or engage the psychotic 
experience.    
  
There is a dichotomisation at work here splitting categories of people.   
Dichotomisations commonly occur in everyday discourse, appearing in discursive 
accounts generated by participants, below.     
    
4.18 Embodied text  
Participant positioning relies heavily on the internalisation of the PLE placing 
emphasises on public/private worlds extending into a mind/body dichotomy.  Their 
resistance to the meta/grand narratives, reliance on non-material, alternative frames of 
psychotic experiences (mind, soul, spirituality) yet reference to the material 
(physiological, biological) influences is present.  Problems of ‘dualistic conceptions of 
mind-body’ arise.  Willig (2000) suggests problems of mind-body dualism can be 
overcome by understanding the generation of text through the process of embodiment.  
The extent with which participants overcome this culturally imbedded dichotomy of 
mind/body dualism, the consequences and effects and where this leads them is 
explored below.           
 
4.18.1  Dichotomisations.  The mind body problem and 
embodied discourse  
People tend to believe that their bodies are occupied as opposed to their existence 
stops at their body.   
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“we do not feel as if we are our bodies; we feel as if we occupy them.”    
(Bloom, 2004, as cited in White, 2015)  
  
This points to a dualism, involving dichotomous thinking (Wilson, 2010) eg; 
Globalization or Internationalisation; Science or Mysticism; Mental illness or Social 
phenomena.  A mind-body dualism ie; a division between the material and the 
nonmaterial; a belief that a soul, a spirituality, a mind, a consciousness exists 
outside/beyond the everyday materiality that is our physical bodies continues to  
“circulate through Western culture” (Alexandra, 2015, p41).  By way of example,  
Singleton (2012) refers to national surveys involving teenagers (US, Great Britain and 
Canada) where it was found approximately half believe in an afterlife.   In his own 
study of 13 –29-year-olds (combining data from national census of Australia, 
interviews and survey) he found that participants harboured a spirituality that hinges 
on the belief that there is an afterlife; therefore, once the body dies and decomposes, 
the soul, spirit; some form of consciousness, life or presence prevails. This allows 
religious or spiritual convictions to endure as our existence beyond our bodies remains 
a possibility.  The secularisation of nations, where traditional religious institutions and 
practices have declined, have tended not to diminish the belief in the existence of the 
immaterial as part of human existence; where a spirituality is increasingly 
individualised: “Idiosyncratic”, “self-directed” and “eclectic” “reflecting prevailing 
cultural trends and trajectories” (Singleton, 2012, p466).   Dualism in broad terms 
subordinates one ideology over another (either/or) often disregarding contexts, the 
fluidity and potential for “relational dialogism” (Wilson, 2010).  Where mind-body 
dualism is particularly challenged, is how the immaterial (mind) and material 
 
  217  
(brain/body) interact.  To put it another way, what are the casual relations between 
both, what is/are the mechanism(s) through which they influence one another?    
 
P7, someone who had a long history of using psychiatric services, at one stage being 
hospitalised for approximately 12 years, created a dualism through rhetorical means 
when asked by the interviewer/researcher the following:  
   
JW: ‘”what would you say to somebody who would come along and say (.) you’ve 
been through the system (.) it’s obvious that you’ve had a mental illness and (.) you 
know it’s all biological (.) so therefore you’re in remission and you know (.) what 
would you say to somebody like that?”  
  
P7: “Did you ever have the flu?”  
   
JW: “Ok (.) yeah.”  
 
P7: “And are you in remission from the flu?”  
  
JW: “Ok”  
  
P7 does not address the question put to her head on; but diverts via a rhetorical device.  
She firstly addresses the question, with a question: “Did you ever have the flu?”.  The 
interviewer is subsequently drawn into a sequence of talk led by the interviewee.  
Given the question “Did you ever have the flu?” is one with high probability of 
receiving an affirmative response (which happened:’ “Ok (.) yeah”) P7 is prospecting 
that she would be able to follow up with another question completing the rhetorical 
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sequence whereby the interviewer does not contest the account; where 
synchronisation between the interviewer and interviewee is complete.  Further, an 
added dynamic may have arisen where, as noted earlier, the interviewer is highly 
likely to be perceived as an ‘insider’, a collaborator; the interview taken as facilitative 
and non-confrontative. P7 may reasonably have taken for granted that her rhetorical 
questions would be met with a corroborative and agreeable response.  Not only does 
this sequence of talk end in an inclination toward corroboration to P7’s denunciation 
of a medical interpretation of her (continued) psychotic experiences, it also establishes 
a dichotomy that separates illness (physiology) from psychotic experiences.  There is 
an implicitness, a subtlety (ie; it is not immediately obvious) to this rhetorical process 
that ends in this dichotomy.  However, some participant accounts were more explicit 
in their established beliefs and positioning regards dichotomies, specifically 
mind/body dualism.  This involved causality.  
 
4.18.2  Mind/Body dichotomy, causality and discourse 
connectives  
Inferences to causal relations can be found in discourse markers.  Specifically, these 
are termed Discourse Connectives-: “generally understood as explicit indicators of 
discourse relations within a text” (Rysová and Rysová, 2014, p452).  The presence of 
discourse connectives has been shown to be universal (Rysová. 2017).  Discourse 
connectives can appear in single word format: ‘because’, ‘therefore’, ‘however’, ‘so’, 
‘when’, ‘and’, ‘is’; or appear in multi-word formations: ‘and due to’, ‘what naturally 
follows is’, ‘the result is’ (Rysová. 2017).  When applied, discourse connectives can 
stimulate casual interpretation (Sanders and Mulder, 2009), highlight or raise 
awareness of casual interactions between entities (Ramesh and Yu, 2010).  In a world 
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where: “Humans see causality everywhere and in everything …  encoded in the 
grammar of various languages” (Le Guen et al, 2015, p2) discourse connectives can 
help underline casual relations.  The appearance of discourse connectives reveals 
performances of a discursive nature enabling speakers to highlight preferred 
causalities complimentary to their world view.  Discourse connectives were 
occasionally used by participants.  However, given participant positioning, claiming 
an expertise attached to an enclosed internalised intrapersonal space, particular 
attention is paid to discourse connectives that reveal lived ideological dilemmas of a 
dualistic nature involving the public/private; mind/body dichotomies offered up 
during interview.  Some discursive accounts offered by participants, involving 
mind/body dichotomies were sustained and methodical; an example of which follows.         
  
P5, who had limited experience of mental health services, stated he was “clear” that:  
“what happened to me wasn’t an illness”; “ you’re feelings and your thoughts are 
coming from you’re physiology (.) they’re nothing to do with anyone else”; “your 
body’s there before your mind (.) and your mind makes sense of your body”; “I think 
I’m fairly clear that the brain and the body are the same thing”.      
P5 is constructing a dichotomy common to dualism; dividing mind and body. He 
utilises the single word connective ‘and’ to combine thoughts and feelings which are 
fastened (“coming from”) to the ‘mechanics’ of the body – “physiology”.  He also 
secures the brain to the body believing they are ‘the same thing’.  It might appear that 
he ranks the body over the mind “there before” but ends in determining that the mind 
has a higher-level function: “your mind makes sense of your body”.  This dualism, 
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where the immaterial and the material; the mind and body become dichotomised was 
present throughout participant’s discourse with a distinct predilection for the 
immaterial to subordinate the material.  Further, P5, similar to other discursive 
accounts, places self-experience in terms of privacy (my business) and/or out of reach 
of others: “feelings and your thoughts … they’re nothing to do with anyone else”.  
This adds another dichotomous layer of disconnect vis a vis; between the internal 
experience and communal life.    
  
P5 presents this dichotomy to justify his belief that his PLEs were not illness related 
ie; physiologically determined.   However, if the “mind makes sense of your body” a 
logical conclusion, based on common sense notions made up of social ‘truths’ and 
realities would be that processing of information is taking place ie; thinking and 
rationalising as an activity is involved.  If P5 chooses a dualism that subordinates the 
material body for the immaterial (mind) he is at risk of emulating cognitive theory that 
“assumes that cognition is the property of individual minds. The body and the social 
context are conceptually separate” (Alexandra, 2015, p542). However, contrary to this 
P5 believes thinking takes place in the body: “thoughts are coming from your 
physiology”.   
 
The discursive nature of his discourse (found throughout other participant’s discourse 9 
) is contradictory and ambiguous and fails to resolve his rejection of illness or 
cognitive deficits (vis a vis meta/grand narratives) being related to his PLEs.   
Moreover, in contrast, to the above dichotomies, there were attempts to construct a 
mind-body holism (Hamilton and Hamilton, 2015) in the form of an embodied sense 
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of self, fashioned by the generation, influence and distribution of knowledge through 
history and culture. 
 
JW: “So there’s the spiritual (.) there’s the body thing(.)  and you did use the term 
you know (1) the thoughts and feelings (.) what would you say or what would you say 
to people who say this is all just kind of fuzzy stuff (.) really you can’t have a mind 
without a brain and your body can’t exist (.) we’re biological beings and our thoughts 
and feelings (.) surely there’s a connection to the brain and all that stuff (.) how would 
you respond to people like that?”  
 
P5: “I think my mind is much bigger than that (1) my mind to me is social (.) ideas 
aren’t just in brains, they’re in books (.) they’ve come down through the centuries (.)  
_____________________________________________________________  
9  Here I refer back to P1 above and return to the interrelatedness of the discursive nature of 
participants positioning demonstrated through the degree with which mind/body dualism 
creates problems for participants. P1 believes the origin of psychotic experiences is ‘not a 
chemical imbalance’ but holistic, involving spirit, mind, body, soul.  In contrast he later 
describes biological and chemical influences on mood: ‘…the further back the diaphragm 
goes back, the more happy chemicals go through …’  applying metaphors that are of a 
mechanical nature (similar to that found in medical practice) and assumes an ambiguous 
position as to personal responsibility in creating a chemical imbalance: ‘…we cause the 
chemical imbalance in ourselves, it’s not inherent in us… I don’t know would you agree with 
that?’  The level of ambiguity reveals the extent of the problem participants are trying to 
address in detaching their experiences from a material determinism from which the 
meta/grand narratives depend.    
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through culture (1) my mind isn’t just the brain and the brain isn’t only in the head (.) 
it’s all the way through your body.” 
 
Above, P5 responds to a problematic view, as presented by the interviewer, of his 
attempt to separate psychotic experiences from illness through mind-body dualism.  
The interviewer alludes to a reliance on the body and brain in order to exist, 
highlighting the significance of biology, its relation to thoughts and feelings, 
connecting mind and brain.  P5 does not explicitly deny this, declaring that what 
follows is based on his own belief about the view presented to him: “I think”.  He 
continues utilising discourse connectives that make causative connections between 
mind, society and ideas.  These are insistent, applied in certain terms; the mind “is” 
social,’ “ideas aren’t just in brains, they’re in books”.  He then goes on to apply some 
multi-word connectives specific to ideas which seem to flow: “come down through’ 
historically, and “through culture”, ending “all the way through your body”.   P5 is 
offering a holistic dualism (Hamilton and Hamilton, 2015) where “knowledge is 
understood as a product of an interaction between human society and its world” 
(Jungert, 2013, p2), the embodied sense of self being shaped through social forces 
with casual consequences that end up impacting the material body which the brain is 
part of.  Describing the mind as “social” may imply that it is a mere concept  
constructed for social/metaphorical purposes and/or is the ‘vessel’ through which 
information, knowledge and historical/cultural influences and experiences flow.   It is 
hard to know which or perhaps it is both?  This attempt at dualistic holism is however 
in contrast to the previous statements P5 made where a distinct dualism between body 
and mind is carved, where a disconnect between the internalised self-experience 
(made up of thoughts and feelings) and communal life is expressed.  He later admits: 
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“god it’s very hard to define these things isn’t it?”  indicating an awareness of a lived 
ideological dilemma.  This problem, I argue below, is common to Western society, a 
discourse that may not have the desired effect for participants.    
 
4.19 A common problem  
It is easy to draw attention to the lack of consistency, the ambiguity that exists here.   
The level of discursiveness is reflective of the mind/body dualism that has  
“plagued Western philosophy since the Enlightenment” (Hamilton and Hamilton,  
2015, p3); found in every day social, scientific and medical discourse (Demertzi et al, 
2009; Mehta, 2011; Riekki et al, 2013).  Hamilton and Hamilton (2015) go on to 
claim that resolving the problem of dualism is “a complex and gargantuan 
philosophical and scientific task” (p3), one that might never be resolved.  The lived 
ideological dilemma for participants is not so much the contradictions and ambiguities 
that accompany their usage of mind/body dualism in defending their position regards 
the meta/grand narratives (indeed they are replaying the mind-body dualism that 
already exists in greater society), but their ability and likelihood of transforming, 
revolutionizing, converting public discourses on psychotic experiences through 
mind/body dualism.  Dualism, as Bordo (2004, p8) argues “cannot be deconstructed 
in culture the way it can be on paper”.  Similarly, Wilson (2010) contests that 
dualism “has led to the privileging of theory over experience” (p 734).  Bordo and 
Wilson maintain that consequences of dualism on groups that are socially 
misrepresented and/or devalued cannot be addressed at an intellectual or academic 
level but through social (inter)action (where “the "margins" are brought to the 
"center”; Bordo, 2004, p28).  In referring to, appealing to, or relying on mind-body 
dualism to counter the meta/grand narratives of psychotic experiences, participants 
may be preventing, as referenced earlier, ‘relational dialogism’ to take place at 
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communal and societal levels where facilitation, perceptions and responses to the 
psychotic experience can improve.  This is one of participants’ primary concerns, yet 
regardless of accounts of dualistic holism their positioning commits them to a dualism 
subordinating the material for the immaterial; or to put it another way ‘mind’ (spirit, 
soul) over ‘matter’.   The end product, I argue, is that discourses that subordinate one 
element of existence (the material body) for another (the immaterial mind, sprit, soul), 
specifically those that replay culturally imbedded dichotomies, may only serve to 
distract from the material world where political authority and structural power 
operates - elements of Western society that cannot be ignored if the social 
transformations participants aspire is to occur.  This I expand in the discussion.  
However, before bringing findings to a conclusion, I present Figure 4 below 
illustrating the consequences of participant orientation to achieve the social 
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Figure 4. The ever-widening context of participant Orientation, 




Figure 4 illustrates the consequences and effects of participant’s discursive 
performances taking into consideration the orientation of their discourse drawing it 
into an ever-widening context.  Working clockwise from the category, top left.  The 
presence of Ambiguity in participant’s discursive performances, the desire to stabilise 
the psychotic experience through a discourse of Order (similarly found in a meaning 
making system allied with the meta/grand narratives) and the extent of Petitioning to  
establish corroboration and certainty to their accounts destabilised participant’s claim 
to a self-assured expertise.  This highlighted levels of self-doubt and vulnerability 
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contrasting with the self-assured position of expert by experience.  Ideological 
Dilemmas contrasted participant awareness and subsequent commitment to every-day 
social convention (ie; Lived Ideological Dilemmas vis-a-vis democratic ideals) 
against the surety of their ‘truth’ that is anchored to the subjective, lived experience.   
Conforming to democratic principles of choice involving the right of others to hold 
various accounts of psychotic experiences, allows indiscriminate acceptance of 
competing interpretations conceding the legitimisation of the meta/grand narrative.  
Here, attempts to Normalising the psychotic experience, translated through the non-
material is less likely to find social acceptance where a knowledge gap can be easily 
filled by the meta/grand narrative.     Therefore, the democratic ideals participants 
expressed led to conditions where attenuation of their self-assured truth through a 
specialism (Expert by Experience) resulted.  Personal responsibility aligned with 
social convention, that is democracy, where persons need to take responsibility and 
embrace the psychotic experience, otherwise they will be “diminished” as a human 
being created a Non-intended hierarchy.   An Us and Them was established through 
this act of exclusivity, once again contradicting democratic ideals vis-à-vis social 
inclusion and equality.  Finally, participants discursive performances reveal a lived 
ideological dilemma played out in everyday discourse, yet to be concluded in Western 
society – that of a mind/body, material/immaterial dichotomies.   I put it that the 
Embodied text where participants subordinate the material for the immaterial fails to 
conclude this dichotomy (as they believe they have), presented as a route to normalise 
the psychotic experience and does not address the structural material power that 
maintains the meta/grand narratives.  In summarising Figure 4, the orientation of 
discourse as revealed through participant discursive acts ultimately leads to 
attenuation of their self-declared/self-assured expertise and truth, a silencing of the 
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psychotic experience and presents dilemmas involving contradictory practices 
(exclusion and formation of social hierarchy) failing to address the structural power 
that maintains the meta/grand narratives challenged throughout their interviews.  I 
provide an overall summary of findings below.  
 
4.20 Summary/concluding findings  
Text generated from one-one interviews were analysed to reveal the existence of 
repertoires and the discursive manner with which participants relate their identity and 
achieve positioning when accounting for their PLEs.   Attention was paid to the effect 
and consequences (compromises and dilemmas) that their positioning has on their day 
to day interactions with the social world, through their desire for change through the 
orientation of their discourse.  The positioning reached through discursive means and 
subsequent consequences and effects of their orientation is summarised in the 
remaining part of this chapter.     
 
 4.20.1  Summary findings  
Participants, defended their identity through repertoires evoking Category Entitlement 
- laying claim to an expertise that can only be achieved having ‘journeyed through’  
the psychotic experience, coming to a realisation of the positivity offered by the 
experience, normalising, naturalising and universalising the experience.   The end 
point was a ‘specialism’, an expertise that is believed to be overlooked and 
undervalued requiring public attention and recognition; the authentication of this 
expertise claimed through the discursiveness of corroboration, rhetoric, consensus and 
competent application of metaphors bringing meaning and life to the world of PLEs.  
Participants called upon scholarly and professional experts as corroborators, applied 
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rhetoric and consensus to close off challenges to their accounts to achieve a positive 
identity and establish credibility to their accounts.  The level of effort and 
commitment to the psychotic experience revealed participant awareness of prevailing 
attitudes and public perceptions toward the psychotic experience dominated by the 
meta/grand narratives - which they denounced.  The final discursive effort in creating 
and maintaining a credible identity; the subsequent positive account of psychotic 
experiences was to establish ‘beyond doubt’ the truth therein through ‘fact 
construction’, in accordance with an expertise (expert by experience) attached to the 
lived experience, internalised, individualised beyond reproach – sacrosanct. 
Participants in defending the psychotic experience opposed a normalisation founded 
on conformity choosing difference above integration.   However, a number of 
consequences and effects to this positioning, contrary to the desires as revealed 
through participant’s primary orientation arose – that of normalisation and social 
acceptance of the psychotic experience.    
 
The level of participant awareness of social disapproval toward the psychotic 
experience became more apparent when consequences of their positioning was shown, 
revealed through a number of dilemmas at stake.  Participants positioning had a 
number of (unintended?) consequences, revealed through dilemmas at stake.  
Participants positioned themselves in opposition to deficit models of psychotic 
experiences (vis a vis; as perceived through the meta/grand narratives).  However, 
they also provided examples when they felt obliged to withhold the psychotic 
experience from social interaction through a commitment to the status quo leading to 
the creation of a moral order.  Rhetoric and corroboration were applied to promote 
and uphold social status of persons with PLEs by creating a niche, an exclusivity for 
said persons.  This niche was particularly noticeable, set against persons who aligned 
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themselves with the meta/grand narratives of psychosis.  Denunciation of the 
meta/grand narratives also included declarations of a ‘completeness’ to psychotic 
experiences that entails a unified self, obviating links or associations with illness and 
an unhealthy divided self.  Participants also constructed a collective identity that 
diminished the possibility of collective corroborative action to achieve to social 
change to improve responses to psychotic experiences.  The rejection of those aligned 
with the meta/grand narratives created a demarcation, a dividing line between those 
who have entered the psychotic experience, and those who have not.  The 
consequence of an exclusivity, an ‘otherness’, of the other discursive categories under 
the repertoire Dilemma at Stake was social distance, a barrier to empathy, a declined 
potential for dialogue to take place between social actors and those living with PLEs, 
ultimately silencing the psychotic experience.  Participant orientation, the desire for 
social acceptance toward the psychotic experience was found to have other 
consequences and effects that compromised their positioning involving practices and 
principles declared at interview.        
 
The discursive acts to protect the site of the psychotic experience (ultimately personal 
identity of the person living with PLEs) from negative assessment from others had a 
contrasting effect against participant’s principles and practices found throughout their 
discourses.  These appeared in the final repertoire Lived Ideological  
Dilemmas.        
  
Lived Ideological Dilemmas played out in a widening social and political context 
where declared practices and principles toward democracy, inclusiveness and social 
responsibility conflicted with discursive acts that created an exclusiveness (a social 
hierarchy), allowing the deficit models of psychotic experiences to go unchallenged 
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displacing social responsibility toward the psychotic experience, closing off potential 
for public dialogue to take place. Participants claiming stake to a specialness, an 
expertise, a gift that is universally accessible, personalised and unique at the 
individual level ultimately becomes standardised, mundane, everyday even banal. The 
expert by experience claiming stake to a unique gift becomes mainstream putting at 
risk their exclusivity.  Other contradictions and ambiguities (emotional uncertainty) 
arise from participant discourses.  Acts of petitioning revealed a level of participant 
self-doubt.  References to metaphorical systems with a function to establish order 
were found to be similar to those within/throughout the meta/grand narratives.  The  
‘expert by experience’ constructed by participants contrasted against the traditional 
conceptualisations of expert opinion and professionalism, publicly and culturally 
established.  The contradictions and self-doubt served to undermine participant claims 
to an assured expertise based on the concept of ‘expert by experience’.    
 
Additional, an intervention in the guise of a problematic view, a ‘challenge’ to 
participant’s orientation toward a material/immaterial dualism was met with a holistic 
dualism applying discourse connectives ie; melding mind, body and social context. 
However, such efforts are compromised, limited and, I argue, counterproductive 
dislocated from the practicalities required to achieve social change.  Holistic dualism 
as an alternative system of understanding, apprehending and assessing psychotic 
experiences is limited as a means to address dominant cultural conceptions and 
established dualistic practices common to public life.  I put it that there is a 
requirement to address structural and political power if the social change participants 
are aspiring, as revealed through their orientation, is to occur.  This discourse and 
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potential for action is missing from their discursive accounts.  I discuss the 
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Chapter 5 – Discussion  
Before presenting this chapter and in order to link the preceding chapters with the 
remainder of this thesis a brief re-visitation of the overall theoretical framework that 
has focused the study, ‘steered’ the aims and objectives is warranted – that of Social  
Constructionism and Discourse Analysis.    
  
Social Constructionism maintains that there are no conclusive facts about the world; 
that multiple versions of reality are anticipated and legitimate (White, 2004).   In real 
terms this means that there are competing realities, where ‘criterias for truth’ are 
contested and various ways to describe the world available.   The social world we 
inhabit is primarily constructed through language where choice of words and 
descriptions become embroiled in performative acts in order to achieve and validate 
an opinion, a moral position, a world view.  This leads us into a world where the study 
of language becomes central to understanding the means by which we construct the 
world around us, allowing competing versions of truth, in turn able to reveal issues of 
social power.  Discourse analysis was chosen as a research method to reveal the 
construction of language and subsequent power struggles that exist in relation to a 
social object – psychotic experiences.     
  
Discourse analysis was chosen to facilitate the process of meaning making with 
regards the psychotic experience, understand the construction of identity and 
positioning taken up, and discursive challenges that arise in maintaining and 
defending both from the first person, lived experience perspective.  Repertoires were 
taken as the main unit of text for analysis with’ secondary’ units of text (eg; rhetorical 
devices, discourse markers etc), considered as part of the discursive performances 
 
  233  
enacted at time of interview.  During analysis, particular attention was paid to levels 
of consistency, variability and compromises that appeared in text and how these 
discursive performances are related to/influenced by larger meta-narratives, demands 
and general expectations from the social environment.  The discursive performances 
and subsequent challenges that arise acknowledges the nuanced manner with which 
we are impelled to construct and defend our identity, take up a particular position with 
regards a social object – again the psychotic experience.    
 
Having presented findings where variabilities, inconsistencies and compromises were 
revealed I now bring these together and connect their interactions and implications 
within a wider social context.  This will help understand issues of power and influence 
on discourse created by participants and allow me to make suggestions as to how this 
discourse might evolve and gain social purchase under social conditions, at a point in 
human history.  I firstly present personal benefits of the discourse created by 
participants, then turn my attention toward wider social conditions that bring about 
possibilities for a social movement to influence the direction of discourse and public 
response as desired by participants, revealed through their orientation 10.   
____________________________________________________________  
10 Here I refer back to chapter 3 ‘Research orientation during analyses and presence of 
researcher’ where the research supervisor was referred as a reflexive source to create 
necessary tension through questioning and probing as part of an intersubjective process during 
analyses.    Whilst the primary aims of this thesis was consciousness raising among the 
participant cohort demanding critical examination identifying compromises, contradictions etc 
within discourse generated at interview, my research supervisors suggested I also look for 
positive aspects of the discourse ie; personalised gains.  This was useful and prompted the 
perspective taken below.        
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Before proceeding. I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the 
narratives, the stories of realization, of the personal feats and individual effort made 
by participants living with psychotic experiences, particularly given the hostile social 
environment that refuses to accept the psychotic experience as a human experience of 
value.   However, I must note that the focus of this study was not to highlight these  
‘success stories’ as might appear in other literature, through other methodologies, but 
to seek a way forward through consciousness raising in order to change public 
responses in favour of the psychotic experience.  Seeking a way forward requires a 
certain method or form of critical analysis described above.  I have decided to add a 
‘reflexive narrative’ in an Epilogue at the end of the thesis to describe personal 
struggles in coming to terms with some of my findings as demanded of the 
methodology and leave some unanswered questions that I believe requires attention 
and may led to further research into the area of psychotic experiences.    
 
Further, it is common that available research evidence relevant to the topic of the 
thesis be considered and presented throughout relevant chapters - with particular 
emphasis on the literature review and the discussion, below (Uncles, 1998).  Here I 
return to the end of Chapter 1, pages 27-29 where I introduced the relevance of 
conducting an integrative literature review ‘sketching prevailing ideas around a 
subject matter’ in order to locate rhetorical functions, socially constructed discourses 
on psychotic experiences.  This, I argue, is in keeping with the parameters of what is 
to be achieved through discourse analytic studies.  In the remaining chapters I will 
continue to use this approach precluding the depth of research evaluation as required 
of other methodologies, locating discourses that influence and inform participant 
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accounts establishing their wider effects and consequences in accordance with 
prevailing social conditions.    
 
 5.1  From personalised gains to collective possibilities   
Findings established participants had a high level of commitment to claims of a 
subjective, personalised, experience-based expertise featuring independence and 
individuality.  Text generated at interview revealed a persistence of this claim to 
expertise and individuality even though a number of challenges for participants 
emerged.  Participants were by and large aware of these challenges - such as 
dilemmas faced in resolving the mind-body dichotomy relied upon to counter the 
meta/grand narratives, an awareness of the silencing that their moral positioning leads 
to (choosing to remain silent) and the revelation that ambiguity and self-doubt existed 
alongside the aforementioned certainty to expertise.   Remaining committed to 
positioning that is knowingly problematic leads one to believe that there are benefits 
thereof.  Below I present what I believe these benefits to be, broadening out the 
consequences of findings as they relate to the effects of discourse created by 
participants at interview, in the context of public discourses according to the social 
conditions with which they operate.    
  
 5.2  Positioning and self-esteem  
In keeping with social constructionism all human experiences, such as mood and 
emotional responses, are “socially molded” (Aranguren, 2017) interpreted and 
influenced by social and cultural normativism at a given time (Hewitt, 2002).  Self-
esteem as “an object of cultural discourse” (Hewitt, 2002) is indicative of a socially 
accepted normativism at work whereby a form of individualism is played out 
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influencing how we interpret and manage our emotional responses to social 
challenges.  Examining the concept ‘self-esteem’ through a social constructionist lens 
Hewitt (2002) concludes that it is representative of “mood” interpreted through 
culture, subject to social conditions where ‘social comparisons’ and personal 
evaluations are promoted.  Similarly, Gergen (2011) notes: “once an emotion is 
performed the relational scenario also prescribes what follows.” (p114).  In  
‘Western’ terms people are encouraged to find self-acceptance, seek acceptance from 
others; uphold standards of efficacy with regards to individual actions and measured 
performance in order to find or maintain emotional equilibrium.  Aranguren’s (2017) 
analysis of the interplay between culture and coping (emotional responses to 
environmental/social challenges) leads him to conclude there is a “non-reductive 
biology of emotions” (p259).  He determines that the demands of coping as a 
necessary part of ‘survival’, brings into play self-preservation as a primary function of 
emotions, itself associated with identity threat, or to put it another way to preserve, 
“self-integrity” (Sherman and Cohen, 2006).  Participant positioning involving 
discursive performances where an expertise through Category Entitlement (Figure 2), 
the creation of a Moral Order and privileged position (Figure 3) is achieved involved 
determinants of identity threat where self-efficacy, feeling valued and the creation of 
positive meaning around personal experiences was at play.  These determinants reflect 
a form of individualism common in Westernised, industrialised societies related to a 
need for social validation (Petriglieri and Stein, 2012).    
 
Discursive performance during interview provided evidence of a perceived hostility 
toward the psychotic experience.  This hostility is evidenced else-where (eg; as 
presented in the Chapter 3, literature review), impacting the type of actions 
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(responses) made possible for those living with PLEs, or as Foucault (1980, p93) puts 
it; ‘a certain economy of discourses of truth’ that is made available.  I argue below 
that responses available to participants have an emotional basis (coping) prompted by 
an awareness of an unsympathetic environment toward the psychotic experience, in 
turn influenced by a modern emphasis of comparative evaluation.   
 
I present that the requirement to respond to this environment understandably led to 
personalised gains for the individual in order to achieve emotional equilibrium.  A 
form of individualism comes to light from these personal benefits.    
  
Here I refer to theories and concepts that have impacted and shaped identity in 
modern times, in particular that which encourages/favours or discourages/disapproves 
certain behaviours, attributes or characteristics.  This involves normalisation 
encouraging self-assessment and comparative evaluations wrapped up in constructs 
such as self-esteem, as ‘an object of cultural discourse’ where particular expectations 
and demands upon individuals are compelled, leading to self-regulatory behaviours; 
or as Foucault (1982) put it “self-governance” - the conduct of conduct:   
  
“This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life that categorizes the 
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, 
imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise, and which others recognise in 
him.”   
(Foucault 1982, 212)  
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I contend below that acts of aversion (ie; silencing, Figures 3 and 4, Chapter 4); of 
pitching one’s knowledge and abilities against socially sanctioned expertise and 
authority (the Other, Figure 4), are potential indicators of social anxiety, driven by 
fear of being judged and publicly shamed.  I argue that participants have committed to 
an identity centred on the creation of positive narratives around their psychotic 
experiences made possible through discursive performances (Category Entitlement) 
that appeal to public notions of morality, individual freedoms, normalization ie; their 
orientation.    
 
 5.3  Feeling valued  
5.3.1 By others  
The need for validation from others is a common experience for people.  It has 
potential to confirm “the worldview” and build “self-esteem components of the 
individual’s anxiety-buffering system”, through reduction in uncertainty as to one’s 
place in the world (Pyszczynski et al, 2004, p464).  The positive experience of feeling 
valued by others is traced from ‘cradle to grave’, such as affirmative experiences 
during childhood, to old age where recognition for contribution to communal and 
family life is related to wellbeing.  Data revealed a number of discursive categories 
that highlighted the need for participants to feel accepted by others (acts of 
Petitioning), yet for the majority superior to others (Figure 4), in other words 
affirmation from personal, communal and social worlds.  
5.3.2 Social comparison   
Social comparison theory, as initiated by Festinger (1954) proposed that individuals 
are inclined to evaluate their own abilities, views and opinions by comparing 
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themselves to others.  According to Festinger, the tendency for social comparison 
serves to establish certainty within evaluative domains. An added dimension is the 
functionary purpose of social comparison that of “self-esteem 
enhancement/protection” (Kruglanski et al, 2012).  There are a number of directions 
with which individuals can move when comparing themselves as a function to 
enhance their self-esteem. These involve vertical (comparing social status) and 
horizontal dimensions (contrastive/connective comparisons, of doing better or worse).   
 
5.3.3 Social Comparison and Othering  
As Foucault points out, power is not simply a physical force, an unsophisticated, static 
top down authoritative source, constantly bearing down on helpless servile persons 
(Foucault, 1975). It is all pervasive, something that people desire in their own lives  
(yet cannot be possessed), something that is often resisted, redefined and reshaped.  
What Foucault refers is that power is also available to those who are/may be judged 
relatively powerless; who actuate their own will to power eg; defiance against 
unwanted status or identities. This leaves open possibilities and opportunities to resist 
or defy categorisations that impact one’s social image, reputation and sense of self. 
Options open to those who resist power includes the power not to believe (for instance 
in mental illness, Walsh et al, 2008) the power to define oneself in accordance to a 
preferred identity (Philbin, 2009).  Positioning oneself as superior to groups or 
institutions recognised as having authoritative expert knowledge is a form of 
resistance, one that people with major mental health problems are willing and able to 
deploy (Crossley, 2006; Walsh et al, 2008).  This is not to say that superiority can 
ever be fully achieved or unequivocally staked, but that participants have positioned 
themselves as having expert knowledge through Category Entitlement and have used 
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this to enhance their (self) identity.  This can involve an appeal to high ranking, 
culturally appropriate standards of conduct, of rightness or wrongness (ie; Moral 
Order, Figure 3 and democratic principles, Figure 4).  Below I present resistance as 
will to power in relation to moral/ethical positioning taken up by participants, 
commonly practiced in Westernised, industrialised nations, present in public 
discourse.  The acts of positioning, I present, serves to relieve and avert emotional 
burden for persons living with psychotic experiences who, as already shown through 
levels of awareness of the social power, of the negative consequences of the 
meta/grand narratives, are socially tainted.  I begin with describing how participants 
have implicated the horizontal dimension of social comparison.  
  
5.3.4 Horizontal dimension - Social Comparison as applied to 
peers and the general public   
A social comparison was enacted by participants implicating the Horizontal 
dimension, (contrastive/connective comparisons, of doing better or worse).  This 
involved, at one level responsibility toward the psychotic experience where you would 
“diminish yourself” (participant 3, 4.15.2), comparing those who somehow lost their 
sense of independency or/and remain within the mental health system, to those 
(participants) who have successfully navigated their way out of the mental health 
system or averted/never required support from statutory mental health services.  Here 
choice, as part of democratic reality is factored regards accepting or rejecting 
psychiatric treatments, accepting or resisting diagnoses, remaining within or without 
statutory mental health services.  That said, in this case, the contrastive nature of these 
circumstances, of participants being in a better or more fortunate situation than others 
who share the psychotic experience does not necessarily constitute a downward 
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oriented social comparison toward mental health service users.  There was evidence of 
sympathy directed at such persons, of suggestions as to what might better serve them 
where reference to’ survivors of the system’ was made (eg; Chapter 4 ‘A neglected 
source of knowledge’; Validation of the Intrapersonal); Universalization and the 
aversion of collectivisation where a dehumanising aspect of psychiatric services was 
highlighted, and a more hopeful and holistic world view was offered.  The horizontal 
social (connective) comparison enacted by participants toward others with similar 
experiences is one of doing worse.  However, given sympathy expressed toward this 
comparative/connective cohort, reasons for their circumstances focus on misfortune 
and/or the weight of authority of services dominated and guided by the meta/grand 
narratives.  This allows participants to establish a connective relationship with less 
fortunate peers(?), experts by experience, and continuation of their moral positioning 
vis a vis; not to be seen to be judgemental, elitist or exclusive by demonstrating a 
sympathetic response to those caught up in the mental health system.        
 
The primary differentiation created through horizontal social comparison was of 
moral character/fortitude between themselves (participants), others who share the 
psychotic experience (those caught up in the psychiatric system) against those who 
have never ‘entered’ the experience yet refuse it (ie; Othering).  People who belong to 
the former group, who have embraced responsibility toward the psychotic experience, 
are better off than those belonging to the latter two groups.  However, given evidence 
of a sympathetic assessment of the circumstances mental health service users find 
themselves in, it is those who have not encountered, entered into or refuse to engage 
the psychotic experience who are the primary target in a horizontal social comparison.   
Here, the horizontal dimension is directed at the public on grounds of the 
universalisation of the psychotic experience as accounted for through democratic 
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ideals.  In other words, positioning emphasised equality as a universal human 
principle with no hierarchy applied.  It follows that we are all equal through shared 
human experience; connected.  The latter group (the public) are ‘missing out’ of 
personal benefits (deep wisdoms and enhanced wellbeing) derived from the psychotic 
experience, due to fear and/or ignorance, therefore worse off.  The contrastive nature 
of acts engaging the horizontal dimension allows a nonthreatening, non-
confrontational, benign posture toward those with equal significance and importance 
(Experts by Experience caught up in the mental health system) and just as importantly 
the public.  The Discerning Silence (Participant 8; Chapter 4) operates (whether 
intended or not) as a ‘moral buffer’ where participants do not contest, upset or 
antagonise the public through actions that may appear ‘inconsiderate’ or result in 
social distance or disconnection.  This allows for the cultivation and maintenance of a 
strategy, as per an ‘interpretative community’ (more on the significance interpretative 
communities below) - that of collective action targeting civic opinion, challenging 
cultural practices that are stereotypically represented in public discourses.   Potential 
for collective action remains, reducing the likelihood of hostility or/and division 
which would endanger or threaten the prospect of gaining public sympathy.  A 
strategy (when/if activated), of gaining public sympathy, of instilling empathy toward 
marked individuals perceived as ‘suspiciously’ different – those living with the 
psychotic experiences – can remain a possibility.    The enactment of the horizontal 
(and vertical dimensions below) of social comparison sustains moral positioning 
maintaining potential for social action, which in turn has personal benefits for 
participants - below.          
 
This horizontal social comparison can help “maintain positive self-perceptions and 
emotional wellbeing … particularly in low-control circumstances” (Rahimi et al, 
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2017, p3).  Low control circumstances can include situations where a meta/grand 
narrative has ‘power over’ distinguished individuals (participants) who are aware of 
its influence over public perceptions and responses to that which marks them 
disapprovingly different from others – those living with psychotic experiences.  An 
awareness that the authority bestowed to the meta/grand narratives cannot be easily 
dismissed or dismantled; that the language that it instils has an alienating (Byrne et al, 
2016) and dehumanising effect (Perkins and Repper, 2001; Sewell, 2018) creates 
circumstances where options to counter such effects are limited.   Those who operate 
under the auspices of the meta/grand narrative are themselves an interpretative 
community, their authoritative position as: “embedded practitioner whose standards 
of judgment, canons of evidence, or normative measures are extensions” of the 
community itself (Fish, 1989, as cited by Scher and Kozlowska, 2018, p89).  One 
community (participants) interprets psychotic experience through the subjective, as 
part of their discursive strategy calling upon public sensibilities – that of normative, 
virtuous, ethics, and rights (or to put it another way ‘moral norms’, Scher and 
Kozlowska, 2018); the other (under the meta/grand narratives) through an objective 
lens justifying its actions that are risk averse, reverting to responsibility and 
obligations to public safety.  Given awareness of the authoritative position bestowed 
to those operating under the meta/grand narratives, yet the potential for participants to 
execute a number of strategies including confrontation, discussion, dialogue, it would 
appear that the social comparison as an act that elevates their status is consolidatory  
(Philbin, 2015).  In this case, the consolation does not end in accepting an ‘unwanted 
identity’ (Philbin, 2015) but from an inverted silence that satisfies each individual 
implicated in their interpretative community.  The inverted silence helps maintain 
emotional equilibrium, self-integrity and self-worth – that of self-esteem.  They have 
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chosen silence involving certain ‘complicities’ toward an elite with claims to 
specialist knowledge, charged with anti-democratic and human rights breaches, whilst 
themselves maintaining a distinctive referential, privileged position made up of 
embodied knowledge through Category Entitlement vis-à-vis Expert by Experience.  
This presents a dilemma where tensions: “between words and deeds” exists; 
“between representational acts and redistributive actions” (Thurlow and Jaworski, 
2017, p251).  The horizontal dimension as applied by participants allows prospects to 
gaining public sympathy to continue, maintaining social union whilst enabling a claim 
to expert knowledge.  A question arises from this dilemma - has this declared source 
of knowledge and wisdom potential for social change at the collective level as 
expressed through participant orientation?   
 
5.3.5 Vertical social comparison and the call to normative ethics  
Through Category Entitlement where psychotic experiences are presented as 
significations of underlying social discordance, as being particularly undervalued 
(Neglected Source of Knowledge); where the Universalisation of the psychotic 
experience (4.10) is asserted alongside principles of democratic ideals (4.14.2) 
participants have raised morals and normative ethics centred on human rights that are 
socially sanctioned; generally accepted, recognisable, embedded throughout Western 
society- individual autonomy, equality, inclusion, community participation.   In 
appealing to these commonly understood, generally accepted, established ethics they 
are setting them-selves up as lived examples of high moral standing against an ethics 
that is presented as dogmatic, often callous, lacking ‘moral imagination’ (Thomas and 
Longden, 2013).   Lewis and Callard (2017) in assessing a Bill of Rights developed by 
the World Psychiatric Association, designed to align psychiatric practice with the 
Convention of Rights for People with Disability, found the tone and content wanting.  
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Efforts by the WPA lack: “engagement with the complex challenges of coercion, 
institutionalisation, consent, and community inclusion” according to these authors, 
allowing continued contravention of Human rights and remaining silent on social 
justice issues encountered by ‘psychiatric populations’.  Thomas and Longden (2013) 
describe how mental health practitioners would be better served if they were to 
discard the technological model of mental health (effectively the meta/grand 
narratives) by engaging the moral imagination.  In order to resolve ethical challenges 
that arise when supporting someone with a major mental health problem, the process 
would involve the exploration of an extensive range of possibilities in a given 
situation or circumstances combining creativity and an empathetic response.  Thomas 
and Longden (2013), specific to mental health practice, describe the moral 
imagination as a process where interpersonal facilitates meaningful engagement with 
the individual’s narrative (the storying and re-storying required to maintain/gain 
emotional wellbeing) enabling the creation of dignified identities; recognising and 
engaging the existential nature of experiences that are estranged due to lack of pre-
established reference points and lose of communal interaction.    
 
The application of normative ethics enables participants to apply upward social 
comparison, levelling themselves with those afforded high social status, who proclaim 
specialist knowledge, who are sanctioned to enforce laws that according to various 
mental health service users, academic and professional commentators (Crossely, 
2006; Spandler and Calton, 2009; Lewis and Callard, 2017) impede various 
democratic rights - equality, citizenship, social participation - the aforementioned 
professional groups.  This allows for raised self-esteem for those who deploy this  
‘strategy’ by creating a morally inferior ‘Other’ and enable vertical social comparison.  
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The change in dynamics, the relationships between health professionals and persons 
presenting with mental health problems has shifted significantly over the last few 
decades (Svavarsdóttir et al, 2018).  There is a growing emphasises, reflected in the 
production of numerous policies and guidelines developed by statutory services and 
professional groups, where the patient through their lived experience is recognised as 
an expert in their own right.  In accordance, the need to create a milieu where power 
sharing and shared decision making becomes embedded in practice has arrived 
(Beyene et al, 2018).  However, scepticism remains regards the ability or willingness 
of traditional systems and professional groups to adapt and fully embrace this 
democratic process (Rogers et al, 2009; Davidson, 2009).  Davidson (2009) observes 
that self-management programmes, some service user-led, some generic, others 
condition specific have tended to be rolled out as part of an overall agenda to address 
the need to acknowledge and exploit the individual abilities of the expert patient.  
Davidson notes however that these programmes tend to be ‘complimentary rather than 
alternative’, ‘lending responsibility rather than sharing it’.  The tendency to be 
relatively prescriptive in approach indicates the continued dominance of a 
paternalistic mental health system.  This somewhat conflicts with participant 
discourses, whose orientation is fixed on democratic processes, where equal rights to 
self-determination and recognition of the psychotic experience as a normal, universal 
experience should be facilitated, not managed.  The segregation of persons, as occurs 
under systems of categorisations, is replaced by a democratic process where the will 
to power, interpretative and meaning making processes is in the hands of those with 
lived experience of psychotic experiences.   Participant discourse dismantles expert 
status as traditionally conceived.  The journey to personal wellbeing involves living 
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through an experience, making life choices, personal morals and access to 
interpretative power.  The need to be ‘fixed’ or cured by professional experts is turned 
on its head as expert status is defended through the lived experience (‘I know what is 
best for me’), staked through democratic ideals (‘I have the right to choose, to be 
equal’); where alternative meaning making systems address people’s need to become 
and not perform in accordance with social norms and expectations.   The meaning 
making process as advocated by participants, is becoming more influential (Noorani, 
2013), challenges traditional ideas on expertise, where professionalism becomes 
foregrounded by the real expert found in their presence – the expert by experience.  
However, as I relate later, there may be challenges and limitations to this idealistic 
notion of self-determination, some of which come from a wider social context.   
5.4  A new (public) order.  The rise of the new expert and 
the identification of an interpretative community   
Discourse studies of morals provides evidence that as Western societies have 
transformed over time, morals have become more individualised and diverse, 
increasingly used for purposes of supremacy, dominance and (personal) advantage 
(Bergman, 1998; Tosi and Warmke, 2016).  With such high stakes to personal 
integrity I argue that people with psychotic experiences (participants), are benefitting 
from moral positioning, as per the construction of a morally inferior Other (4.12), with 
compensatory benefits.  In other words, common to groups/persons living with 
experiences that are socially tarnished, publicly discredited, alienated, isolated, 
shunned - the psychotic experience  (see for example Thornicroft, 2006; Philbin, 
2009; Farrelly, 2015) the creation or construction of moral supremacy over the Other 
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functions as a mechanism to maintain/enable raised self-esteem and self-integrity, 
above.                 
 
The creation of the Other as discursively performed by participants was achieved 
multidirectional, levelled at various interactions and observations of others.  Firstly, 
and most prominently, a comparison was constructed, a distinction between those 
living with psychotic experiences and those associated with the meta/grand narratives.  
The insistence that it is only through the lived experience (Emergence of Expertise, 
Category Entitlement - chapter 4) that you can truly understand, appreciate or 
meaningfully support someone with psychotic experiences places those with said 
experiences, peers, in an expert role permitting the application of a Comparison Class 
whereby:   
   
“an expert’ is a triadic predicate… a three‐part relationship between a knower, a 
subject and a comparison class. To say that a subject S is an expert on a subject O is 
to say that s has an ability and/or level of knowledge concerning O that is 
significantly greater than a comparison class K.”  
(Ben and Smit, 2017, p640).    
 
  
Ben and Smit make this observation under the umbrella of Social Constructionism:  
“This indelible reference to a comparison class implies that there is an essentially 
social dimension to expertise”. (p640).    
Therefore,’ Subject O’, in line with constructed identity, becomes the unique, 
individualised, internal world of the knower, the ultimate source of truth and 
knowledge.  This is reminiscent of Socrates dictum; ‘Know thyself’ a principle that 
remains socially influential, commonly regarded in people’s lives (Green, 2018).  It is 
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applicable to personal development, self-improvement (morally and spiritually) “an 
early sign of the individual breaking away from his full participation and absorption 
in the divine order” (Reiss, 1985, p355).  The expertise that is being offered by 
participants, constructed on the basis of self-knowledge, responsibility toward oneself 
involving choice and diversity, is an expertise frequently applied, pitched against 
expertise afforded to traditionally held, authoritative powers.  
  
Examples of changes that have taken place over the last few decades, ones which have 
refocused the concept of expertise (at least at the discursive level) within/throughout 
traditional professional groups can be found in the worlds of journalism and medicine.  
Journalism has been observed to have made a significant ‘move away’ from one of its 
essential criteria of reporting – that of objectivity - described by Bolger et al (2016) 
as: “(1) relying on external sources and (2) excluding personal views and values by 
avoiding the use of subjective language.” (p6) Participatory journalism, whereby 
personal experience and first hand witnessing is increasingly relied upon; where “a 
true account of reality can be presented” on the bases of objectivity, is now 
overridden by an assumption: “that the audience would, for instance, have a 
preference for personal, trivial or sensational topics and take up a subjective, 
emotional style” brings into focus public discourses that are considered incompatible 
with a ‘journalism’ that was ideally “depersonalized and rationalized” (Bolger et al, 
2016, p2)  There is also growing recognition of the ‘expert patient’ whose subjective 
experience of illness, distress, discomfort and reporting of symptoms is acknowledged 
as a major factor in clinical decision making and self-management of various health 
conditions (Xiao, 2015).  The rise of the expert patient has provided impetus for self-
experience - the subjective - to influence, orientate, direct what was once dominated 
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by a unidirectional decision-making process when a clinician and/or allied health 
professional would prescribe, advise, instruct the patient in ‘health behaviours.’      
 
The change in journalist and health professional practices demonstrates standardised 
recognition of various forms of expertise and knowledge, found in participant 
discourses, reflecting a culture that now legitimises personalised, individualised (lay) 
discourse that often challenges and is at variance with traditional authoritative 
expertise (Koschack et al, 2015).  That is not to say that ‘professionally qualified’ 
scientific based expertise has minimalised its influence or become irrelevant (in fact 
Cook et al 2004 and Kerr et al, 2007 make a case that the status quo remains) but that 
there is evidence of public re-evaluation of competing sources of expertise based on 
trustworthiness (see for example scientific evidence vs experiential knowledge; 
Koschack et al, 2015).  An emergence of public mistrust and scepticism toward 
professionally qualified accounts and witness to events constitute discourses that 
amalgamate meta-discursive features (Ribeiro, 2010). For example, Kerr et al (2007) 
present that a hybridisation of lay person (lived experience) and expert (rationalised, 
science based) knowledge is now established providing opportunities to construct 
corroborative statements (blending both sources of knowledge) that lend more 
credibility to accounts or narratives advantageous to a cause or world view, shaped to 
gain maximum influence on public discourse and by extension public responses to 
psychotic experiences.  Knowledge sources involving hybridisation appeared in 
participant discourse eg; acts of corroboration (Figure 2, Chapter 4) and Petitioning 
(4.13.3).  However, the central point to be made here is that variances that transpire 
with this hybridisation of knowledge lie with emphasises on either side of the expert 
continuum, within/throughout interpretative communities (Johnstone, 2004; Scher and 
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Kozlowska, 2018).  It is this hybridisation as an impetus to address the structural 
power that maintains the meta/grand narrative that participant’s overlook or neglect.  
 
It is obvious that participant orientation toward normalisation and universal 
acceptance of the psychotic experience reflects wider social trends where defence of 
the individual at political and communal levels has become centre stage (O’Flynn, 
2013; Queiroz, 2018).  Defence of the individual fits hand in glove with ‘modern day’ 
social movements.  By way of example, Fuchs (2006) identifies several dynamics 
during the emergence of a social movement, one of which is ‘internalism’. Here, 
under the guise of individualism, agency, autonomy, and, as presented in participant 
discourse, the right to choose one’s own pathway toward wellbeing and meaning 
making is asserted. Though participant positioning is fixed to the individual (Expert 
by Experience), discursive acts indicate ‘collective intentionality’ (Fitzpatrick, 2003) 
as specified in their orientated discourse, vis-a-vis desire for social change.  The 
necessary steps (as I have already alluded), to create social change such as direct-
action involving protest and verbal interaction with the general public is lacking.  
However, that is not to say that a social movement cannot be identified among the 
participant cohort, but rather their discursive acts indicate wider social trends where 
collective intentionality exists in the absence of direct action (Fitzpatrick, 2003).   
Social movement theory takes account of collective intentionality broadening 
possibilities and consequences of interpretative strategies.  Interpretative strategies are 
found within and throughout participant discourse and as I present below reveal an 
interpretative community with potential for affirmative acts to achieve the social 
change in favour of the psychotic experience that participants aspire. 
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Below I present conditions where affirmative acts may be realised, and the social 
change participants orientate toward/desire might take hold.   
 
 
5.4.1 The interpretative community and potential for collective 
action  
Fish, (1989) describes an interpretative community as:  “not so much a group of 
individuals who shared a point of view, but a point of view or way of organizing 
experience” (as cited by Scher and Kozlowska, 2018; p88)  An interpretative 
community is ‘marked’ not by a specific meaning attached to a stable, consensual, 
harmonized, consolidated world view but in its interpretative strategy which is “not 
natural or universal, but learned” (Fish, 1976, p484).  The strategy adopted (learned) 
by an interpretative community involves a particular way of reading (and 
shaping/reshaping) text consisting of cultural assumptions where “opposing positions 
(are) made possible” (Fish, 2010, p. Inserted italics in brackets mine.).  A claim to 
expertise premised on the subjective, first person narrative creates a distinction  
(opposition) to an objectified version or representation of behaviours and experience.  
The territory staked by research participants (and others with psychotic experiences – 
see for example Thornhill et al, 2004; Jacob, 2015); the strategy employed, is one of 
ownership (through Category Entitlement), where the personal narrative, first-hand, 
lived experience is believed to trump other versions or accounts; in particular sources 
that judge ‘from a distance’.   Ownership involves the authentication of 
individualised, personalised knowledge centred on the internal experience where 
“meaning is in the eye of the beholder” where “interpretation must achieve not 
reference” (Díaz, 2001) ie; those who ‘possess’, live with the psychotic experience 
are in the most advantageous position to judge and place value upon it.  An example 
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of the individualised, internalised expert narratives as staked by participants in a 
broader, public discourse comes from the recent referendum on abortion in Ireland 
where the ‘successful’ camp won public opinion with a discourse of ownership and 
personal trust in the subjective through an appeal to women ‘knowing their own 
bodies’.  This, in contrast to the ‘Right to Life’ of the unborn, whose subjective 
experience could not be directly expressed or represented.     
 
For an interpretative community to achieve public sympathy, to gain maximum 
traction over public narratives, a strategy to gain legitimacy for truth(s) over another is 
required.  Participants are aware of the objective power of the meta/grand narratives.  
A major part of their strategy is to appeal through an ‘experience-oriented’ society 
(Groot, 2017) where subjectivity is crossed with ownership of named experiences 
creating a higher truth claim.  Ownership, of an experience(s), as in the case of this 
study lends legitimacy; authenticates a version of truth enabling a strategy involving 
moral positioning which participants have taken up in order to mark themselves 
distinctive (superior) from those allied with the meta/grand narratives.  
    
The strategy deployed by the interpretative community constituting research 
participant’s positioning is achieved through the subjective, engaging the vertical 
dimension implicating status of expert persons or professional groups (Locke, 2003) 
upsetting a balance of power, achieving a sense of superiority through morals and 
(normative) ethics that are established, publicly agreeable.  Unlike ethics applicable to 
professional groups constituting a set of standards to guide decision making and 
practices (see for example Keohn, 1994; Knapp and VandeCreek, 2012), morals are 
contingent upon personal beliefs, principles influenced by culture, personal history; 
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reflective of ongoing social appraisal of behaviours, conduct and character (Cohen 
and Morse, 2014).  The Social Comparison constructed by participants is made 
through an appeal to the right of the individual involving morals that are steeped in a 
rights-based approach, commonly deliberated and aspired throughout Western, 
industrialised societies such as member states of the EU, including Ireland, the site of 
this study (Manners, 2008).  These included the individual right to religious (spiritual) 
beliefs, expression and opinion (expert by experience, self-knowledge and alternate 
realities); the right to autonomy, to equality, inclusion, community participation.  This 
is in contrast with those practicing under the meta/grand narratives who are often 
positioned as ill-informed, aggressive in their opinion of/over others, as inhumane, 
unable or unwilling to consider the effects of the treatment models they apply to 
people living with psychotic experiences.  There are strong, substantive confirmations 
that the primary focus of those working under the meta/grand narratives is to compel 
treatments and interventions at the behest of individual rights, participation and social 
justice (Thomas and Longden, 2013; Sweeny et al, 2015; Lewis, 2009; Lewis and 
Callard, 2017).  There is certainly evidence that this is the case where social control 
remains a primary concern and consequence of public mental health services, where:  
 
“Anticipated discrimination influencing patients’ views of their experiences, negative  
 
experienced discrimination in many domains of life might be related to prior coercive 
mental health service intervention.”   
(Thornicroft et al, 2009)  
  
This demotes ethics that are applied in justifying practices under the auspices of the 
meta/grand narratives.   Due to the social status afforded to professionally qualified 
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groups associated with the meta/grand narratives (in particular psychology and 
psychiatry) participants have constructed a moral superiority through a normative, 
virtuous ethics.  Virtuous/normative ethics focus on personal choice, behaviours, 
emotions, motivations to action that reflect individual character (Gardiner, 2003).   
These are often embodied throughout social, communal settings, culturally 
established.  This is in contrast to a formalised ethics that is deliberated/decided by an 
elite group of ‘qualified’ experts, establishing standards of conduct involving ‘duties 
and rules’ (Manners, 2008) rationalised through projected probabilities of the 
consequence of interventions.  Such ethics are risk aversive, closing off opportunities 
to explore interventions beyond traditional practice, regularly denying psychiatric 
populations rights enjoyed by normal populations such as autonomy, social justice and 
freedom of thought (Thomas and Longden, 2013).  ‘Alternative practices’ to mental 
health such as shamanism do not factor in an objective, scientific, evidence based 
world as idealised by the meta/grand narratives (see chapter 3); elevated projections of 
risk inhibit, rationalise, attach a reasonableness to practices that may be seen by others 
to threaten human rights.  A question arises however: can this claim to moral authority 
and claimed expertise that participants and similar others stake be transferred or 
benefit others who share the psychotic experience?  This is significant given 
participant’s orientation toward social change (ie; universal acceptance of the 
psychotic experience) and the obvious need for social action if this is to be achieved.    
 
   
 5.5  Can self-knowledge benefit others?  
The privileged position that self-knowledge creates enables those with lived 
experience to subvert, substitute or emulate that which is staked by groups of mental 
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health professionals described above, yet is there any social advantage to this ‘staked 
expertise?’ ie; can this transfer onto similar others, or to put it another way peers? 
Although participants described events and accounts of ‘alternative practices’ 
(Shamanism; Holotropic Breathwork etc) they did not expand into the context where 
peer support could/should be readily offered, easily accessed.   Studies into the 
efficacy of peer support delivered within statutory mental health systems may help 
point to the potential to develop systems, services or communities where this source 
of knowledge may benefit others who find themselves faced with similar life 
experiences.  Such studies have had mixed results.   
  
 A systemic review of research on peer support conducted by Repper and Carter 
(2011) found that mental health service users benefited from this service with regards 
declined social isolation and stigmatisation.  The primary impact was observed to be a 
reduction in hospital admissions - similar to that found by Valenstein and Pfeiffer 
(2018) in a randomised control trial involving 441 mental health service users 
engaged in six Crisis Resolution Teams across the UK.  Although findings were 
favourable in the Valenstein and Pfeiffer (2018) study the authors highlighted the 
need for clarity as to the specific components, active or crucial elements, that led to 
the success of the intervention.  Studies on peer support, specifically delivered as part 
of statutory mental health services, indicate the complexity involved in peer support 
services, particularly interpersonal processes.    
  
 
 Applying Theory Construct and Content Analysis methodology to the concept of peer 
support within (general) health care settings Dennis (2003) raises a number of adverse 
outcomes that have been found in a number of studies, namely: “incorporate conflict, 
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criticism, failed social attempts, emotional over-involvement resulting in contagion 
stress, reinforcement of poor behaviors, diminished feelings of self-efficacy, lack of 
stability” (p328)  Whilst these findings may appear to have no bearing on this 
particular study, I argue that potential negative consequences to providing or offering 
peer support (as outlined) may threaten willingness for those claiming or positioning 
themselves as experts by experience to come forward and transfer knowledge, act as a 
guide or mentor to others who find themselves distressed and in similar circumstances 
to that which they experienced themselves.  Secondly, in constructing an identity 
through positioning as an expert based on unique, individualised, internalised 
experiences (vis-à-vis expert-by-experience) solely based on the lived experience 
leaving others to recognise, nurture, take responsibility for their own expertise (or you 
will “diminish yourself”, participant 3, 4.13), falls into the category of an expertise 
that is socially constructed and not one that is based on realism (knowledge that is out 
there, theoretical or practical, Ben and Smit, 2017).  To put it another way, practices 
such as shamanism and holotropic breathing have not been tested in accordance with 
the same standards of scientific enquiry to ascertain its efficacy as the public might 
expect.  It is therefore not knowledge that is transferable, but a philosophy, a way of 
living in the world that is encouraged, enabled, through choice and personal 
responsibility.  This ‘philosophy of living’ harks back to the Greek proverb: 
‘Physician heal thyself’, where self-regulatory behaviours, projected by a self-
authoritative and self-knowing conscience for the purposes of achieving self-healing 
is encouraged; where one should tend to one's own personal challenges rather than 
criticizing or advising how others address theirs (Hirsch et al, 2002).  However, the 
issue of averting communal/social dialogue around the psychotic experience (the 
aversion of collective action, 4.11) is amplified here and remains problematic, 
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somewhat disenfranchising claims to high moral/ethical standards as publicly 
warranted. Transfer of knowledge, experience and moral fortitude in order to support 
others in similar times of need also becomes problematic as it cannot be achieved.     
  
To summarise this section, responsibility, as directed at/expected of professional 
groups associated with the meta/grand narratives; in particular those with public 
responsibility for mental health, does not apply to this interpretative community who 
might offer their expertise for the benefit of others, yet through discursive means, by 
referencing certain cultural ‘normativisms’, (democratic practices eg; choice and 
personal agency) detract responsibility toward others.  This echoes elements of 
personal responsibility or self-determination seen as a cornerstone of ‘Recovery’ from 
mental health problems, evidenced in numbers of accounts written by persons who 
have declared ‘recovered’ from psychosis (eg; Deegan, 1993; Bassman, 2007).  
Problems as to how, why and in what circumstances this expertise can be applied for 
the benefit of others struggling with challenges that arise from psychotic experiences 
remains.      
        
5.6  Within or without a social movement for those with 
psychotic experiences?  
The issue at stake here is the claim to an expertise that aims to dislocate traditionally 
established professionalism, standards of knowledge, authoritative power whilst 
remaining silent on the issue at stake (the latter three sources charged with side 
stepping, ignoring or dislodging democratic ideals and human rights).  Participant 
orientation toward social acceptance of, normalising/humanising the psychotic 
experience while maintaining public silence confounds features of responsibility 
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attached to offering knowledge, expertise, supports that similar others could benefit 
from - specifically reaching out to those with the psychotic experience and creating 
meaningful social change.   
  
Taylor and Whittier (1992) in assessing how informal networks and collective 
identities lead to collective action, emphasise the significance of “strong bonds as the 
basic building blocks of social movements” (p169).   Van Dyke et al (2004) identify 
two primary strategies/routes in pursuing social change, activated by social 
movements - 1. targeting government, the state and its institutions or 2. changing 
public opinion, identities and cultural practices.  They note that all of the movements 
they studied (4,654 in total over an eight-year period) involved, to a lesser or greater 
degree strategy number 1.  Those with a Civil Rights agenda (eg; gay/lesbian and 
Women’s groups) focused strategy number 2 targeting public opinion, challenging 
cultural practices, enhancing identities stereotypically represented in public 
discourses.  Given participant positioning that appealed to civic, commonly held 
criterion of morals/ethics; the linguistic efforts in defending the subjective world that 
is the psychotic experience, of maintaining a universalism and positivity toward the 
psychotic experience, it would appear that participants primarily orientate toward 
strategy number 2 with linguistic efforts levelled at public opinion and cultural 
practices through an activation of Civil and democratic Rights based on individual 
entitlements.  However, they do not take the practical steps to address structural 
power that maintains social perceptions and responses toward the psychotic 
experience.  I explore below why this might be so.    
 
 
  260  
5.7  A New Age or maintenance of old structures of 
power?  
Data revealed participant beliefs that their unique experiences and world views were 
of universal importance.  There is a comparison here to a counterculture of spiritual or 
religious dimensions, akin to a post traditional or secular 'revolution’ described by  
Houtman and Aupers (2008) as: “an offshoot of the tradition of Western esotericism” 
(p101).  Houtman and Aupers (2008) add that spirituality has become increasingly 
privatised, individualised involving “processes of socialisation through which people 
come to adopt a spiritual discourse about the self and the role played by problems of 
meaning and identity in making people amenable to such a discourse.”  (p117).  The 
problems of meaning and identity “the declining grip of external and authoritative 
sources of meaning and identity robs late-modern individuals of the protective cloak 
of ‘pre-given’ meaning and identity and throws them back upon themselves in dealing 
with their ‘precarious freedoms” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1992: 16; as cited by  
Houtman and Aupers, 2008, p112).  Because it is ultimately only one’s internal 
experiences made up of feelings, cognitions, imaginings and intuitions that remain 
sources to conjure answers to those questions, “a shift of authority: from “without” to 
“within”’ (Heelas, 1995: 2, as cited by Houtman and Aupers, 2008, p112) 
“the loss of the protective cloak of ‘pre-given’ meaning and identity creates tensions 
and anxieties” (p113).  With a growing scepticism, rejection, diminishing faith in 
institutional religion and with it a void created due to declining external interpretative 
and explanatory sources of meaning and authority it is understandable that people 
with experiences (the psychotic experience), particularly those when first encountered 
lack social reference and would turn to the very source where the experience itself 
takes place.  Under conditions where the psychotic experience remains an internalised 
 
  261  
event because of stigma, discrimination and public ignorance, explanation and any 
(psychological or emotional) resolution required or sought is difficult to achieve 
because disclosure becomes risky, disjointed and dislocated.  To achieve resolutions 
to alienation, shame or bewilderment encountered, there would be a requirement to 
attach the psychotic experience to an external source, one that the public can relate to, 
accepts as part of social and cultural reality.  Groot (2017) points to the current social 
environment where the exceptional, the distinguished is embraced:   
 
“this rational climate does favour the experience of the extraordinary, the attribution 
of special gifts and the feeling of being lifted up from everyday life. The appreciation 
of special experiences responds perfectly to the discontent with the dominant Western 
worldview.” (p3).  
  
It may appear that the social environment favours the performative acts, the discursive 
objectives of participants, their orientation as presented in chapter 4 as per 
normalising the psychotic experience, yet, the desired consequences as aspired by 
those belonging to this interpretative community identified vis a vis; attempts to 
establish counter discourses, may have the converse effect and work to satisfy and 
maintain a materialism and rationality that they are trying to unravel. Even though a 
world of holistic dimensions was accounted for - spirituality, mind, body (eg; 
Embodied text, 4.17), – put forward to bring about changes to how the psychotic 
experience is interpreted, spoken about, responded to, facilitated; reconciling these 
worlds is incredibly difficult in Western Societies where an “instrumental rationality” 
(O’Neill et al., 2014), an objectively reasoned version of reality securely attached to a 
materialism that requires quantifiable accounts of social life dominates.  Groot (2017) 
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describes one of the major obstacles facing communities that offer counter discourses 
to a culture dominated by materialism – that of assimilation:   
“During the 1960s, beatniks and hippies embraced spirituality, nature and  
authenticity in what seemed like a rebellious response to mainstream culture. At the 
end of the twentieth century, their notions became a crucial part of consumerism. The 
discomfort with rational Western culture is now supplemented with a romantic 
counterculture that has gone mainstream” (p3)  
  
What Groot refers to is the ease at which a rational, materialist, consumer driven 
society can draw upon/adapt counter discourses as part of its overall governance and 
command structures: “This is why advertisements for commercial products, such as 
beer and shampoo, sometimes refer to magic and the mystical, why foods and 
lifestyles promise access to nature and the authentic self and why celebrities are 
popular”. (Groot, 2017, p3).  This points to a culture dominated by a materialism that 
is parasitic upon discourses that begin at the periphery, becomes fashionable, that 
appeals to a new way of seeing or experiencing the world, that has the potential to 
reshape the individual, yet taken up by other forces and used for its own purpose – 
consumerism.  Individual profiling required to satisfy market forces becomes part of 
the process of identity formation; part of an “All-integrating and unchallenged 
coherence” (Blühdorn, 2006, p29).  This brings us to the problem of mind-body 
dualism as per chapter 4 where a common dichotomy may play into the hands of the 
world view the interpretative community is resisting.      
      
As pointed out, referring Mind body dualism to resist, question or elude the 
meta/grand narratives may be futile, and merely replay discursive dichotomies that 
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have persisted for centuries.  Mind body dualism remains unresolved in Western 
society and according to various scholars may never be resolved (Qazi, 2018); its 
significance playing out in spiritual, religious and scientific realms where levels of 
influence, of material and non-material worlds are differentiated to various degrees 
depending on one’s epistemological and ontological positioning.  As stated in Chapter 
4 (4.18) dualism may become a distraction as the interpretative community engages 
levels of ontological and epistemological depths; the complex nature of which makes 
the holism constructed by participants; the reconciliation of the material and the 
immaterial unresolvable allowing those operating under the meta/grand narratives 
dominion over public discourse by having the last say, reminding the public of the 
‘hard facts’ of the private impact and social cost of psychosis and the need for 
intervention (Farrellyb, 2015; Bilić and Georgaca, 2007; Henderson, 2018).  How 
society frames connections between psychotic events, interpretations and appropriate 
responses is heavily influenced by this discourse melding risk and health enabling 
associated practices to persist.  Even though the interpretative community recognises 
the authoritative power of the meta/grand narratives, their insistence (reliance?) on 
dualism to undermine said narratives, not to mention the inverted silence, indicates 
limited awareness or lack of alternative ways of creating text about psychotic events 
beyond discursive performances that are already available.  Blühdorn (2006) citing 
Roth, (1994) observes if:   
 
“Their ‘self-perception as radically different . . . is self-deceptive if it does not take 
into account the narrow limits of its alternative components and the wide range of 
characteristics it shares with its [societal environment]’. Social movements  
‘therefore, never act outside of the imagined logic of the system” (p27).    
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The interpretative community referred here may require an enhanced reflexivity if it is  
 
to step outside/beyond the ‘imagined logic’; that which repeatedly returns to 
quantifiable, objectifiable measurements of human performance, essentially justifying 
the continuation of the meta/grand narratives and overall materialism and rationality 
that dominates Western society.  Further to this, Blühdorn (2006) describes social 
movements as having a stabilizing effect on current social systems:   
  
“by reproducing ‘the belief in the autonomous subject’ where: ‘the only societal 
movements that are possible today are movements that defend the personal Subject … 
that construct or defend … the personal rather the collective … that no longer present 
a ‘political alternative, but alterity, i.e. the desire of individuals to be different from 
the system and experience themselves as autonomous subjects.”  (p35/36)  
  
There is a paradox here, where ‘the system’ that is associated, promotes and 
participates with democracy - where health, wellbeing and prosperity; choice, 
inclusivity, individual rights, is promoted, taken up by social actors - becomes the 
very thing that regurgitates, adapts, restricts and ultimately shuts down alternative 
discourses that may lead to improved circumstances for the dispossessed (Farrelyb, 
2015).  Springer (2012) links this to the rise of neo-liberalism where “a discourse that 
encompasses material forms in state formation through policy and program, and via 
the subjectivation of individuals on the ground”  is enabled; where “the potential for 
democracy emerges from pre-existing circumstances of social relations” (Farrellyb, 
2015, p13-14) – the status quo.  As Gershon (2011) notes accepting diversity, 
promoting self-experience on an individual basis can play into the hands of neoliberal 
ideals where: “Difference is not neoliberalism’s enemy, especially not when these 
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differences can so easily be figured as homogeneous heterogeneities” (p545).  The 
interpretative community in emphasising the deeply personal/individualised yet 
universal nature of the psychotic experience (Ideological Dilemma, 4.14, chapter 4); 
the autonomous-self as per choice and personal responsibility and self-determination; 
self-healing where personal fortitude becomes a central characteristic to achieve 
recovery could be accused of corroborating neo-liberal ideals where a form of 
materialism dictated by ‘the Market’ is confirmed, restated and replayed.  Here: “A 
seeker is therefore marked by the exercise of self-authority: It is up to the seeker to 
pick and choose, combine and synthesize, his or her own journey” (Wood, 2016, p3). 
This leaves the interpretative community found here open to public criticism - of 
thoughtless, reckless and unrealistic approaches to supporting people experiencing 
‘psychotic crisis’ (publicly marked as vulnerable and at risk) allowing them to 
flounder in a complex, inconsistent and incoherent world where guidance and advice 
as per traditional conceptions of expertise is inhibited and no obvious system of 
support is put forward, tested, made readily available.  I would like to state that this is 
not my personal criticism, but one that exists, that the interpretative community would 
likely be accused of given existing systems and public concerns.      
 
In orienting a strategy of changing public opinion, identities and cultural practices the 
interpretative community identified here, implicates itself in a struggle for recognition 
of the psychotic experience; as being part of the human condition and with it raised 
awareness of various breaches of civic and human rights.  However, the very 
structures, knowledge and power base constituted by the meta/grand narratives, 
allowing associated institutions and practices to persist is not addressed.  This leaves 
those who potentially, or who are currently being ‘treated’ by the mental health 
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system (peers) vulnerable to the rights breaches as highlighted by participants.  Yet 
participants, demonstrated through the Horizontal Dimension of Social Comparison 
(5.3.4), strategically remained sympathetic toward such persons.  Cunningham and 
Savage (2015) present that:        
“Construct[ing] a narrative solely around the characteristics and problems of the 
most disadvantaged people and places … does not address how the power and 
privileges of the advantaged are organized.”  (p332)  
  
Beresford (2016), highly acclaimed academic, self-proclaimed user of mental health 
services and personal experience of the welfare system, notes the failures of 
deinstitutionalisation under neoliberalism where reduction in public expenditure was 
the primary rationale; to recent times where a constant with ‘recovery, as part of UK 
government mental health program, is diminution in long term support; to reduce 
service user dependency on state benefits moving them into employment. Regardless 
of this social reality; “we are encouraged to be ‘aspirational’, denying who we 
actually are and creating alternative fantasies, as well as to distance ourselves from 
our peers as ‘other”. (Beresford, 2016, p346).  If discourse is to change in the 
direction advocated by this interpretative community, programmes of care and 
appropriate structural arrangements may be required to avoid lessons of the past, 
ensure appropriate supports are made available to those struggling with ‘psychotic 
crisis’.  This would also be required if they are to win over a ‘concerned public’ 
(Smith-Merry, 2018). 
    
Taking up a moral position based on individual character and fortitude (‘I am doing 
better’ 5.3.4; ‘I have higher ethical standards than identified others’, 5.3.5) in line with 
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commonly understood moral norms and human decency may avert from distress that 
accompanies ‘problematic’ psychotic experiences.  Psychotic Like Experiences may 
appear benign, but the structures, the knowledge base that sustains the public 
perception of all that is associated with psychotic experiences; the level of influence 
and authoritative knowledge on public discourse, institutions and practices emanating 
from the meta/grand narratives remains intact.  I therefore contend that the discursive 
performances conducted by the interpretative community is reflective of a discourse, 
driven by an ‘economy of truth’, where the individual as an exploitative resource 
(Groot, 2017, p3) as per autonomy and agency contrived by neo-liberal ideals 
maintaining the status quo.      
 
 To conclude this section, the above may appear to have drawn a negative, futile and 
pessimistic view of the strategy adapted by this interpretative community.  However, 
there is a larger picture to be drawn here, one that may help participant orientation 
toward the normalisation and public acceptance of the psychotic experience, leading 
to the fruitfulness urged by Potter and Wetherell (2007) when applying discourse 
analysis.  The fruitfulness may lie with opportunities already identified above 
currently existing in current ‘trends’ of social discourse, found in the discursive 
performances as achieved by participants.  This would involve a corroborative 
approach which I will turn to below.  
 
 5.8  Social movements as Early warning systems  
I argue that participants for this study are part of an interpretative community, 
constituting a social movement through collective intentionality.  Strategies deployed 
by the interpretative community have been noted preserving a sense of self that 
maintains self-integrity, positioning aligned with moral norms, civic and communal 
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ideologies pertaining to principles of democracy and human rights to achieve public 
sympathy.   The strategies chosen are constituted by and reflective of a social system 
compelled by a materialism that promotes self-enhancement through neoliberal ideals; 
parasitic toward discourses that might threaten the status quo.  Through strategies 
such as opportunistic marketing, personal profiling, adapting democratic principles - 
choice, autonomy, prosperity and diversity - alternative or counter discourses are 
enveloped shaped and reshaped to satisfy these neoliberal ideals.        
         
Habermas (1981) observed social movements to be analogous to “early warning 
systems” of an established order; Luhmann (1995) as “indicators of societies 
condition”.   There are a number of frustrations, and displeasures that appear in the 
discursive performances by participants that reflect public disquiet toward the 
materialism allied with neoliberal ideals dominating society today; a level of 
dissatisfaction and discontent that provides a window into the social disconnection 
and ‘dehumanising’ effects of neoliberalism as enacted by the meta/grand narratives.   
Current conditions, as noted by Beresford (2016), encourages neoliberal governments 
forming alliances with a prevailing, expanding psychiatry and a broad public 
acceptance of ‘psych-thinking’.  Combined; “Both neoliberalism and mainstream 
psychiatry individualise responsibility and frame understanding in terms of individual 
rather than social causes and analysis.” (Beresford, 2016, p346).  The interpretative 
community identified here emphasise ownership over the psychotic experience, as an 
internal, personalised event leaving them open to similar critique ie; that they have 
limited concern of social causes and social analysis of psychotic experiences.  I have 
presented that the interpretative community have taken the responsibility of the 
individual toward their psychotic experience, their journey toward ‘recovery’ as an 
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event that should be marked with autonomy, agency, self-determination, social and 
communal acceptance.  However, against this desire for change, as highlighted 
through participant orientation, lies the meta/grand narratives through its alliance with 
neoliberal forces that act in opposition to this liberal position on psychotic experience 
- where experience is “reduced to silence by positivism” (Foucualt, 1965, p198), a 
positivism that can act in favour of social elites based on an economy of truth (Tesler, 
2018).  I describe below how those working within the meta/grand narratives can 
enhance a ‘truth’ that participants espouse and help address the structural power and 
knowledge base avoiding the inhibitions to change as outlined above.           
 
 5.9  Science, elitism and societal forces  
Tesler (2018) refers to two major historical events swayed by scientific appraisal that 
changed public opinion of groups judged deficient; socially deviant - that of race and 
sexuality.  During the 1930s scientific consensus presented that there was no 
discerning biological or genetic difference between races, and in 1974 the American 
Psychiatric Association relinquished its position that homosexuality and lesbianism 
were mental illness.  These events changed public opinion, but the impact of expert 
knowledge in the guise of the scientific community has somewhat waned since then.  
Fast forward today, Tesler (2018) analysing the impact of scientific consensus on 
climate change on public policy observes that:   
  
“science-minded elites are not the principal initiators of new partisan policies; 
interest groups, political intellectuals, and perhaps even ambitious politicians are 
more important actors…. The dynamics of public opinion formation may still be top 
down, but science-minded elites are not the top.” P323  
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Scientific ‘truths’ can therefore become truths of convenience where elite groups with 
vested interests, such as those identified by Tesler, can regulate public opinion in turn 
initiating policies that ultimately influence and justify state responses and institutions.  
The convenience for an elite operating under the meta/grand narratives is that public 
policy on mental health, including Mental Health Legislation, and ensuing 
institutional arrangements fit hand in glove with neoliberal ideals confirming and 
maintaining ‘economies of truth’.  A circularity exists where mental health legislation 
places ultimate responsibility on a ‘psych community’ in managing crisis pertaining to 
risk of/to psychotic persons (Smith-Merry, 2018); neoliberal governments have at 
their disposal an array of experts and professionals to carry out this public duty which 
the public have to a large extent accepted and ‘learnt’ to expect.  Somewhat obscured 
within the circle is the vested interest of pharmaceuticals and its relationship with 
medicine.  For decades major concerns about the efficacy of psychiatric medications, 
in particular risk to physical health and exacerbation of mental health problems has 
been raised by various academics, scholars and health practitioners (see for example 
Whitaker, 2010; Davies and Read, 2018,  Stockman et al 2018, on the addictive 
properties of anti-depressants and effects of withdrawal; of anti-psychotics; brain 
atrophy as a consequence of long-term usage of anti-psychotic medications - Breggin, 
1990; Ho et al, 2011).  Despite strong evidence that serious risks with psychiatric 
medications exists, continued reliance on and increase in prescribing persists 
(Whitaker, 2010; Ilyas and Moncrieff, 2012; Moncrieff 2010; specific to Ireland see 
thejournal.ie: ‘HSE prescriptions for antidepressants and anxiety medications up by 
two thirds since 2009’).  Worth noting is that a significant number of the various 
practitioners, scholars and academics critical of the over reliance on psychiatric 
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medications to treat psychotic ‘symptoms’ are found within the ‘psych community’ – 
namely psychiatry and to a lesser extent psychology.  This implies that a schism exists 
within the ‘psych’ groups operating under the meta/grand narratives.  Given the level 
of divergence and contradictory evidence made available by these groups, questions 
on the presentation of evidence, the weight each source is given in influencing 
national policies and guidelines (in turn having direct impact on practice and 
institutions), requires highlighting.  In reviewing NICE guidelines on the diagnoses 
and management of Depression (NICE, 2009) and ADHD (NICE, 2008) Moncrieff 
and Timimi (2010) highlight lack of critical analysis of the validity of both diagnoses 
and recommended treatment. Taylor and Perera (2015) highlight issues regards 
evidence and recommended interventions as appears in NICE guidelines (2014) for 
the treatment and management of psychosis.  They make the point that CBT is over 
promoted; “as a panacea”; “beyond the evidence” and that recommendations on 
prescribing anti-psychotic medications are “nonspecific and vague”.   Moncrieff and 
Timimi (2013); Taylor and Perera (2015) for different reasons are concerned about the 
political implications of these national guidelines.   Specifically, Moncrieff and 
Timimi describe guideline formations involving selection and interpretation of data as 
a process that favours, “the symbiosis between power and knowledge”; that is 
convenient, technologically driven vis-à-vis governed by medicine and diagnoses.  
The process ignored opposing evidence, closed down alternative solutions, whilst 
giving the impression of consensus in reaching conclusions and recommendations.  
Moncrieff and Timimi (2013) determine that “The medical profession and the 
pharmaceutical industry obviously benefit, but patients and parents have also been 
instrumental in the medicalisation of ADHD in particular” adding that: “Some of the 
authors of both guidelines considered here have declared financial conflicts of 
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interest involving various drug companies, in common with authors of other clinical 
guidelines” (p69).  This points to privileged knowledge, adapted and applied by select 
individuals to maintain a narrative to their advantage, knowledge as noted by 
Moncrieff and Timimi that permeates public conscience and behaviours – their 
example, family and patients.  Moncrieff et al (2005) comment that the relationship 
between Psychiatry and the pharmaceutical industry meets: “commercial rather than 
clinical or scientific demands’ leading to ‘the popularity of developing cheaper ‘me 
too’ options” (p84).  Marcia Angell, former Editor in Chief of one of the most 
prestigious internationally renowned medical journals for over 20 years - The New 
England Journal of Medicine - is more specific when she writes:   
 
“Breaking the dependence of the medical profession on the pharmaceutical industry 
will take more than appointing committees and other gestures. It will take a sharp 
break from an extremely lucrative pattern of behaviour. But if the medical profession 
does not put an end to this corruption voluntarily, it will lose the confidence of the 
public, and the government” (Angell, 2009).     
  
From the comments, observations, concerns made above there may arise potential to 
develop a ‘counter narrative’ to the meta/grand narratives; one that supports 
participant orientation of humanising the psychotic experience, addressing some of 
the structural power, part of an overarching governance structure within neo-liberal 
ideology.  Firstly, professional groups operating under the meta/grand narratives are 
themselves divided on the validity and value of scientific evidence, of the merits of 
the technological model of mental health it represents and spawns.  Main concerns 
from the various scholars, practitioners, researchers referred to above centre around 
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practices and institutional care that threaten and inhibit civic and human rights of 
persons identified as ‘having’ psychosis; concerns (buoyed up by mounting evidence 
and rational argument), about the threat to health in prescribing psychiatric 
medications.  Those who provide the knowledge and language of critique disturb the 
status-quo; opening up possibilities for a holistic rights-based approach to mental 
health, an approach that challenges the monopoly commanded by a ‘psych-elite’, in 
particular those with vested interests (Koppl, 2010).  The message put forward by 
critics, the discursive acts applied correspond the same standards of logic and rational 
argument, employing the same ‘scientific apparatus’ essential for the continued 
dominance of the meta/grand narratives.   In other words, strategies toward economies 
of truth, the tools of science and rational argument organised to maintain the 
meta/grand narratives are now inverted.  The growing number of ‘expert’ critics of the 
meta/grand narrative points to a model under threat (Kuhn, 1962); one that may no 
longer find indiscriminate acceptance in a society whose values are shifting, where the 
traditional concept of expertise is being challenged (above).      
 
Secondly, there is growing evidence of a cynical public increasingly 
questioning/challenging the credibility and value of scientific enquiry, in particular 
scientific knowledge utilised to steer individual morals (Cho and Relman, 2010) and 
lifestyle choices (Hobson, 2002).  These are increasingly “viewed as a bureaucratic 
tool” (Seale and Fulkerson, 2015) implying a “society-science distance” (Bauer, 
2009; Moran, 2013).  Additional, according to Coleman (2013) is a growing “distaste 
for fundamentalist certainty” (as cited by Doona, 2016) that has developed alongside 
modernity pointing to a public erring in the direction of pluralism.  This illustrates a 
civic disposition, reflected in participant discourses, toward the protection of 
individual rights and diversity; valued and defended with minimum interference from 
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authoritative sources.  The level of public cynicism toward science and resistance 
against efforts to impose certainty or conclude an individual’s identity (labelling and 
categorising) brings us back to Habermas and Luhmann above who describe social 
movements in terms of ‘early warning systems’; ‘indicators of societies condition’.   I 
put it that the interpretative community identified here, their positioning through 
Category Entitlement, their orientation (or collective intentionality) toward acceptance 
of the psychotic experience, (primarily though democratic principles) is reflective of 
wider social trends constituting attitudes toward traditional expertise and authoritative 
sources.   
   
5.10 From disclosure to social action  
Similar to the above, I contend that the discourse generated by the interpretative 
community as represented in the findings reflects a broader, social condition of 
underlying discontentment toward authoritative sources that threaten an individual’s 
right to define and redefine oneself, to express oneself, make lifestyle choices and 
determine moral imperatives.  Even though a personalised, individualised expertise 
based on internalised first-person experience is itself a form of resistance, of 
preserving a preferred sense of self inhibiting others to question, define or claim to 
represent the reality therein the social distance created may itself inhibit necessary 
shifting of discourse into an advantageous communal space.   Considering concerns 
raised by the ‘expert’ critics operating within the meta/grand narratives above, issues 
that have arisen from discourses created by participants (identified as part of an 
interpretative community) and an underlying public disquiet and discontentment with 
authoritative sources that infringe upon individual freedoms, conditions for  
‘communicative action’ (Habermas, 1987), may have arisen.    
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Communicative action involves dialogue between persons/groups strategically 
invested in life worlds that can be morally and ethically challenging, of relational 
importance requiring contemplation, reflection and resolution at communal level.  The 
lifeworld referred extends beyond the lived experience expressed through a wholly 
internalised, enclosed subjectivity (as expressed by participants, reflective of a general 
social disposition illustrated by for example participatory journalism above), to an 
intersubjective arena where the context of lives lived takes centre stage.  In this 
communal space the otherness created is dissolved through communicative action 
initiating a deliberative process where individuals interact and coordinate action 
seeking consensus in interpretation and shared rationality of the situation.  Although 
the interpretative community identified in this thesis resists rational objective 
scientific enquiry, particularly that which interferes in areas of human endeavour such 
as autonomy, morality and personal identity, a corresponding rationality appears in 
their discourse.  Their rationality shows up in their discursive performances, 
consciously and deliberately acted out with purposive intent ie; to protect individual 
integrity by referring to normative values. Moving the enclosed subjectivity into a 
dialogical space may for participants risk exposure to scrutiny questioning the 
integrity of a truth claim, but subjectivity in and of itself may not be able to make a 
significant shift in the way the public interprets, responds and talks about psychotic 
experiences.  I contend that in order to shift the direction of discourse in favour of the 
psychotic experience as desired through participant discourse orientation, the 
interpretative community is required to find a way of ‘letting the public in’, 
forestalling the silence that participants enact in their discursive accounts, whilst 
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making allowances for a rationality and objectivity that engages civic concerns such 
as health and safety.   
 
An added dimension of Communicative Action, Reflective disclosure, is proposed by 
Kompridis (2005).  Reflective disclosure consummates social criticism initiating 
practices and circumstances where imagination and articulation of meaningful 
alternatives to current social and political conditions, by “acting back on their 
conditions of intelligibility”.  The intelligibility and acting back referred to here 
requires a reflexivity of openness, transparency and acceptance of the challenges, 
limitations and drawbacks to the positioning taken up by the interpretative community 
(in this instance participants with PLES). The interpretative community implicates a 
measurement, a standard of (moral and social) truth, hinged upon an internalised, 
personalised reality (Expert by Experience).  Moran (2013) argues that Truth has 
social capital, whereas Wrennn (2017) shows that Truth has no actual intrinsic value 
described as: “the value something has in itself and apart from its 
relationship to anything else.” (p108).  In effect Truth is ‘intrinsically neutral’, 
something the interpretative community needs to be aware of, its significance 
discussed below.    
  
5.11 The truth is ‘out there’  
Wrenn, is particularly cynical toward Truths attached to personal beliefs.  Truth is 
what we make it, is often convenient and what-ever ‘the Truth’ really is, a claim to 
truth often depends on what is acceptable, for whom and for what purpose.  Presenting 
truth through the application/reliance upon autobiographical realities, as defended by 
the interpretative community, is in danger of ending in a number of ‘Truth 
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inversions’.  As I see it, there are two challenges to the source and standard of 
achieving truth claims as applied by the interpretative community.  Firstly, a truth that 
necessitates, is heavily dependent on personalised subjectivities, confirmed through 
the source itself, becomes a mere reflection of the individual, with limited vision 
beyond itself, potentially having little social consequence.  Neoliberalism as already 
presented is invested in and parasitic toward such autobiographies.  The source of 
truth in the case of an over reliance of the subjective world initiating self-seeking; 
self-affirming beliefs and behaviours is the very thing that feeds a rational, neoliberal 
system which the interpretative community is trying to avoid.  Secondly, truth centred 
on personalised subjectivity allows others to present alternative or counter truths 
about personal experience of psychotic experiences by applying the same standard of 
truth.  For example, those who claim through their lived experience to have positive 
experiences of mental health services and/or of anti-psychotic medications, 
corroborating the meta/grand narrative (see for example, First Person Account, 2018).  
The existence of truth inversions is nothing new and probably not surprising given 
social conditions where the march of individualism, the right to hold personal beliefs 
and increased opportunity for self-expression has expanded.  However, if the 
interpretative community continue with a strategy that orientates toward changing 
public discourse, associated interpretations and responses toward psychotic 
experiences, the ambiguity and inconsistency that arises from their positioning, 
culminating in truth inversions would leave a noticeable knowledge gap and scupper 
their strategic intentions.   
 
Wrenn (2004) presents that in order for a belief (version of truth) to become accepted, 
it would need to become a “candidate for knowledge” based on a hypothetical and 
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categorial “Epistemic Normativity”.  Wrenn describes Epistemic Normativity in terms 
of that which: “arises from the causal connections between cognitive means and 
epistemic ends”.  In context of this study, internal representation of reality, privileged  
and defended by this interpretative community, reflective of a wider social disposition  
(epistemological internalism) would be required at some level to match or reflect 
external representation (epistemological externalism) if it is to become a candidate for 
credible knowledge (Wrenn, 2004).  Moran (2000) shows that experience “presents 
itself as the experience of engaging directly with the world” and that “Subjectivity 
must be understood as inextricably involved in the process of constituting objectivity 
… objectivity for subjectivity” (p15).  In other words, subjectivity has its eye on a 
rational objectivity, is able to influence and shape objective measures (and 
presumably its outcomes) by referencing subjectivity through feedback derived from 
social reality - that is the lived experience, the life world.  In order for a truth (ie; that 
psychotic experiences is part of the human condition) to be accepted as socially 
valuable and achieve social purchase a level of correspondence between the subjective 
and objective material world would be required.    
 
 5.11.1  From truth to a responsible communal response  
Here, it is worth pointing out that it is not the psychotic experience that is questioned,  
confirmed/reconfirmed as a form of reality, but the belief (corroborated above) that 
the psychotic experience is excluded from what is deemed normal human experience 
and therefore those who live with/or have lived with the experience are subject to (or 
at least risk of being subject to) misuse and neglect of human and civic rights as raised 
by the interpretative community.  For the interpretative community to elevate its truth 
claim the social reality as described could be confirmed and corroborated through 
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rational argument and reporting as presented by the ‘expert critical voices’ working 
under the meta/grand narratives as referenced above.  The risk, as the interpretative 
community may be conscious of, is that the current preference for personal, trivial or 
sensationalism, of a subjective, emotional style of reporting may lead to an 
inquisitive, intrusive public leading to questions as per health and safety concerns, of 
biological and genetic influences over their psychotic experiences pertaining to urges 
and behaviours.  I suggest the interpretative community would prefer to avoid such 
questions, hence their tendency to remain silent.  Worth noting though is that social 
movements such as feminism, of gay and lesbianism, of the black movement have 
tended to maintain a public discourse that has focused on issues of equality and social 
inclusion.  The public are to an extent deterred or discouraged from asking such 
questions around genetic and biological influences on being a woman, to being gay or 
lesbian, to being born black.  These questions have become somewhat obsolete or 
irrelevant as issues of inequality and social exclusion take precedence. The 
interpretative community would do well to learn from any advances made by such 
groups (though I acknowledge continuing struggles experienced by these groups).  
That said, issues of health and safety, of the ability of managing psychotic experiences 
and potential for intervention will most likely remain.  This is perhaps where the 
greatest risk to allowing a public in to the ‘privatised/hidden’ lives of the 
interpretative community, but one I contend worth taking.  
I would add that the interpretative community may consider the likelihood that there  
 
will always be some people with psychotic experiences of such a severe and complex 
nature that they require intervention from state bodies, facilitated by legislation.  The 
case for this likelihood is amplified as part of modernisation.  The potential for such 
interventions requires dialogue at various levels, within and beyond groups involved 
 
  280  
in communicative action and reflective disclosure.  Communication and communal 
engagement is essential, led by authentic and genuine communal concern for the 
individual where a risk discourse that expresses: “outrage at behavior deemed 
socially unacceptable, thereby exerting control over the body politic as well as the 
body corporeal.” (Lupton, 1993, p425) is resisted.  Where state sanctioned 
intervention may be warranted Open Dialogue (2.21, Chapter 3) as facilitating the 
necessary communicative space during ‘psychotic crisis’ may provide some of the 
answers.  The caring process should also consider a Moral Imagination that can 
facilitate the shared subjectivity and life world of all involved.  The level of 
reflexivity put forward requires recognition of forces of socialization and amendments 
to certain social structures that impede a humane and compassionate response to 
psychotic experiences.  One that enables shared responsibility in creating meaning 





  281  
6. Chapter 6 – Conclusion  
 6.1  Implications for individuals    
At a personal level, participants, through deployment of repertoires and acts of 
positioning - specifically othering and social comparison -elevated and maintained 
self-integrity and a preferred self.   Othering created a superiority between those with 
psychotic experiences and professional groups operating under the meta/grand 
narratives by claiming an expertise through category entitlement based solely on self-
experience and an appeal to normative ethics.  The expertise staked through an 
individualised, personalised reality where the ‘beholder’ becomes the ultimate judge 
and arbitrator of psychotic experiences formed a layer of protectionism for the 
individual.  Under these conditions self-experience becomes sacrosanct, never to be 
questioned.  Normative ethics is described in terms of public understandings of right 
and wrong, in this case commonly understood morals pertaining to civic and human 
rights.  Participants aligned themselves with the aforementioned normative ethics 
pitching themselves against an ethics created by an exclusive, elite group of 
professionals (the psych community) operating under the meta/grand narratives.  The 
call to normative ethics allowed participants to claim superiority against an ‘expert 
group’ through an appeal to higher ethical standards, ones that the public can relate to.  
By way of example, participants valued and upheld autonomy, equality and social 
inclusion as part of their individual moral frame when interacting with others, a moral 
frame that should apply to those with psychotic experiences.  Conversely, those 
operating under the meta/grand narratives were charged with imposing interventions, 
practices and identities upon people labelled psychotic therefore threatening and 
contravening their human and civic rights - specifically rights to inclusion, equality  
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and autonomy.  The participant group could position themselves as superior to a group 
of recognised experts (who are sanctioned to carry out ‘dehumanising’ acts) through 
higher ethical standards publicly and commonly understood and shared.  This 
positioning enabled the vertical dimension - social comparison (comparing social 
status) enhancing a sense of self through virtuous claims.     
 
A horizontal dimension was enabled (doing better or worse) through ‘subtle’ acts of 
positioning that allowed participants to maintain self-integrity and a preferred self, 
whilst avoiding social distance that would threaten their moral positioning.  Across 
the horizontal dimension reference was made to those ‘caught up in the mental health 
system’ labelled psychotic (peers?) and comparisons made between participants with 
all others who have not lived with the ‘psychotic experience’ (the general public).  
These comparisons factored another layer of othering.   Although participants claimed 
strength of character central to learning to accept and live independently with the 
psychotic experience, therefore doing better than those caught up in the mental health 
system, they were at odds to ensure they were seen to remain sympathetic toward this 
group of ‘peers’ ie; to avoid claiming superiority, looking down, judging them.  
Othering directed at the general public emphasised social and individual benefits of 
living with psychotic experiences (an overall positivity), the need to accept it as part 
of the human condition (universalisation) the wisdoms and richness therein, and how 
they were missing out because of fear or ignorance.  However, as with the comparison 
made with peers, participants were careful not to denounce those whom they need a 
continued relationship with - the general public.  To maintain a narrative of 
acceptance and universalisation of the psychotic experience, participants remained 
silent in their everyday social circle, in their condemnation of the public, not wanting 
to be seen to be detached from peers averting speech acts that would contradict their 
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moral positioning and orientation – that of equality and inclusivity.  To outrightly 
condemn the public or to claim superiority toward peers through a comparison of total 
exclusivity would risk a strategy whose aim is to gain public interest and sympathy in 
order to create a discourse in favour of the psychotic experience.    
 
 6.2  Implications for a social movement  
Discourse created by participants indicated they were mindful of public 
interpretations, beliefs and perceptions of psychotic experiences via their desire, or 
more succinctly their discourse orientation toward inclusivity and equality (eg; 
horizontal dimension above) inferring a requirement for social action.  This pointed 
toward a social movement.  Given participants were diverse in their beliefs and 
interpretations of psychotic experiences, with geography also separating them, it was 
apparent they did not come from or belong to a coherent whole, an identifiable group 
or organisation.  However, discursive performances corroborated an interpretative 
community through shared discursive strategies.  The primary strategy oriented 
toward holism, individualism and normalisation claiming civic and human rights, 
constructing a positive message about psychotic experiences appealing for public 
sympathy and a desire to challenge and change the public narrative as informed by the 
meta/grand narratives.  The strategy chosen did not target political, institutional or 
structural power, but highlighted suspect mental health practices that contravened 
individual rights pertaining to autonomy and agency appealing to democratic ideology 
and a shared normative ethics.     
 
However, the strategy chosen represents neoliberal ideals where counter narratives are 
often replayed, adapted and reassembled to preserve a liberalism built on a materiality 
that maintains social hierarchies and inequalities - the status quo and elitism. 
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Neoliberal ideals encourage self-serving behaviours, an individualism, a marketplace 
where self-enhancement is encouraged/realized through the exercise of choice and 
individual fortitude; vis-à-vis autonomy and agency as per strategies applied by the 
interpretative community.  Moreover, a strategy of the interpretative community is to 
create a division of morality between those who live with psychotic experiences and 
those who operate under the meta/grand narratives charged with judging, 
misrepresenting and imposing practices upon those with self-experience.  Given the 
interpretative community adapt a strategy of ‘educating’ the public about the reality of 
psychotic experiences yet choose to remain silent; that they replay neo-liberal ideals 
and distance themselves from all ‘experts’ as traditionally conceived operating under 
the meta/grand narratives it is improbable that they would be successful in their 
intentions.  Firstly, replaying neo-liberal ideals will only serve a system where 
standards of normalisation occurs through the quantification of human performance; 
pitching one individual against another in a competitive environment, highlighting 
risk behaviours that threaten social stability.  Secondly, remaining silent communally 
or publicly will not achieve the social change they aspire.  Thirdly, in distancing 
themselves from all experts operating under the meta/grand narrative’s, assurances to 
the public - that of health and safety associated with psychotic events - may not 
materialise in a world where autonomy and agency can be overridden by a ‘perceived’ 
need for intervention.  It is health and safety concerns that sustains the public 
perception of psychotic experiences and these I argue cannot be ignored.  Notably, a 
significant number of experts - scholars and practitioners - operating under the 
meta/grand narratives have similar concerns raised by the interpretative community 
identified here, concerns that point to a potential to develop a symbiosis of knowledge 
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and expert opinion from a number of sources creating space to construct a culturally 
acceptable narrative sympathetic and accepting of the psychotic experience.   
 
 
 6.3  Blending expertise  
Observed in today’s society are challenges to traditional expertise and 
professionalism.  It is common to find experts involved in all fields of natural 
phenomena referring to the lived experience, the life world of individuals, no longer 
seeking to observe effects, describe impact and provide explanation without 
consultation and facilitating public and/or communal dialogue.  The location of 
knowledge, specifically that directly impacting on health and wellbeing has shifted 
from an aggregated reliance on categorisation and symptomology, based on 
generalised observation imposing explanation and advice, to facilitation of self-
reporting, whilst considering social context of the individual.  This has changed the 
nature of interactions and relationships between a client/patient; public and private 
self, leading to calls for a holistic response to individuals in need.  Deciding 
symptomatology is increasingly augmented by self-reporting where the individual can 
help the practitioner understand the nature of any discomfort and personal meaning 
attached to their experiences.     
 
In the context of mental health, current expertise is challenged, critics pointing to a 
mismatch between self-knowledge, decision making apparatus and interventions that 
are available.  Decision making apparatus has been shown to be anti-democratic in 
favour of vested interests and a ‘psych-elite’, interventions shown to be damaging to 
health, contravening civic and human rights.   A number of scholars and practitioners 
operating under the meta/grand narratives (the other as categorised by the 
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interpretative community) have consistently raised these concerns seeking a holistic 
response and an agenda of social justice to mental health.  Given concerns similarly 
raised by the interpretative community and a growing number of practitioners and 
allied scholars, it may be fruitful to open up spaces for dialogue where these sources 
of knowledge can be combined, synthesised in order to construct a public narrative 
that addresses the issues of wellbeing, health and safety concerning psychotic 
experiences.   A starting point would be to turn to communicative action where a 
willingness to communicate and learn with others is undertaken without resorting to 
power as a means of persuasion.  Here, communicative action is preferred over a 
systems approach and instrumental action, human performance as defined by 
neoliberalism no longer becomes the yard stick with which we should aspire; a culture 
of being is preferred over one of doing.  Finally, even though a reconstructed narrative 
may improve public response to psychotic experiences, it may always be the case that 
the complexity and depth of some individual’s distress is so unmanageable that they 
require ‘caring for’ or ‘caring with’.  Again, communicative action involving 
‘communities of interest’ may be central to a process whereby state sanctioned 
intervention is humanely practiced, redeveloped and warranted.  Here as alluded in the 
literature review Open Dialogue may provide some of the answers including the 
encouragement of Moral Imagination as part of the caring process.  
 
6.4 The rise and fall of new wave social movements 
Considering tensions between individual positioning and collective action, findings 
and discussion as interpreted and presented in this thesis signifies challenges 
increasing numbers of interpretative communities seeking recognition and social 
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change encounter, specifically where: “the increasing importance of individual 
autonomy within networks is centred on the empowered individual’s role in 
enhancing democratic control over the direction that society is taking” (Gillan, 2018, 
p.16 ).  As presented above, the general trajectory society is on is very much in the 
direction of liberalism, diversity, the promotion of individual autonomy and personal 
responsibility (as found in participant discourse).  This presents an ever-changing 
world where individuality raises new levels of social complexity and interpersonal 
demands, where: “The politics of lived spaces” are played out in “Alternative 
spatialities” (Keith and Pile, 2013, p27).  Alternative spatialities can materialise in a 
variety of spaces (eg; virtual or actual) where subjectivities are facilitated, where 
action can be expressed through and/or restricted to collective intent as revealed 
through the orientation of participant discourse where the desire for social change 
toward the psychotic experience was expressed, not actioned.  Kraus (2012) observes 
that “Social phenomena are not simply constituted by the subjective meanings agents 
assign to them. They are also objective facts in the sense they are constituents of 
social reality which can coerce agents into adapting their behaviour”, (Kraus, 2012, 
p347).  Spatialities, where intentionality occurs, in particular that which involves an 
increasing need for subjective interpretation and the facilitation of personalised 
meaning making, motivates individuals to believe that social change is possible, even 
imminent.  It is this belief that I think participants of this thesis hold on to, with their 
behaviours adapted to wider democratic ideals and principles through which they 
assert their rights and protect their identity.  Added to this social reality is temporality, 
where protest becomes progressively fluid, rising and falling, coming and going, 
appearing and reappearing; periodic (McDonald, 2002; McDonald, 2004; Gillan, 
2018; Poell, 2019).  The collective identity, the extent of ’we-ness’ traditionally 
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associated with social movements has been transformed by a “new order of life 
movements” (Blumer, 1995), where “experiences of oneself” becomes the focal point 
and social movements become “experience movements” accentuating “experiences of 
difference” (McDonald, 2004).  The difficulty for modern social movements in 
accentuating experiences of difference, highlighted through discourses created by the 
interpretative community identified here, is the difficulty in establishing 
representation (what, who?) and agreeing a strategy (why, how, where?) resulting in 
collective action.  I argue that these constituent parts are required to achieve structural 
transformation of mental health systems for the benefit of those within and without 
the institutions dominated by the meta/grand narratives.   
 
The silence chosen(?) by participants serves to protect the subjective from an overly 
inquisitive public, but also from intrusive forces that maintains a disapproving 
message about the psychotic experience.  MacClure et al, (2010) describe such silence 
as: “an impediment to analysis or the emergence of an authentic voice” (p492).  
Similarly, Scambler and Kelleher (2007); Kaun and Treré (2018) point out that silence 
can be a form of resistance creating a layer of protectionism from “excessive 
intrusions” where decolonization through silent ownership over life worlds can be 
achieved.  Barranquero (2013) and Pink (2008) describe comparable acts of resistance 
involving ‘disconnection’ from a rapidly changing temporal capitalism, where 
alternative platforms of ubiquitous communication and connectivity are being created.  
Silence and disconnection can therefore operate as a form of power and resistance ie; 
strategies of indifference, disengagement and denunciation of meta/grand narratives 
potentially enabling the individual to live outside/beyond the gaze of what is 
perceived as systems of control.  In considering these observations though, I remain of 
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the opinion that participant’s orientation is compromised and found wanting if social 
change, as revealed through their orientation, is to be achieved.  That said, there may 
be hope for these ‘new wave’ social movements.  
  
In ‘modern times’ social movements may appear to be more erratic or episodic; driven 
by an individualism struggling to achieve collective transformations lacking 
representation and strategic direction.  People that find themselves socially oppressed 
or persecuted through systems of classification typically have a consistent narrative, 
repeated throughout their history.  The ‘survivor movement’, the ‘anti-psychiatry 
movement’, groups opposed to a biological reductionism and deficit models that 
threatens the dignity and identity of those judged inferior (the psychiatrically unwell) 
has maintained a message of liberalism and human rights, highlighting inhumane 
practices and a paternalistic view of persons living with extreme states of mind, body, 
spirit.  Perhaps the interpretative community, through its collective intentions will 
eventually locate a moment in history when spatialities and temporality collide; an 
optimum time when they will find a public receptive to the psychotic experience 
accepting its rightful place in human experience.  I maintain though that the 
spatialities and temporality found, created, discovered should welcome in and engage 
the practitioners and allied scholars equally critical of the meta/grand narratives, 
associated practices and representations that belie the psychotic experience.  As things 
stand though, relying solely on “experiences of difference” as a basis for 
interpretation and representation risks fragmentation where the modelling of a 
“democratic way of self-organisation and action” is arduous and difficult to achieve 
(Sapouna and Gijbels, 2016, p401).   Explicit, visible acts of resistance and activism is 
wanting, as is a consensual message that might shift public discourse and institutional 
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response from one of rejection and social isolation to one that accepts the psychotic 
experience as a humanly shared event.  
 
6.5  Limitations and ‘Real-world Contribution  
Limitations, including shortcomings in design and ‘real-world’ impact are common in 
research.  Below I comment on a number of limitations of this study hoping they may 
help others interested in taking a similar route in researching discourses on psychotic 
experiences and mental health in general.  
 
Firstly, discourse analysis as a research methodology errs toward deconstruction of 
language where alternative knowledges can be drawn out potentially influencing 
associated practices (Georgaca, 2014).  Correspondently, Harper (2006) puts it that 
discourse analysis is pretty much ineffective in transforming established interventions 
with Breeze (2011) pointing out that discourse analysis has been described as an 
“intellectual orthodoxy”.  The outcome of this thesis could be framed in similar terms 
where discourses presented by participants could be perceived as being subject to an 
overly critical methodology with no benefit for persons living with psychotic 
experiences, or indeed other stakeholders interested in psychotic experiences and 
mental health in general.  I would acknowledge anyone coming to this conclusion.  
However, equally I would point out that this thesis was necessarily exploratory in 
nature.  I did not start out with a hypothetical or theoretical question to be answered or 
to find resolution or solution to a specific problem.  I have however, successfully 
linked findings with real-world implications that can influence common responses and 
practices toward the psychotic experience.      
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As already stated throughout this thesis, discourse, contrary to what others might 
believe, is never complete, fixed or secure in its totality.  Discourses are full of 
contradictions, compromises, inconsistencies, nuanced and fluid.  By revealing 
limitations, found in participant discourse, revealed through their ideological 
dilemmas, positioning and orientation I have opened windows of consciousness to 
distal forces, that work against their desire through their orientation to find universal 
acceptance of the psychotic experience.  In revealing these limitations, I am able to 
bring real-world structural challenges to this interpretative community encouraging 
collective reflexivity and synthesis of knowledge that I believe would find social 
purchase at the level they are pitching their discourse.   Further, struggles of identity 
at the discourse level encourages practitioners to consider the impact of categorisation 
on persons subjected to labels and to appreciate their psychological, emotional and 
behavioural impact.  It should be no surprise then that resistance to categorisations 
and associated deficit models of psychosis exists (the meta/grand narrative), present in 
certain speech acts and response behaviours such as resistance to and avoidance of 
services (Brett et al, 2014).  It is the experience of identity threat, as revealed in 
participant discourse, that those working within the meta/grand narratives need to 
acknowledge, accept and understand if they want to develop and maintain meaningful 
working relationships.  Brett et al (2014) recommend that approaches toward 
‘troubled’ populations with psychotic experiences include “normalizing and 
validating contexts in which psychotic experiences can be accepted … rather than 
attempting to control them … less stigmatising” (p213)   
 
In summary, contrary to criticisms from Harper (2006) and Breeze (2011) above I 
argue that given the real-world impact of meta- discourses on person’s identity and 
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subsequent behavioural responses discourse analysis and in particular this thesis has 
real-world value raising awareness of direct consequences and conflictual relations   
influencing associated practices (public and institutional), toward psychotic 
experiences (Georgaca, 2014).  In drawing attention toward real-world impact and 
effects of discourse produced by the meta/grand narratives on persons living with 
psychotic experiences, it is possible to influence and change the way the public and 
authoritative forces frame their understanding of psychotic experiences, in turn 
respond more positively to individuals living with these experiences.  The real-world 
impact of these discourses and potential to generate conditions where responses are 
affirmative and accepting toward the psychotic experience highlights the distinct 
contribution of this thesis.  Lastly, referring back to the introduction of this thesis, 
there has to date been few qualitative studies carried out on people living with 
psychotic experiences outside/beyond statutory mental health systems.  This 
particularly applies to Ireland as a potential site for further research in this area.  This 
is a gap in knowledge, potentially lucrative in forming a deeper understanding of how 
people with what is understood as a troubling or troubled experience can and do live 
successfully with them.  The direct impact of this thesis emanating from its unique 
contribution to knowledge pertaining to psychotic experiences is presented below in 
the list of recommendations.  
           
6.6 Recommendations   
A common response to recommendations arising from discourse analysis studies is to 
approach with “extreme caution” (eg; Farrelya, 2015).   Renkl (2013), whilst 
acknowledging such reservations refers to discourse analysis studies that are 
practically grounded - “use inspired”.   Renkl warns against discourse studies that 
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present general sweeping recommendations proposing that they should be modest and 
legitimate.  I believe that the recommendations below are both realistic and legitimate, 
applicable to practices and social responses to psychotic experiences.  I put it that this 
transcends criticisms that discourse analysis is merely an intellectual orthodoxy with 
little inference toward established structures of power.  The recommendations speak 
to social dimensions, of dialogue, culture and education with research implications.  
 
6.6.1 Finding a common language through dialogue 
As a provocative and deliberative social object, it is difficult to find a common 
language on psychotic experiences that enables the creation of an interpretative 
framework that captures, reflects and satisfies the myriad of groups and persons that 
have a direct interest in the lives who live with this experience.  As noted at various 
junctures of this thesis there is ample evidence that one of the most notable sources of 
discomfort, disquiet and mistrust among persons with psychotic experiences is the 
interpretative power bequeathed to established groups of mental health experts, taken 
up and reflected back at micro and macro levels.   
 
The need for a common language involving all ‘stakeholders’ may never satisfy all 
interested parties but space to enter into dialogue where the interpretative power of the 
meta/grand narrative, its direct impact on the people it captures and defines is openly 
discussed, deliberated, and confronted is a worthy exercise.  Finding a universal 
language where an agreed humanity is attached to psychotic experiences becomes 
familiar, established and socially accepted is possible to achieve.  There are dialogue 
groups established in Ireland that take place in community settings primarily made up 
of persons with self-experience, carers/family members and mental health 
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professionals.  These Trialogue meetings address issues of concern, chosen for 
discussion and deliberated on (see Mental Health Trialogue Network Ireland: 
www.trialogue.co; https://www.facebook.com/pages/category/Community/Mental-
Health-Trialogue-Network-Ireland-107425315996430/).  Studying differences and 
any shift in language that takes place at these informal settings can be captured and its 
underlying meaning analysed through linguistic methodologies.  Here it is possible to 
identify avenues where institutional and by default public response to psychotic 
experiences can be transformed as a direct consequence of the function of dialogue 
groups.  Where formal decision making is removed, as occurs in the Trialogue groups, 
Schiffman (2001) suggests “informal consensus” can be achieved where “people are 
making adjustments in their habits and tailoring their linguistic production to their 
perceptions of what their hearers/interlocutors want to hear”.   Adjustments at the 
linguistic level and newly formed habits in response formation are often made 
unconsciously with a naturalisation of a new ‘spoken norm’ being established, 
“retrospectively, after it happens”.  Studying the development of discourses that occur 
through a collective and naturalising linguistic process could potentially lead to the 
identification of an underlying consensus as to a ‘spoken norm’ toward the psychotic 
experience.  The establishment of a spoken norm through corroboration and 
consensus could ultimately determine better ways of describing and framing psychotic 
experiences, enable and improve practices and public responses.     
 
6.6.2 The role of Culture 
Cultural environments can influence social responses to psychotic experiences, as 
presented in Chapter 2 (2.17 and 2.18) where some are found to be more inviting and 
facilitative than others.  As pointed out culture has a bearing on those with self-
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experience, specifically their ability to cope and relate with psychotic experiences.  
This includes the availability of social reference points from which persons living 
with psychotic experiences who live outside/beyond state services or institutional care 
attach their experiences to, such as cultural symbols and spiritual outlets.  Cultural 
comparison research into non-clinical populations living with psychotic experiences 
tends to focus on frequencies, variances and outcomes as accounted through 
categorisations and epidemiological measures (see for example Vermeiden et al, 
2019).  Findings from these studies seem to result in pessimistic outcomes for those 
who satisfy thresholds of inadequacy and distress as judged by the chosen 
measurements.  This perpetuates the deficit models, vis-à-vis meta/grand narrative, 
with little or no room for optimism for those who live with considerable and enduring 
psychotic experiences. Narratives involving positive meaning making systems are 
worth studying where successful coping is captured from a first-person perspective 
linked with cultural symbols and spiritual conduits (ie; the availability of 
environments where non-material explanations can be facilitated).  Cultural 
backdrops, symbols and non-material interpretations may have a role in helping 
people who first encounter psychotic experiences.  An overly rationalised 
interpretation of psychotic experiences fixed to a material world leaves those with 
first time experience of psychotic events in a vacuum, deprived of a social reference 
point from which they can initially make sense of and/or anchor their experiences to, 
leaving feelings of mistrust and abandonment.  Exploring the availability and effects 
of symbols and cultural conduits may help people find meaningful reference points to 
their psychotic experiences at first point of experience allowing for a more positive 
and socially beneficial narrative to expand into various social and communal settings.  
Lessons derived from studying the potential impact of symbols and non-material 
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representations and interpretations across cultures, found in participant narratives 
could expand into the practices directly and indirectly involved with the meta/grand 
narratives.       
 
6.6.3 Education for mental health professionals and services          
In order to maximise the likelihood of achieving an empathetic response to those they 
seek to help and support, health professionals should be committed to life-long 
learning and open to new ways of ‘seeing’.  One of the areas specific to mental health, 
highlighted in this thesis, where practitioners are particularly challenged, is 
understanding and appreciating the position taken up by persons with significant 
mental health problems who refuse or decide not to engage with services (Henshaw 
and Freedman‐Doan, 2009; Dixon, Holoshhitz and Nossei, 2016).  Disengagement, 
refusal and service avoidance is often taken by practitioners as part of an underlying 
pathology such as lack of insight and elevated suspicion/paranoia (see for example 
Smith et al, 2013).  Stigma surrounding mental health, service use and prescribing of 
psychiatric medications is understood as a factor in disengagement, refusal and 
service avoidance (Wagstaff, Graham and Salkeld, 2018).  However, the level of 
identity threat experienced by mental health service users and potential users of 
services goes underappreciated.  For many, receiving a psychiatric diagnosis implies a 
major flaw in character, receiving psychiatric medications taken as further 
confirmation - an attempt to correct their personality.  Additional to generalised 
experience of stigma and complexities of experiencing psychotic events as 
highlighted by Wagstaff, Graham and Salkeld (2018); Smith et al, (2013),  
disengagement, refusal and service avoidance needs to be taken as reasonable acts of 
resistance in order to protect identity.  This needs to be understood, acknowledged and 
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acted on if services are to be more effective and ‘successful’ when offering their 
support to those who may need it.  The response form services to disengagement or 
refusal often involves coercion or force which leads to increased distance and mistrust 
between service user, or potential service user, and practitioner.  Considering the 
depths of disenfranchisement experienced by service users and potential users of 
mental health services highlighted here it is recommended that practices and strategies 
of engagement address the impact of diagnoses and medical intervention at the level 
of identity.  Improvements in practices, engagement and offering of services could be 
developed through consensus applying methods of research, facilitation of dialogue 
groups or both.      
 
Finally, what this study demonstrates is the extent of social influence, the level of 
authority bequeathed to the meta/grand narrative and its direct effects on the lives of 
persons living with psychotic experiences. The history of the meta/grand narrative and 
how it came to establish itself involves the construction of a reality through a 
discourse of public concern, attached to health and safety removing psychotic 
experiences from rational human activity.  The words, descriptions and interpretations 
as presented by the meta/grand narrative filters down into a broad social conscience, 
influences public response and institutional practices toward the psychotic experience.  
This has led to social shaming, the effects of which has been shown to silence the 
people it purports to represent.  Nevertheless, there are a number of factors that might 
have worked in favour of this cohort helping them move beyond the shaming effects 
of the meta/grand narrative.   
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On pages 151 and 152 I describe the age range of this cohort of research participants 
as significant (middle to old age) indicating depth and breadth of lived experience 
over significant lengths of time.  To add to their depth and breadth of lived experience 
I combine the extent of knowledge specific to psychotic experiences and mental 
health in general.  The extent of this knowledge is borne out of discourses created at 
interview, particularly in relation to the meta/grand narrative with, having reflected on 
conversations once each interview concluded, the level of education and professional 
qualifications that a number of participants had achieved.   Although not part of data 
collection, I learnt that at least close to two thirds of participants were highly educated 
with a minimum of two completing PhDs, three up to master’s degree (with one of 
those conducting their own PhD study) and several up to bachelor’s degree level.  
Several had professional qualifications, including paediatric nursing and qualifications 
derived from psychotherapy training programmes.   Add to this persuasive levels of 
self-belief that participants are successfully living with psychotic experiences 
(evidence endorsing this belief can be found page 140, Participant Criteria), that they 
belong to the general population (p12) and appear to have found social spaces and 
other dimensions (eg; spiritual) to attach their experience to it is easy to conclude that 
this is a group of people who feel empowered and are not affected by the shaming 
effects of the meta/grand narrative.  However, even among a group of persons who 
present as articulate, vocal, well informed, empowered and socially active (research 
participants), silence becomes the primary response and means of resistance toward 
the meta/grand narrative highlighting the level of influence and authoritative effect on 
social convention.   
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All is not lost though.  If history has taught us anything, social transformation 
including changes to public response and cultural arrangements can occur through the 
creation of an evolving narrative and/or shift in discourse.  Equally then, the findings 
and recommendations as presented above can translate into the world of human 
response to social objects leading to social change including acceptance and 
facilitation of the psychotic experience at a public level in turn transforming 
institutional and practice arrangements as conventionally consummated.  Discourse 
analysis does tend to separate language from practice but it also “tries to find causal 
relations in the use of language and the influence on practice” (Metze and Brink, 
2006, p1).  I therefore hold that the recommendations as presented above and 
discourse studies in general can create meaningful change to a culturally formed 
response to a commonly shared human experience.            
 
 6.7  Epilogue  
I am taking the opportunity as part of overall reflexivity to state some of my anxieties 
and personal struggles whilst carrying out this thesis.  I am also taking this 
opportunity to express some observations that may be interpreted as additional 
recommendations which I think best put in a personally reflexive manner.     
  
Conducting this thesis has affected my own world view and created certain challenges 
and discomforts over the journey.  There has been a genuine emotional and physical 
impact, pushing me back against personal inclinations and support I feel toward the 
positioning, orientations and intentions of the interpretative community identified 
herewith.  I still concur with the interpretative community’s call for universal 
validation, positive and optimistic narratives in favour of the psychotic experience in 
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order to transform public response and discourse, yet have been left with several 
questions, conundrums, dilemmas.     
  
As stated in chapter 3, I identify with what is sometimes called the ‘survivor 
movement’, a movement of persons who claim that psychiatric services and 
psychiatric practices have damaged individuals who require or seek support during, 
for want of words, ‘emotional and psychological crisis’; a movement that seeks an 
appropriate societal response including justice for such persons.  The support that 
many believe is required for persons experiencing such a crisis is at the most basic 
human level, of kindness; genuine authentic listening, non-judgmental empathetic 
responses with a holistic, accepting corroborative programme of care implemented to 
dispose of non-consensual interventions.  This has been and remains my principled, 
values base position; one that I believe aligns with text created by participants of this 
study.   
  
For many, psychiatric services threaten individual autonomy, the right to choose and 
meaningfully participate in care and treatment by denying informed consent, 
misinform service users and withhold or misuse essential information on many, if not 
all psychiatric treatments.  Paternalistic, non-consensual and alienating practices 
erodes self-belief, isolating the individual from meaningful human interaction, 
estrangement and deference where they become strangers to their own narrative.  It is 
not so much the individuals working within the mental health system that is the target 
for change, but the system with which they work under.  Stories of maltreatment are 
well documented, and I have certainly heard enough of them to believe that things 
should and can change with determination and the presentation of an ‘obvious truth’ 
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that takes hold of the public imagination altering opinions and responses.  I am 
therefore sympathetic toward the ‘cause’ and remain committed, though have stepped 
back over the years whilst completing this thesis where personal reflection and 
challenges to my world view has taken place.    
  
During analysis, I was particularly anxious that what I was uncovering was incorrect, 
over critical, even unacceptable; ‘letting the side down’.  I have never questioned the 
positive storying of how people have managed to successfully live with, integrate, 
create confident and constructive meaning about their psychotic experiences and that 
this occurs on a daily basis.  Perhaps though, given the methodology chosen, this 
thesis was never going to enforce this positive message and allow positive storying to 
unfold as appears in various forums, in other literature.  It took a while to accept the 
fact that the main issue being addressed through the methodology chosen for this 
study is to critically examine the ability of such narratives, ‘alternative truths’, certain 
ways to talk about psychotic experiences to change public discourse under social 
conditions they currently exist.  In hindsight, it should have come as no surprise that 
given the endurance and longevity of the meta/grand narratives, replacing or 
overthrowing its’ hold’ on public discourse would be more complex and more 
difficult than imagined.  Certainly. I never fully appreciated the wider public 
conditions that allow the meta/grand narrative to continue to dominate.  I believe that 
allowing the positive narratives of psychotic experiences to flourish, to ascertain their 
usefulness, their potential to constructively guide or inspire others, their utility in 
transforming mental health systems is for another methodology, for another day.  
Perhaps the interpretative community could consider conducting a study that would 
represent the specific lessons derived from these life journeys (in particular the life 
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worlds and alternate meaning created) for the benefit of peers or service providers, or 
indeed join forces with academic institutions to co-produce such an endeavour?    
 
Given the level of diversity and disposition toward inclusivity expressed in today’s 
society (at least at the surface), the individual nature with which participants presented 
their stories should be expected.  The diversity of life stories however became 
problematic in identifying a pattern of talk that achieved consistent levels to enable a 
coherent discourse of ‘coping’/living with the psychotic experience that could 
represent a new or alternative way of talking about this human state.  I was left feeling 
frustrated as my desire to find this pattern of talk was consistently confounded by the 
chosen methodology.      
 
My discomfort was most intense whilst analysing text and preparing findings.  I was 
particularly uncomfortable noting and highlighting compromises, even contradictions, 
of the struggle’s participants were experiencing in creating a holistic view of 
psychotic experiences, squaring the world of mind, body, spirit.  Given the 
revolutionary nature of discussions I have participated in with peers over the years, 
the tendency of participants to resort to silence was a phenomenon that stood out for 
me.  Indeed, this was exemplified in narratives that dissolved at a point where causal 
links with their psychotic experiences might have been confirmed.  For instance, a 
number of participants shared experiences of trauma and neglect at which point they 
shifted focus talking about previous lives at different points of history, of spiritual and 
cosmic dimensions to their experiences.  I could theorize or hypothesise that they 
were defensive, avoiding talking about such deeply embedded experiences, that this 
was ‘proof’ that there is an underlying link between past traumas and hardships 
leading to the existence of psychotic experiences.  However, that would be looking 
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beyond the text, potentially leading to the inclusion of psychodynamic measures to the 
methodology (eg; unconscious conflicts, ego defence etc). Perhaps allowing the world 
of ‘observable’ causative effects to creep in was to be avoided as this would be too 
close to the objective measures directly linked with the material world applied by the 
meta/grand narratives in confirming diagnoses, cognitive defects?  I am unable to 
confirm.  
  
That said, the discourse created during interview appears to me to err toward anti-
establishment.  This has left me with another conundrum that could only be answered 
by the interpretative community.   Is there a suggestion for a total disentanglement of 
state led services for persons with (problematic) psychotic experiences, pushing for a 
total overhaul, an alternative through communal led responses where funding is given 
over to independent community driven services?  Or is there a suggestion for more 
input or control over state-led services?  Indeed, is this the wrong choice of questions 
in the first place? This is not entirely clear.    
 
Related to this final question is the context of my employment over the duration of 
this thesis.  I work full time as a ‘training officer’ often delivering peer-led courses on 
self-advocacy to groups of mental health service users.  Their lives as I see it are 
wrapped up in the meta/grand narratives, dependent upon statutory services.  Some 
have complex needs, including an assortment of psychotic experiences, intellectual 
difficulties, brain trauma, drug and alcohol addiction.  This has left me with another 
conundrum that could only be answered through dialogue with the interpretative 
community.  If the current mental health establishment is to be replaced, how do we 
(the interpretative community) constructively and empathetically deliver and inspire a 
new service, a new discourse to this group?  How do we inspire local communities to 
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embrace and become meaningfully involved in these services?  One thing constantly 
on my mind is that the cohort of people who continue with statutory mental health 
services cannot be left behind as we strive to drive forward.  I remain ambiguous to 
addressing their needs but remain optimistic to meeting the challenges.    
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Appendix A  
Interview Schedule  
1. Could you tell me about your psychotic like experiences (you may use other 
terminology or words to describe these eg; extraordinary experiences; unusual 
beliefs etc).  
2. Can you remember when you began to have these experiences?  
3. What sense of/what meaning do you attach to these experiences?  
4. (How) has your understanding of these experiences changed over time?  
5. What would you say are the most significant influences on any change in 
understanding of these experiences were/are?   
6. To summarise - you have described your experiences in spiritual terms; 
explained beyond the material body?  What would you say to someone  
 
who has similar (psychotic like) experiences to yourself, but their explanation 
is biological, and genetic and that they are happy to take medications?  
*The above(question 6)  is an example of an ‘alternative’ or  
‘problematic’ view on participants representation presented nearing the end of 
the interview creating a “Confrontative arena” (as per Interviews, Chapter 3).   
7. Have you anything else to add or ask?          
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Appendix B  
Ethics approval, Dublin City University (2011)  
Dublin City University  DC  
Ollscoil Chathair Bhaiie Ätha Cliath  
Dr. Liam MacGabhann, School of Nursing  
 
 
16th March 2012  
 REC Reference:  DCUREC/2012/060  
 Proposal Title:  A discourse analyses of people living with Psychotic like  
Experiences in Ireland.  Coping and relating.  
 Applicants:  Dr. Liam MacGabhann, Prof. Chris Stevenson, Mr. Jim  
Walsh  
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Dear Liam,  
Further to review, the DCU Research Ethics Committee approves the 
changes made to this research proposal. Materials used to recruit 
participants should note that ethical approval for this project has been 
obtained from the Dublin City University Research Ethics 
Committee. Should further substantial modifications to the research 
protocol be required at a later stage, a further submission should be 
made to the REC.  
Yours sincerely,  
  
Dr. Donal re'Mathuna  
Chair  
DCU Research Ethics Committee  
 
Offic 
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Appendix C  
Recruitment Flier  
A discourse analyses of people living with Psychotic like Experiences in Ireland.  
Coping and relating.   
Do you see, hear or feel things that no-one else does? Hold personal beliefs that others might judge as 
unusual; find hard to believe or hard to accept? Experience levels of suspicion of living things 
(including people) or objects in the world, so much so that it impacts on your relationship with 
others?  If so, you are invited to engage in a study designed to increase understanding of these 
experiences - sometimes labelled psychosis or psychotic like experiences.    
  
The research is part of PhD study conducted by the School of Nursing and Human Sciences, Dublin City 
University.  The questions below will help you decide if you can take part in the study.  
     
1. Are you aged 18 to 65 years old?  
2. Would you be willing to share some examples of your psychotic like experiences with the 
researcher?    
3. Have you experienced something similar to the above occurrences and live with these without 
professional support from statutory psychiatric services?   
4. Do you feel confident that you have lived successfully with these experiences?  
  
If you answer yes to each of the above would you be willing to engage with this study?  
How do I volunteer to take part?    
Use the contact details below where you will be expected to leave a phone number and date/time 
when you are available to discuss the study.  The researcher, who has a lived history of mental health 
problems and has learnt to deal with these, will then get back to you as soon as possible.  During the 
telephone conversation he will ask some questions to help decide who can take part in the first stage 
of the research.  
         Anonymity and confidentiality assured.    
Ethical approval has been granted by Dublin City University Ethics committee   
Tel: 0851526581                                      Email: james.walsh49@mail.dcu.ie  
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Appendix D  
List of organisations and networks for recruitment  
Organisational and individual networks that the researcher approached and has formal 
relationships  
   
Organisation  Website  Business  






An advocacy service  
providing  peer  
advocacy to people 
with mental health 
problems throughout  
Ireland.    
2. SHINE  http://www.shineonline.ie/  A  nation  wide  
voluntary organisation 
providing support and 
advice primarily to 
people with ‘enduring 
mental illness’.    
3.  GROW  
Ireland  
http://www.grow.ie/  A  mutual  help  
organisation  
supporting people 
with mental health  
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  problems on 
their journey 
toward  
recovery.    
 4.  Hearing  
Voices Ireland  
http://www.voicesireland.com/Home.htm  
 
Hearing Voices Ireland also has an active Facebook 









experience.     
 5.   
National  
Service User  
Executive   







 by  the 
HSE,  
established to 







services at a 
national level.     
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http://www.amnesty.ie/content/workingpartnership  A group of 10 
people with 
experience of  








human rights   
campaign for 
people with 
mental health  
problems in 
Ireland.   




CVN also has an active Facebook Page linked to 
their main webpage. 
 
Established as 
an online forum 
to allow space 
for critical 
voices of mental  
health services to 
be heard and 
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Appendix E 
Telephone interview schedule  
1. Age?  
2. Gender?  
3. Approximately how long and roughly how often have you/do you experience Psychotic  
Like Experiences?  
4. Have you ever discussed these experiences with a health professional?  
If no, go to question 7  
5. If yes please explain:  
  
a) How long did you engage with these services?  
  
b) When was the last time you engaged these services?   
  
  
7. Have you ever been treated for drug or alcohol problems?  
8. Have you ever experienced head injury, brain trauma or been treated for a brain tumour?  
9. Have you been diagnosed with any disease that may cause Psychotic Like Experiences?   
For example:  Epilepsy, malaria, hypoglycaemia, etc…  
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Appendix F 
1.   
 
  
Jim Walsh  
School of Nursing  
Dublin City University   
Whitehall  
 
Dublin 9  
  
28th April 2012.  
  
Dear Jim,  
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Re:  A discourse analyses of people living 
with psychotic like experiences in Ireland.  
Coping and Relating.  
  
Thank you for your email regarding support for individuals taking part in your Phd.  I am 
happy to confirm that Claire Hawkes and Susan McFeely are available to provide this. If you 
would like to discuss the detail please give Claire or Susan a ring.  We currently have no 
waiting list so individuals will have good access should they need it.    
Please note that since January lst we have placed a charge on counselling.  
Very best of luck with the work.  
Yours sincerely  
______________  
 
Patricia Seager,    
 













The HSE National Counselling Service welcomes calls from adults 
who have experienced abuse in childhood.  Contact details are as 
follows:   
   
The HSE National Counselling Service welcomes calls from adults who have 
experienced abuse and trauma in childhood. Contact details are as follows:  
  
HSE Area Freephone Number  
HSE Dublin North East (North Dublin & Meath)1800 234 110  
HSE Dublin North East (Navan, Cavan, Louth & Monaghan) 1800 234 117  
HSE Dublin Mid-Leinster (South Dublin, East Wicklow) 1800 234 111  
HSE Dublin Mid-Leinster (West Dublin, West Wicklow & Kildare 1800 234 112  
HSE Dublin Mid-Leinster (Laois, Offaly, Longford & Westmeath) 1800 234 113  
 
HSE West (Galway, Mayo & Roscommon) 1800 234 114  
HSE West (Limerick, Clare & North Tipperary) 1800 234 115  
HSE West (Donegal, Leitrim, Sligo)  1800 234 119  
HSE South (Waterford, Wexford,Kilkenny, Carlow and South Tipperary) 1800  
234 118  
HSE South (Cork & Kerry) 1800 234 116  
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3. Misc supports  
  
Samaritans 1850 609090  
  
AKOS (Healthy Living Centre) School of Nursing, Dublin City University - 01  
700 7171   
  
SHINE counselling service - 01 860 1620 (note; there is a small cost to this service)  
  
Aware Defeat Depression Help Line - 1890 303 302 (10am – 7pm)  
  
GROW help line - 1890 474 474  
HeadsUp text service is (run by RehabCare) Text the word HeadsUp to  
50424  
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Appendix G  
Consent form  
Consent form - questionnaires  
Dear participant, in order to ensure you consent to taking part in this study you are asked 
to complete and sign this consent form and will be invited to partake in completing two 
questionnaires.  This should last between 30 – 40 minutes.  If you choose to withdraw at 
any time in the study process you will be supported in this decision and will be given equal 
access to information and support services.  The researcher may ask to meet you for a 
follow up interview to clarify information that you have shared.     
  
Participant Confirmation:  
(Please answer each question)  
 Have you read or had read to you the Information Sheet?      
   Yes/No  
Do you understand the information provided to you?                   
Yes/No  
Have you had any opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study?  
   Yes/No  
 Have you received satisfactory answers to your questions?      
   Yes/No   
 Are you agreeable to having your interview recorded?        
   Yes/No  
    
Participant Signature:  
I have read and understood the information in this form and the attached 
information sheet.  My questions have been adequately answered by the researcher 
and I have a copy of the consent form.  Therefore, I consent to participate in this 
research project.  
  
  
Participants Signature:  
______________________________________________  
  






Date:  _________________________________________________________   
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Appendix H 
 
Example of analysis 
 
Below I present three abstracts from three separate participants.  These have particular 
functions leading to consequences, indicating overall participant orientation of their 
discourse.  The below also demonstrates the interrelatedness of text constructed at 
interview colour coded to illustrate ‘themed’ textual strategies.  helping when taking 
context into question.     
  
- P 8 - I really believe we’re moving into a place in the world (.) where we all have to 
claim our own power and (.) it’s not enough to go through the priest (10, the pastor 
(1), the rabbi (1), the minister(1), we need to take our own responsibility for our own 
holistic health which includes the spiritual health 
 
- P 7 – So you’re not getting the information from outside (1), you get the information 
from your own inner wisdom (.) but I don’t believe your own inner wisdom just 
lands here. 
 
- P9 - I think that everybody can heal themselves and everybody knows what to do in 
situations (.) and anybody who judges what somebody does in a situation has never 
been in it. Because you have no idea (1) don’t need anyone outside myself. Because 
I feel I have reached a connection with a higher power that has guided me this whole 
way   
 
Demonstrates strong commitment, assertion of beliefs through thoughts, feelings and 
inclinations.  Responsibility for own wellbeing.  
The subjective as a source of ‘wisdom’ beyond other sources, not to be questioned. 
Questions sources that relate to convention.       
 
Overall orientation denotes non-material/non-physical aspects to health and wellbeing 
and by association psychotic experiences?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
